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Many scholars have argued the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM)’s principal 
contribution was as an intellectual/student movement, and its main shortcoming the limited 
degree of active political and military opposition it was able to offer the apartheid regime.  
My dissertation, ‘Uncovering Hidden Fronts of Africa’s Liberation Struggle: Black Power, 
Black Consciousness, and South Africa’s Armed Struggle, 1967-1985’, broadens our 
understanding of this movement and moment in South African history by unearthing the 
little known history of BCM’s unrelenting engagement with armed struggle as a form of 
resistance to apartheid rule during the 1970s and 1980s.     
The first part of my dissertation charts the evolution of Black Consciousness (BC) 
inspired organisations such as the Azanian People’s Liberation Front (APLF), the 
Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort (IRE), and the South African Youth Revolutionary 
Council (SAYRCO) from 1974-1982 as they organised for armed confrontation with the 
apartheid state.  It then moves to a discussion of the Black Consciousness Movement of 
Azania (BCMA) and its armed wing the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA) 
that emerged in the 1980s as the BC alternative to the non-racialist nominally socialist 
African National Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA) after previous movements failed to 
consolidate themselves.  Their failures are less important than examinations of why they 
failed, which reveals their struggles were mostly caused by BCM being outmanoeuvred 
and betrayed by the ANC-SA and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in exile.   
The second part of my dissertation excavates how many new recruits of the Soweto 
generation attempted to radicalize Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) from within.  While this is 
acknowledged by most MK scholars, they do not link this drive for radicalization with the 
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politics of BC that a number of these recruits carried with them into the movement.  From 
this perspective, the mutinies and internal suppressions that wracked MK during the 1980s 
need to be viewed as an internal ideological struggle for what the future of South Africa 
would look like. 
Although my work offers a careful historical reconstruction of previously under-
explored events, my thesis suggests BCM’s vision of a future South Africa/Azania, where 
land and resources would be redistributed to the masses, was outmanoeuvred and defeated 
by bourgeois liberal-democratic and South African Communist Party (SACP) forces of the 
ANC-SA.  Returning to this history helps frame contemporary struggles South Africa finds 
itself in as current movements strive to find answers to continued racism and economic 
inequality.  While BC did not have all the answers, it offered a different vision of freedom 












This dissertation is dedicated first and foremost to the working people who fought and continue 
to fight for the liberation of the Pan-African world from racial capitalism and all its 
institutions.  It is also dedicated to my parents and grandparents/aunts who were unable to 
receive a PhD given the racist and sexist nature of the societies in which they lived.  Lastly, this 
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Introduction: South Africa’s Armed Struggle, Black Power, and Black 
Consciousness 
‘Taking up arms for the freedom and the political 
unification of Africa is the final crystallisation of serious 
study of the oppressed and the oppressor’.1 
 
Black Consciousness and Armed Struggle: A New Research Agenda 
During the 1970s the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), essentially the un-
identical twin of the US Black Power Movement in South Africa, had grown to become 
one of the principal vehicles for Black opposition to apartheid rule in South Africa.  With 
the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA) and Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) suffering from state suppression, military defeats in the 1960s, and heavy scepticism 
in the diplomatic community, Black South Africans turned to a new group of activists like 
Steve Biko, Bokwe Mafuna, Deborah Matshoba, Thenjiwe Mtintso, Harry Nengwekhulu 
and a multitude of other BCM activists for political leadership.  Despite this, a host of 
scholars and ANC-SA activists have sought to negate BCM’s impact by arguing its 
principal contribution was as an intellectual movement, and its main shortcoming the 
limited degree of active political and military opposition it was able to offer.  Within the 
growing Black Consciousness (BC) literature efforts to disrupt this narrative have sought 
to understand the political/community projects the movement built, explore its 
contributions to Black art and culture, expand our understanding of its student activism, 
and track its current socio-economic reverberations in post-apartheid South Africa.  This 
dissertation adds to this literature by exploring BCM’s little researched but nonetheless 
                                                          
1 K. Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution 
(London, Panaf Books Limited, 1968). 
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serious and unrelenting engagement with armed struggle as a form of resistance to white 
minority rule. 
My research has shown that during the 1970s and again in the 1980s, BCM 
organisations formed a number of independent armed wings that have not been given 
sufficient attention in BC literature or the wider canon on South Africa’s armed struggle.  
Chapters two, three, and four this dissertation follows what was famously called the 
“Bokwe Group”, inspired by its leading personality Bokwe Mafuna, who formed the 
Azanian People’s Liberation Front (APLF) whose cadres trained undercover in Botswana, 
Libya, and Syria before trying to infiltrate South Africa.  However, shortly after the Soweto 
Uprising of 1976, due to a host of reasons, the APLF disintegrated.  In its wake two new 
organisations arose to replace it, namely, the Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort (IRE) and 
the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO).  In the 1980s, after both 
formations withered away, the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) 
consolidated itself as the external wing of the newly formed Azanian People’s Organisation 
(AZAPO).  They too formed an armed wing, the Azanian National Liberation Army 
(AZANLA) which unlike its predecessors would last longer and be more effective.   
Despite these numerous attempts by BC activists to form independent armed wings, 
chapters five and six show that many BCM adherents did end up joining the ANC-SA and 
its armed wing Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK).  Unlike a number of other scholars and ANC-
SA activists, my work argues their joining did not represent an abandonment of Black 
Consciousness, instead, it was a conscious attempt to radicalize the ANC-SA/ MK and its 
ally the South African Communist Party (SACP) from within.  Here, my dissertation pays 
particular attention to the June 16th and Moncada Detachments, MK’s first detachments 
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trained in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising.  These detachments are worthy of note not 
only because they were MK’s first since the Luthuli Detachment of the mid-1960s, but 
because they were made up of cadres who were more strongly influenced by the Black 
Nationalism of BC than the ANC-SA’s non-racialism.  Hence, my dissertation argues the 
initial resurgence of MK in the 1977-1979 period can be directly traced to BC-inspired 
activists.  While some in this new wave of recruits were able to positively contribute to the 
growth and development of MK and rise in the ranks, tragically, many more were brutally 
repressed by some in the leadership who felt threatened by this new political force. 
Chapters five and six track these tensions in order to help us rethink why so many MK 
guerrillas remained in exile rather than being infiltrated into South Africa.  This new 
emphasis helps us re-evaluate the mutinies in the ANC-SA’s camps in the 1980s that have 
garnered a good degree of scholarly attention but have not been explicitly linked to 
presence of BC inspired recruits in MK’s ranks.  
Although this dissertation offers a careful historical reconstruction of previously 
under-explored events, the conclusion attempts to provide alternative thoughts to why the 
post-apartheid ANC-SA government has not delivered on many of the promises they made 
during its armed struggle.  Most of the literature has argued the following: structural 
conditions within the global economy have hindered South Africa’s development, the 
movements themselves were always flawed due to corrupt leaders, or the ANC-SA 
leadership was not Marxist-Leninist enough from the onset.  My argument complicates 
these narratives by suggesting that during the liberation struggle, it was both bourgeois 
liberal-democratic and SACP elements which conspired to stamp out the more grassroots 
radical Black Nationalism of BCM.  This suppression, done within the broader context of 
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the war against apartheid, and the culture it created in the ANC-SA has played a significant 
role in hindering a more sustained grassroots democratic culture and curtailing the 
promotion of a stridently Black self-affirming ethos.        
Among those who study BCM hints of a wider story of its armed struggle while 
plentiful, have remained mostly unexplored.  This is unfortunate as much of the criticism 
levelled at BCM from the ANC-SA, and a lesser extent the PAC, centres around the former 
not actively embracing armed struggle.  Consequently the ANC-SA in particular has 
capitalised on this narrative to secure its own claims to political leadership post-1994 and 
hegemony over the narrative of liberation prior to 1994.  The following section will chart 
the development of the literature on Black Consciousness since the 1970s with a focus on 
two traditions that seem to dominate the writing on BC, namely, a Black activist tradition 
and an academic tradition predominately but not exclusively dominated by whites.  Both 
traditions have offered important insights into the historiography on BCM, its impact on 
the struggle against apartheid, and importance post-1994 and are read together to chart the 
evolution of the literature since the 1970s.   
This literature review also points out how the academic tradition has gained more 
“legitimacy” in the canon on BCM over the activist tradition.  Moreover, the Black activist 
tradition has been more open to reading a strong class critique within BCM and has 
generally rejected characterizations of BCM as a movement not taking class struggle 
seriously.  The relative dominance of the academic tradition has been influential in the 
limited understanding and marginalization of BCM as a “race-based” movement.     
After engaging with the literature on Black Consciousness, this introduction will 
move to a discussion on the literature on South Africa’s armed struggle.  It argues that the 
 5 
 
recent emphasis on exploring the regional and global activities of the various Southern 
African Liberation Movements opens a space for an engagement with the under-researched 
armed struggle activities of BCM.  Additionally, the emphasis on exploring the 
contributions of other organisations to South Africa’s fight for democracy and the ANC-
SA’s interactions with them opens a space for the research in this dissertation.  Following 
this, the section will conclude with a broad overview on the international reverberations of 
the US Black Power Movement as it was a powerful inspiration, among a host of other 
radical Third World currents, to the formation and development of BCM.  This engagement 
will also critique the growing Black Power literature for not paying enough attention to 
Black Power’s reverberations on the African continent; doing so reveals it to be far more 
than a race-first political philosophy but one able to speak to class struggles from within a 
predominately African-descendant population. 
             
Black Consciousness, South Africa’s Armed Struggle, and Black Power 
Gail Gerhart’s work in the late 1970s and again in the mid-1990s was one of the 
first to construct a broad historiography of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) 
within the wider context of Black South African opposition to apartheid since the 1940s.2  
Gerhart’s early work argued that like the PAC, BCM represented what she termed a “rebel” 
tradition that developed within Black South African politics post-World War II.  This 
tradition, according to Gerhart, argued Africans could only find freedom if they began to 
                                                          
2 G. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: An Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1979); T. Karis and G. Gerhart, eds., From Protest to Challenge: A 
Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990, Vol. 5, Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-
1979 (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 89-155. 
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think African, in other words, ‘to define their own goals in terms of their own interests and 
priorities as an oppressed people’.3  It was a praxis born in opposition to a “reformist” 
tradition personified best by the ANC-SA and its Congress Alliance which believed in a 
gradualist approach to integration.  Consequently, the reformists were willing to work 
closely with white liberals and communists to articulate a broad non-racialist vision for a 
future South Africa and up until 1961, work within the apartheid system to find freedom.   
While Chabani Manganyi had in the early 1970s briefly written on BC’s political 
philosophy, seeking to centre its conception of Blackness with sociological and 
psychological factors that went beyond merely reacting to white racism, Gerhart’s work 
was foundational.  Her access to key primary sources and interviews enabled her to more 
accurately chart the development of organisations like the South African Students’ 
Organisation (SASO), track BCM’s numerous internal debates, and map the movement’s 
multi-faceted approach to attacking the apartheid regime.4  Gerhart’s work launched what 
this introduction terms the academic tradition of writing on BC, as someone who was not 
Black and not intimately involved with BC organising, Gerhart’s work offered an 
outsiders’ perspective on the nature and development of this growing Black movement.  
Tom Lodge would continue this tradition with his brief engagement with Black 
Consciousness as part of his broader work on Black politics in South Africa.  Following 
Gerhart, he connected BCM’s evolution to not only revolutionary trends within the African 
                                                          
3 Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa, p. 41. 
4 N. Manganyi, Being-Black in the World (Johannesburg, SPRO-CAS/Ravan Press, 1973), pp. 17-24.  It 
should be noted that Gerhart being a white woman with US citizenship gained her access and a freedom of 
movement in South Africa those who were Black were never afforded.  This does not diminish the import of 
her contributions, rather it places were academic research and publications in a real political context.   
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continent but to movements in the African diaspora like the US Black Power/Theology 
movements.5   
Around the same time Mokgethi Motlhabi and Sam Nolutshungu, writing within 
the academic tradition, sought to clearly define the political ideology of Black 
Consciousness as opposed to the African Nationalism of the PAC it was often compared 
to.  Their contributions are important, like that of Manganyi, because theirs were one of 
the first attempts by Black scholars to explain what the movement represented to the 
world.6  Importantly, they both located a powerful class and anti-capitalist critique within 
the racial consciousness of BCM in ways Gerhart and Lodge had not.  According to 
Motlhabi, ‘Among the values of white society to be rejected was its exploitative nature 
which was seen as a result of capitalism’.7   
Nolutshungu was concerned with exploring the development of BCM as a broad 
movement inside South Africa as an example of ‘the tendencies towards nationalist 
militancy and social radicalism that popular movements among Blacks invariably 
contain’.8  He went further than Motlhabi and others by framing BCM as a revolutionary 
movement, designed initially not to replace the ANC-SA and PAC, and was one of the first 
to discuss, albeit briefly, the discussions among activists in SASO on the question of armed 
struggle.  Interestingly, in opposition to Lodge and Gerhart, both downplayed the 
connection between BCM and US Black Power.  In hindsight, this may have been done 
                                                          
5 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Harlow, Longman, 1983), pp. 323-325. 
6 S. Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa: Political considerations (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1982); M. Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid: A Social-Ethical 
Analysis (South Africa, Skotaville Publishers, 1984), pp. 106-153. 
7 Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid, p. 112.  
8 Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa, pp. xiv-xv. 
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because they saw it as a connection being overemphasised by the apartheid government, 
and the ANC-SA, as an excuse to attack/discredit SASO.  Where they agreed with Gerhart 
was on her reading of the Soweto Uprising as being a manifestation of BC politics despite 
not being directly planned by it.  
A few years later Robert Fatton Jr. would offer perspectives on BCM that closely 
followed Gerhart and Lodge but departed from them in his understanding of the class 
critique inherent in its radical Black Nationalism.9  Fatton Jr’s perspective came from his 
grounding in the politics and history of Haiti as well as the Marxist revisionism tradition 
that began emerging within South African historiography in the 1970s.  These perspectives 
enabled him to understand BC, similar to other Black scholars, as a movement designed to 
strengthen the subjective impulses of the exploited Blacks to reinvigorate the fight for a 
social revolution.  Black Consciousness for Fatton Jr. was helping to facilitate the process 
through which the exploited Black population transitioned from ‘a class in itself into a class 
for itself’.10  Like Gerhart and Lodge, Fatton Jr. strongly acknowledged the influence of 
the US Black Power Movement on BCM as its activists had closely read the works of 
Stokely Carmichael, Eldridge Cleaver, Malcom X, James Cone, Angela Davis and others.  
Fatton Jr. argued the Black Power Movement provided ‘a theoretical source for the renewal 
of black South African thinking’ but he stressed, like Motlhabi, that it was not an uncritical 
importation.11   
                                                          
9 R. Fatton Jr., Black Consciousness in South Africa: The Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to White 
Supremacy (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1986). 
10 Fatton Jr., Black Consciousness in South Africa, p. 58. 
11 Fatton Jr., Black Consciousness in South Africa, p. 75. 
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 Following Fatton Jr. the late 1980s saw the unheralded release of one of the first 
autobiographies of a South African guerrilla in exile.  The autobiography of Mosibudi 
Mangena, who at the time was President of the BCMA, was one of the first to openly, albeit 
briefly, discuss BCM’s engagement with armed struggle.12  Mangena was a founding 
intellectual and activist of BCM, in 1973 he was arrested for his activism and became the 
first BC organizer to be sent to Robben Island.  His autobiography launched the Black 
activist tradition school on BCM which wrote on the movement in ways that were 
fundamentally different from others.  Mangena’s book was unique in that it offered a 
personal take on the political significance and ideological importance of BCM in the 
context of the late 1960s and early 1970s where the ANC-SA and PAC were non-existent.   
While a stalwart of the movement, Mangena was never shy in dealing criticism.  In 
particular, Mangena believed the Soweto Uprising demonstrated the weakness in BCM as 
it pertained to its ‘inability to handle the armed and other forms of violence unleashed by 
the abominable apartheid regime against the black community’.  Although they reacted in 
solidarity with the high school student protests, Mangena pointed to SASO’s decision at 
its July 1972 General Student Council (GSC) to reject calls to ‘create structures for the 
prosecution of the struggle at other levels’ as the reason why BCM was unable to 
effectively channel the anger and energy of the students into an organised overthrow of the 
apartheid regime under the banner of BCM.13   In some ways his memoir should be 
                                                          
12 M. Mangena, On Your Own: Evolution of Black Consciousness in South Africa/Azania (Braamfontein, 
Skotaville Publishers, 1989).   
13 Mangena, On Your Own, p. 117.  The second half of chapter two will explore this GSC in more detail.   
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considered a primary document like some of the writings of Steve Biko in the early 1970s 
that were compiled into the seminal text I Write What I Like.14   
 Shortly after the unbanning of the liberation movements by F.W. De Klerk in 1990, 
soon to be followed by the release of Nelson Mandela, a number of BC activists met in 
Harare, Zimbabwe to discuss ways to effectively add BCM to the growing global and 
national discussion of South Africa’s freedom struggle.15  Notably absent were BCMA 
comrades like Mosibudi Mangena whose organising strategies and tactics differed from 
those leading this conference like Barney Pityana, one time President and Secretary-
General of SASO, and Mamphela Ramphele, a founding activist and intellectual of SASO 
and the Black Community Programmes (BCPs).  Nevertheless, working in conjunction 
with friendly scholars like Lindy Wilson, this meeting was able to lay the foundation for a 
seminal text on BCM in 1991 entitled Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and 
Black Consciousness.16  This text saw the activist and academic traditions meet with the 
former emerging dominant enabling it to provide insights into BCM previous scholars had 
been unable to do.     
To begin with, Bounds of Possibility went into more depth and detail than previous 
works on the intricacies of BC’s ideology and the various political projects of the 
movement.  In addition to this, while Nelson Mandela had by this point become the global 
figure of anti-apartheid resistance, and by extension the ANC-SA became seen as the 
natural heirs to the National Party (NP) for power, BCM activists sought to insert the 
                                                          
14 S. Biko, I Write What I Like: Selected Writings (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
15 Wits Historical Papers (hereafter referred to as WHP) A2675/I/3, Gerhart notes on Biko Symposium, 
Harare, June 17th-22nd, 1990, pp. 33-37. 
16 B. Pityana, M. Ramphele, M. Mpumlwana, and L. Wilson, eds., Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve 
Biko and Black Consciousness (Cape Town, David Philip Publishers 1991). 
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murdered Steve Biko into the discourse to bring to light the still little known contributions 
of BCM to South Africa’s freedom struggle.17  Furthermore, unlike earlier literature, in the 
chapters by Lindy Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, this edited volume carefully explored 
the experiences of women in BCM and openly critiqued the patriarchy of male leaders like 
Biko.18  Moreover, the authors sought to chart BCM’s continued impact within South 
Africa after the assassination of Biko in September 1977 and the banning of almost twenty 
major BCM organisations one month later.19  Lastly, again unlike earlier works with the 
exception of Mangena’s autobiography, in a chapter by former BCM activists Welile 
Nhlapo, Thenjiwe Mtintso, and Keith Mokoape who eventually joined the ANC-SA, 
BCM’s engagement with the armed struggle was briefly charted.  This chapter on armed 
struggle was the first to openly discuss attempts by some SASO activists in Botswana to 
obtain training with the PAC in Libya and Syria.  The authors also discussed a few reasons 
why the alliance failed but focused on praising the Soweto generation for revitalizing and 
reinvigorating the ANC-SA/MK in exile.20     
Inside South Africa, Tom Lodge would build on his earlier engagement with BCM 
by exploring the formation of BC organisations post-1977.  In some sense arguing against 
the growing notion in mostly ANC-SA centric scholarship that BCM was mostly dead 
inside South Africa during the 1980s, Lodge showed how groups like AZAPO continued 
                                                          
17 L. Wilson, ‘Bantu Steve Biko: A Life’, in Pityana, Ramphele, Mpumlwana, and Wilson, eds., Bounds of 
Possibility, pp. 15-77. 
18 M. Ramphele, ‘The Dynamics of Gender within Black Consciousness Organisations: A Personal View’, 
in Pityana, Ramphele, Mpumlwana, and Wilson, eds., Bounds of Possibility, pp. 214-227. 
19 K. Moodley, ‘The Continued Impact of Black Consciousness’, in Pityana, Ramphele, Mpumlwana, and 
Wilson, eds., Bounds of Possibility, pp. 143-152; G. Budlender, ‘Black Consciousness and the Liberal 
Tradition: Then and Now’, in Pityana, Ramphele, Mpumlwana, and Wilson, eds., Bounds of Possibility, pp. 
228-237. 
20 K. Mokoape, T. Mtintso, W. Nhlapo, ‘Towards the Armed Struggle’, in Pityana, Ramphele, Mpumlwana, 
and Wilson, eds., Bounds of Possibility, pp. 137-142. 
 12 
 
to organize and mobilise Blacks against apartheid under a BC banner.  Unlike earlier 
scholars on BCM, both from within the primarily white academic and Black activist 
tradition, Lodge located the evolution of BC politics in the 1980s to their rejection of the 
Freedom Charter, rivalry with the United Democratic Front (UDF), and the deadly clashes 
between these organisations and Inkatha and the increasingly desperate apartheid regime.21  
Lodge’s chapter, as well as chapters by Bill Nasson, Khehla Shubane and a few others, 
looked more closely at how BC politics operated at a local and regional level within South 
Africa set in the wider context of the turbulence of the 1980s.     
This was followed shortly after by a very important article by Nozipho Diseko.22  
Diseko’s piece was primarily concerned with divorcing SASO and BPC from having any 
influence over the South African Students Movement (SASM) during the Soweto Uprising.  
Indeed, Diseko went so far as to claim, with questionable evidence, that SASM had secretly 
embraced the ANC-SA’s non-racialist doctrine in the early 1970s.  According to Diseko 
this meant that June 1976 needed to be seen as an example of the ANC-SA’s influence on 
Black Consciousness instead of the latter’s influence on youth activism in South Africa.  
Diseko argued that SASM sought to break with the larger BCM for the following reasons: 
the latter embracing Black communalism instead of scientific socialism, SASM rejecting 
the exclusion of whites, and SASM wanting to engage with armed struggle.  According to 
Diseko, these disagreements moved the organisation closer to the ANC-SA.  In the early 
1990s this was a landmark piece, yet, recent work by ANC-SA scholars and even 
recollections by some ANC-SA activists have debunked Diseko’s thesis on the strong 
                                                          
21 T. Lodge, ‘Black Consciousness and the Left’, in T. Lodge and B. Nasson, eds., All, Here, and Now: Black 
Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1991), pp. 142-151. 
22 N. Diseko, ‘The Origins and Development of the South African Students Movement (SASM): 1968-1976’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 18, 1 (1992), pp. 40-62. 
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presence of the ANC-SA underground in the early 1970s.23  As it pertained to the growing 
scholarship on BC from within the Black activist tradition, Diseko’s piece was one of the 
first to be openly critical of the movement.   
 Anthony Marx, similar to Diseko although from within the scholar tradition, 
particularly the broad analysis of Lodge, levelled a blistering critique of BCM and its Black 
Nationalist politics in his work on opposition to apartheid inside South Africa.24  Marx’s 
text can be seen as a counter to Beyond a Boundary as he sought to argue that while Black 
Consciousness was an understandable evolution within South African politics, it was 
insufficient and actually detrimental as a political praxis to the liberation of South Africa.  
Incorrectly, Marx tried to construct BC as primarily concerned with boosting the self-image 
of Blacks instead of organizing concrete actions against the apartheid state.  In other words, 
they were more idealists than activists.25  Following Diseko, Marx also mistakenly argued 
BC activists like Biko rejected Marx’s class analysis as a foreign ideology, this was 
inaccurate as it conflated BCM’s fierce desire to be independent of the SACP and USSR 
with rejecting class analysis.  Marx also, like Diseko, did not take into consideration the 
fact that BCM tactically wanted to stay legal for as long as possible, because of this 
decision if they had openly embraced socialism/class struggle they ran the risk of being 
banned before they could consolidate themselves.  Marx’s text also argued that when the 
engagement with class analysis came, it began in 1976 with Diliza Mji, SASO’s President 
                                                          
23 WHP A2675/I/35, Victoria Butler interview with Joe Slovo, February 1988, pp. 1-4; WHP A2675/I/14, 
Howard Barrell first interview with Ronnie Kasrils, August 19th, 1989, pp. 241-242; T. Simpson, ‘Main 
Machinery: The ANC’s Armed Underground in Johannesburg During the 1976 Soweto Uprising’, African 
Studies, 70, 3 (2011), pp. 415-436. 
24 A. Marx, Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990 (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1992).  
25 Marx, Lessons of Struggle, pp. 10-16. 
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at the time who many believed had secretly joined the ANC-SA.26  In addition to not having 
enough sources available to him on the serious activist work BCM did accomplish, Marx 
was very hostile to African/Black Nationalism in South Africa as, ‘Extreme in its claim to 
the land and in its attitude towards whites’.  He also referred to the US Black Power 
Movement as a ‘volatile expression of racial assertiveness’.27   
Nevertheless, Marx did make an intriguing argument as it pertained to the banning 
of BC organisations in 1977 after Biko’s death.  According to Marx, this was done by the 
apartheid regime to prevent attempts at forming a united front under BC’s banner rather 
than the immediate threat of BC after the Soweto Uprising.  The apartheid government 
wanted to head off Biko’s death being used as a rallying point for serious unity among the 
Blacks in South Africa as they were still convinced they could hold onto power.28  Yet, this 
prescient analysis is overshadowed by his dismissal of groups like AZAPO as repeating 
the same mistakes of the previous BC organisations by only having Black membership.29     
A few years later, seeking to centre the experiences of women Mamphela Ramphele 
followed in the now rapidly growing practice of South African anti-apartheid activists in 
publishing her autobiography.  Importantly, Ramphele built on her earlier work on women 
in the movement by attacking characterizations of her having value only in relation to being 
one of Steve Biko’s romantic partners.  Through her autobiography she tried to illustrate 
the ignored contributions of Black women to the founding, development, and growth of 
BCM.  This was done by using her own example as a critical co-author with Steve Biko on 
                                                          
26 Marx, Lessons of Struggle, p. 48. 
27 Marx, Lessons of Struggle, p. 42. 
28 Marx, Lessons of Struggle, p. 85. 
29 Marx, Lessons of Struggle, pp. 89-91, 103-104, 118-141. 
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his now famous articles on Black Consciousness for the SASO Newsletter as she, ‘would 
write down his thoughts as a stream of consciousness which he would dictate to me, and 
later I would read the text back to him as he typed with his two fingers until it was done’.30  
Ramphele also charted her rise within the organisation as Chairperson of a SASO Local 
Committee which ran a number of health clinics that she was critical in operating as a 
doctor-in-training.31  As Ramphele grew in confidence, she and other Black women like 
Nomsisi Kraai, Deborah Matshoba, and Thenjiwe Mtintso ‘became a force to be reckoned 
with at annual SASO meetings.  Ours was not a feminist cause at the time… but an 
insistence on being taken seriously as activists in our own right amongst our peers’.32     
Another important contribution this autobiography gave to the historiography of 
BCM was the importance King Williamstown had for the movement after Steve Biko was 
banned there in March 1973.  Ramphele recalled that, ‘As the community at King grew 
and developed, the transition was made from student activism to professional development 
work’.  It was also here that newer activists began to develop such as Malusi Mpumlwana 
and Mapetla Mohapi.33  Mohapi in particular Ramphele recalled, ‘often had more radical 
views on many issues, and would engage Steve and Malusi in long discussions’.  Mohapi 
seemed to be advocating more overt forms of resistance against apartheid in addition to the 
self-help projects of the BCPs.34  This was important in two regards, firstly, it showed the 
diversity of opinions present among key personalities in BCM which had until that point 
only been minimally interrogated in the literature on BCM.  This is something Anne 
                                                          
30 M. Ramphele, Across Boundaries: The Journey of a South African Woman Leader (New York, The 
Feminist Press at CUNY, 1996), p. 59. 
31 Ramphele, Across Boundaries, pp. 61-65. 
32 Ramphele, Across Boundaries, p. 66. 
33 Ramphele, Across Boundaries, p. 94. 
34 Ramphele, Across Boundaries, p. 108. 
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Heffernan would later expand upon with her carefully researched work on Onkgopotse 
Tiro and his importance as one of the founding activists of BCM.35  Secondly, through 
highlighting the lively debates among these different visions of how BCM should organize 
itself, Ramphele underscored one of the strengths of BCM in comparison to other South 
African organisations at the time, namely, its ‘openness to internal debates [which] helped 
to develop leadership amongst younger members of the community’.36   
Towards the end of the 1990s critiques of BCM from within the predominately 
academic school continued in the work of Salim Badat, a former South African National 
Students’ Congress (SANSCO) activist in the 1980s.37  Like Gerhart and a few others 
before him, Badat drew connections between the ideology of SASO and that of the African 
National Congress of South Africa Youth League (ANCYL).  He also acknowledged the 
impact US Black Power and wider Pan-African nationalism had on BC thinking and 
praxis.38  However, he like Marx and Diseko continued the critique of BCM/SASO as only 
seeing the problem of apartheid through the lens of race.  Moreover, he also linked 
BCM/SASO’s turn to an embrace of class with Diliza Mji’s 1976 July speech which 
chapter two will show to be inaccurate as the embrace happened from as early as the late 
1960s.  That said, unlike Marx, Badat did not believe SASO was anti-white.39   
Badat also made a point in his book to delve deeper than others into how SASO 
organised itself and structured its branches across the country at the various “Bush” 
                                                          
35 A. Heffernan, ‘Black Consciousness's Lost Leader: Abraham Tiro, the University of the North, and the 
Seeds of South Africa's Student Movement in the 1970s’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 41, 1 (2015), 
pp. 173-186. 
36 Ramphele, Across Boundaries, p. 109. 
37 S. Badat, Black Student Politics: Higher Education and Apartheid from SASO to SANSCO, 1968-1990 
(Oxford, Routledgefarmer, 1999).   
38 Badat, Black Student Politics, pp. 82-87. 
39 Badat, Black Student Politics, pp. 88-101. 
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colleges and universities.40  He also discussed the BCPs and literacy projects in more depth 
than previous scholars with the exception of Mangena.  Although he concluded they failed, 
mostly because of a lack of drive, he did see success for BCM in its impact on Black culture 
and Black Theology.41  In summation, unlike Marx who argued BCM fell because of its 
own internal contradictions, or Diseko’s argument that it was a rising internal ANC-SA 
underground that made BCM redundant, Badat correctly argued it was government 
repression which limited its ability to expand.42 
In the early 2000s, Tor Sellstrom’s masterful history of Sweden’s assistance to the 
African Liberation Movements also engaged with BCM.  This work was distinctive in that 
up until that point, with the exception of the closing chapters of Mangena’s biography, few 
had systematically dealt with the movement and its politics in exile.  Also located from 
within the white academic school, Sellstrom relied heavily on primary sources of Swedish 
officials who interacted with BCM and a number of secondary sources to demonstrate how 
supportive Sweden and its non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were of the movement 
and its community projects.43   Their support to BCM, in particular SASO, had been so 
extensive that when Sweden finally recognised the ANC-SA as the leading South African 
liberation organisation in November 1974, they had already contributed to BCM 175,000 
SEK in aid which was 25,000 SEK more than they had given the ANC-SA up until that 
point.44   
                                                          
40 Badat, Black Student Politics, pp. 108-121. 
41 Badat, Black Student Politics, pp. 124-128. 
42 Badat, Black Student Politics, pp. 134-138. 
43 T. Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance 
1970-1994 (Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002).   
44 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume II, pp. 400-401. 
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According to Sellstrom, ‘The most important reason for the comparatively late 
assistance to ANC… was the liberation movement’s precarious situation in the 1970s’.  
This led many in the Swedish government like First Secretary Govan Hasselmark, posted 
to Dar es Salaam, to remark in November 1975 that both the ANC-SA and PAC were 
ineffective organisations as BCM/SASO were the most active organisations inside South 
Africa.  This opinion was echoed by the influential international secretary of the Swedish 
Metalworkers Union who visited South Africa in early 1975.  By mid-1976 Oliver Tambo 
was pressuring the Swedish government to stop financing BCM all-together as this was, in 
his opinion, creating unnecessary tensions between BCM and ANC-SA.  Tambo was 
eventually able to successfully argue that the money for the liberation of South Africa 
should be flooded through the ANC-SA only.45   
Sellstrom’s piece was also important because it was the first to prove that Steve 
Biko had some knowledge about the attempts by some BCM cadres to receive military 
training in exile from the PAC.46  In addition to providing a wider understanding of BCM 
in exile, Sellstrom’s detailed study exposed the little acknowledged narrative of how weak, 
vulnerable, and minimally supported the ANC-SA was in exile throughout the 1960s and 
1970s.  It was only in the late 1970s that Swedish support ‘had increasingly taken the form 
of institutional cooperation, outside the military field paving the way for support to central 
functions of the future South African ruling party’.47   
More recently in the immense South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) 
volumes, a new narrative on Black Consciousness has emerged that blends the academic 
                                                          
45 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume II, pp. 409-413, 544-547, 561. 
46 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume II, pp. 550-551. 
47 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume II, p. 580. 
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and Black activist/civil society traditions.48  Mostly following the established academic 
narrative on BCM, authors in Volume II of the immense series have argued, curiously, that 
it was ‘Activity, not activism as such, [that] marked BC strategy’.49  They also temporally 
delineate its boundaries to the 1967-1977 decade, with scant attention being paid to its 
continued activism at home and abroad post-1977 except to say BC remained entrenched 
in the minds of politicised Blacks.  Notably, the authors argued that when BCM ended in 
1977 its adherents split into three broad groups: those that saw BCM as an end who 
eventually formed the BCMA, those who would join the ANC-SA, and those who joined 
the PAC.50  More importantly, they argued, perhaps more strongly than those before them, 
that BCM trained a generation of new leaders and laid important foundations for the 
movements of the 1980s.  However, it seems for the authors when BCM went into exile 
their impact as a movement was negligible, a viewpoint this dissertation hopes to challenge.     
As the 2000s progressed a number of activist scholars, both white and Black, began 
to reengage with Black Consciousness and the political thought and praxis of Steve Biko 
to help find ways to frame why South Africa had become racially and economically more 
unequal more during the ten years the ANC-SA had been in political power.  Nigel Gibson 
was one of the central figures in this new wave of scholarship who provocatively argued 
that movements like Abahlali baseMjondolo, also called the Shackdwellers Movement, 
challenged the post-colonial apartheid state in a ways that embodied ‘Fanon and Biko’s 
idea of a decolonised new humanism’.51  Gibson importantly emphasised that Black 
                                                          
48 M. Mzamane, B. Maaba and N. Biko, ‘The Black Consciousness Movement’ in The Road to Democracy 
in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970-1980] (Pretoria, UNISA Press, 2007), pp. 99-159. 
49 Mzamane, Maaba and Biko, ‘The Black Consciousness Movement’, p. 100. 
50 Mzamane, Maaba and Biko, ‘The Black Consciousness Movement’, p. 157. 
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Consciousness was not a simple identity politics framework or a cultural exceptionalism 
argument, instead, it was ‘a product of the experience of a movement – of apartheid, of 
postcolonial Africa and of the Black consciousness mediated by US Black freedom 
movements’.52  Arguing against some of the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist writings on 
post-apartheid South Africa, Gibson posited BC was still a relevant political praxis of 
liberation in a South Africa where it was wrong to reduce current struggles to a transition 
from racial oppression to class oppression as ‘the economic reality and the glaring 
inequalities do not mask the racialised human reality’.53   
This emphasis on re-engaging with Black Consciousness in order to speak to 
contemporary struggles in South Africa would continue in an edited volume entitled Biko 
Lives!  Contesting the Legacies of Steve Biko which can be seen as an updated version of 
Bounds of Possibility.54  Working with and drawing inspiration from scholar-activists such 
as Andile Mngxitama and Amanda Alexander, the authors in this new text sought to 
demonstrate the powerful role BC ideology, organizing strategies/tactics, and fierce 
material/ideological independence played in shaping South African politics prior to and 
after the historic 1994 elections.  Furthermore, they offered an expanded view of some of 
the struggles women in BCM experienced that emphasised how despite their contributions 
and some new political freedoms won, women in the movement still encountered both old 
and new patriarchal restrictions.55   
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On the question of Black women in BCM one of the more revealing chapters was 
an interview the editors published with one of the more unheralded founding BCM activists 
and intellectuals, Deborah Matshoba.56  Matshoba’s interview was significant because in 
addition to providing more details on various aspects of SASO’s early history, her 
discussion of her own political biography showed that a number of women entered SASO 
with a fully formed political consciousness about Blackness.  Moreover, unlike Ramphele, 
Matshoba explicitly stated that while in SASO she and other women identified as feminists 
as they had engaged closely with Black radical figures like Angela Davis.  Matshoba also 
castigated Biko and others for voting down a women’s proposal to form a Women’s 
Student Organisation (WSO) in order to independently organize Black women.  According 
to men like Biko, they mistakenly believed creating a WSO would produce unnecessary 
divisions among Black people, instead, WSO should just become a branch within SASO.     
In addition to this, two chapters in this edited volume offered new perspectives on 
BCM that were not found in previous writings.  Gibson’s chapter on BCM after the murder 
of Biko tried to sketch a more nuanced history of AZAPO’s attempts to bring some 
organisational unity to the scattered BC forces in the country post-1977.  However, 
incorrectly, Gibson argued that in exile the BCMA was formed by exiles like Barney 
Pityana who were scrambling to pick up the pieces of the injured movement.57  That said, 
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Gibson’s chapter accurately charted how this new phase of BCM more explicitly grafted a 
broad conception of Marxism onto the organisation.58   
Neville Alexander’s chapter added to this by attempting to explain the context 
around the night Steve Biko was picked up by security forces by explaining what he 
(Alexander), Biko, and Peter Jones were trying to discuss at a meeting in Cape Town.  
According to Alexander, he and Biko were to be sent abroad ‘to discuss with the armed 
movements in exile the suggestion to constitute a single united liberation army that would 
be complemented and “represented” by the Black People’s Convention (BPC) as the 
legitimate voice of the oppressed inside the country’.59  He also argued, against scholars 
like Anthony Marx, that the AZAPO-led National Forum’s failure was due more to it being 
overwhelmed by the rising United Democratic Front (UDF) which had more international 
support instead of it being racially exclusive.60   
 From within the predominately white academic tradition, Daniel Magaziner’s work 
built on Gerhart’s by centring the influence of US Black Power, the South African multi-
racial University Christian Movement (UCM) and Black Theology during BC’s formative 
years (1968-1972).61  Magaziner importantly offered an expanded understanding of the 
early years of BCM by locating its development with that of Black Theology and the 
University Christian Movement (UCM).  Prior to Magaziner, this link had not been 
explicitly made despite it being widely accepted that both Biko and Pityana regularly 
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engaged with liberal/radical Christian organisations in SASO’s early years.  Furthermore, 
unlike Gerhart, Magaziner discussed how women who joined the movement found a level 
of freedom within its political spaces while at the same time continued to combat sexist 
and patriarchal stereotypes held by their male comrades.62  Despite these important 
contributions, Magaziner departed from Gerhart and others before him when he 
questionably framed the movement’s post-1972 moment as the end of a “pure” Black 
Consciousness as adherents moved away from internal conscientizing towards direct 
confrontation with the apartheid state.63   
In a corrective to Magaziner’s false dichotomy between conscientization and direct 
confrontation, Julian Brown and Leslie Hadfield’s recent works have shown how BCM’s 
transition to openly organizing opposition to apartheid was implicit in its conscientizing 
process during its formative years.64  Brown in particular sought to demonstrate how SASO 
evolved from a university student project to a national activist movement that was able to 
mobilise mass-based demonstrations against apartheid.65  Leslie Hadfield’s work further 
broadened our understanding of BCM by chronicling its participation in rural struggles, 
exemplified by its grassroots economic/heath care projects in the Transkei and Natal 
(today’s Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal respectively).  She also, more deeply than 
Badat, explored the origins of the BCPs, a little known but critical BCM organisation that 
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constructed health clinics and leather-making factories in local villages.66  Her focus on the 
rural areas and the BCPs centrality in the publication of the Black Agenda newsletter 
highlighted the activism of women in these projects in ways previous scholars were unable 
to do.67            
Recently, Mosibudi Mangena published an updated autobiography in which he 
continues his story roughly from when his first one ended.  Here, Mangena made two 
notable contributions to the historiography and analysis of BCM. 68  To begin with, he 
detailed the work the BCMA and its armed wing AZANLA did in exile as they struggled 
to pick up the pieces of the fractured movement in the wake of the Soweto Uprising.  
Mangena also traced the various internal splits that racked BCM in exile and the struggles 
the movement faced in regards to gaining recognition, obtaining financial/military support, 
and simply surviving in foreign countries.  Secondly, he honestly and self-critically 
discussed the struggles of AZAPO since 1993 in the newly democratic South Africa.  
Primarily, there were crippling conflicts, similar to the ANC-SA, between cadres who had 
gone abroad and those who had operated from inside the country.  These tensions hindered 
the ability of AZAPO to become a mass party.  Furthermore, while Mangena argues that 
ideologically the decision of AZAPO to not participate in the 1994 elections was correct 
given the conditions under which free and fair elections were being called, tactically, it was 
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a mistake which locked them out of power and the larger national conversation on where 
South Africa needed to go up until today.     
Taken together, this literature has importantly presented Black Consciousness as 
more than an ideological/intellectual intervention in the anti-apartheid struggle, or as a 
mere incubator for the high school student led Soweto Uprising.69  While Brown, 
Mngxitama, Mangcu, Hadfield and Gerhart recognize BCM as a liberation movement, 
none, with the exception of the autobiographies of Mosibudi Mangena, have researched its 
deep engagement with armed struggle.  Even Xolela Mangcu’s expansive biography on 
Steve Biko does not systematically discuss this engagement with armed struggle although 
we know from Sellstrom that Biko knew about the attempt in exile to train a BC-inspired 
armed wing.70  When BCM’s engagement with armed struggle is discussed, scholars like 
Anthony Marx and Gerhart have mistakenly dated its genesis to the Soweto Uprising or 
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the assassination of Steve Biko/banning of BCM organisations.71  This is not surprising as 
the APLF and others like AZANLA kept their work very secret and only recently have 
some members been willing to discuss what they did as little written record exists of their 
activities.  Furthermore, because much of the BCM literature contains it to a project within 
the borders of South Africa, little has been done to sketch its impact in exile; consequently, 
its armed struggle efforts have been under-researched.   
This silence on BCM’s various armed wings throughout the 1970s and 1980s and 
their contribution to the struggle against apartheid is continued within the growing 
literature on South Africa’s armed struggle which is dominated by refreshing insights into 
the inner workings and missions of ANC-SA/MK and other organisations.  This upsurge 
of interest has taken place within the wider context of scholars like Luise White, Miles 
Larner, Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi excavating the 
history of the various southern African liberation movements from a more regional non-
leadership centred perspective.72  The exile experience, engaged with more closely here 
than within the BCM literature, has formed an important component of the scholarship 
directly focusing on South Africa.73  What makes this literature innovative is the access to 
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interviews, memoirs, and other primary source material few had available to them during 
the liberation struggle.  Recently, scholars such as Arianna Lissoni have pointed out that 
in order to counter the post-1994 ANC-SA centric narratives that dominate discussions on 
South Africa’s liberation struggle, scholars need to ‘complicate a single heroic narrative of 
liberation and suggest that the relationship between the histories of earlier struggles and 
the present needs to be rethought in more complex, and less utilitarian terms’.74  Doing so 
amplifies the neglected voices of rank-and-file members, women, youths, and other 
subversive individuals and has set the standard for how future research on southern African 
Liberation Movements need to be studied.   
Scholars within this field of study like Lissoni, Hugh Macmillan, Thula Simpson, 
Ben Magubane, Noor Nieftagodien, and Gregory Houston have expanded our 
understanding of the ANC-SA’s armed struggle by detailing internal differences within the 
organisation and highlighting the difficulties they faced trying to survive in exile and 
relaunch their armed struggle.75  Their scholarship has been particularly thought-provoking 
as it has attempted to show how the politics of exile shaped the ability, or inability, of MK 
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to carry out operations.   Additionally, others have explored how other South African 
movements like PAC/Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) and National Committee 
for Liberation/African Resistance Movement (ARM) took up arms against apartheid.76  
Yet, BCM’s armed wings are not explored and the movement itself is dismissed as being 
too concerned with psychological liberation versus physical liberation.77       
Lastly, while research on the Black Power Movement and its global reverberations 
has grown, precious little has been done to excavate the presence of these radical tendencies 
within the African continent.78  While Kwame Nkrumah’s public embrace of Black Power 
and the activism of Steve Biko is widely known, as it pertains to the study of its global 
reverberations, few have interrogated what this form of Black radicalism meant within 
African Liberation Movement spaces.79  While scholars like Gale Plummer and Fanon Che 
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Wilkins have shown us how influential the African Liberation Movements were to the 
Long Black Sixties, and we know that many Black radicals travelled to Africa, we do not 
know much about the inverse relationship as it pertains to how the diaspora influenced 
African movements.80  This is interesting because the literature on Black Power in the 
Caribbean is very rich as it reveals the relevancy of Black Power within predominately 
African/Indian populations.  While indeed some elements of Black Power were more 
culturally Black Nationalist, the radical thrust of the Black Power Movement in the 
Caribbean was firmly entrenched in socialism.  Moreover, it offered serious visions for a 
future for the Caribbean that was politically, economically, and socially independent of 
capitalism.  That said, where attempts have been made to explore Black Power’s 
reverberations on the African continent scholars such as May Joseph, Manthia Diawara, 
and Andrew Ivaska have focused on the circulation and consumption of US Black Power 
music and cultural expressions in African states.81    
 
Silences in History: Reading South Africa’s struggle through Michel-Rolph Trouillot  
Accordingly, this dissertation seeks to fill the various holes in all three literatures.  
In order to move past the limits of these debates this dissertation draws heavily on the 
pioneering work of Haitian scholar Michel-Rolph Trouillot and his concept of silences in 
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history as it pertains to the scholarship, or lack thereof, on the Haitian Revolution (1791-
1804).82  Engaging with Trouillot’s work offers a different way to imagine how future 
research should unpack South African liberation movement historiography.  In the late 
1980s a number of scholars focused on various trends that developed in South African 
historiography from colonial-apologist positions in the early 20th century to the Marxist-
revisionism of the 1970s, with some engagement with Black writing in-between.83  More 
recently, as mentioned above, there has been a concerted effort in the literature on South 
Africa’s struggle for democracy to highlight the efforts of organisations not named the 
ANC-SA or, if one is working within the ANC-SA historiography, centre narratives of 
those whose voices have not been highlighted.   
In this Trouillot is useful because unlike most South African scholars, his work 
pays more attention to how silences within and among radical Black movements against 
white supremacy operate.  He also discusses how these silences are mobilise d by the ruling 
class post-independence to justify their exploitation and suppression of the working people.  
As the first Third World/African country to win political independence, Haiti’s struggles 
after the euphoria of its victory was a precursor to the contemporary struggles of African 
states like South Africa. 
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In the mid-1990s Trouillot powerfully introduced the compelling thesis that the 
researching, writing, publishing and even assumption of what history is, has always been 
a contested project for power.84  Moving beyond arguments stating that history is written 
by the victors, he carefully explored how the construction of histories implies a certain 
choice of sources of what to include or exclude.  In so doing, the creation of certain silences 
in history is inevitable.  However, far from being an accidental or neutral project, the 
construction of silences according to Trouillot is an active political project often controlled 
by those in power to centre a particular narrative over others both nationally and world-
historically.  At the level of world history, he potently argued that at the time of the Haitian 
Revolution, during the Age of Slavery, the global dehumanization of African-descended 
peoples made the successful execution of an armed slave revolution to a racist European 
world-view an “unthinkable” event.  In many ways, the prospect of a BCM-led movement 
winning political power in South Africa and reshaping the country accordingly is an 
“unthinkable” event to not only a number of whites, but ruling class Blacks who draw their 
legitimacy from their ties to white monopoly capital.    
 Nevertheless, at the national level, more pertinent for this dissertation, Trouillot 
addressed the process by which certain leaders/tendencies of the revolution, particularly 
Toussaint L’Ouverture (broadly recognised as the leader of the revolution) and Henri 
Christophe, were praised over others in the national narrative created after independence 
in 1804.85  For Trouillot the case of Christophe, who eventually became King of Haiti in 
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1806, is instructive.  During the revolution Christophe, who had been emancipated before 
the slave revolt began, rose within L’Ouverture’s army to become a high-ranking general.  
Towards the end of the revolution, a rivalry developed between him and a maroon 
(runaway enslaved peoples) Bossales (African-born) leader named Sans Souci.  Sans Souci 
was an exceptional military figure who, like Christophe, was one of the early leaders of the 
revolution.  Unlike the Creole (Caribbean-born) Christophe, Sans Souci was popular with 
the former field-slaves and maroons who made up the majority of the army and 
emancipated population.  Sans Souci did not trust Christophe’s commitment to building a 
better life for the formerly enslaved in the future as at a critical point in the closing stages 
of the revolution Christophe, as well as other Creole leaders, surrendered to the French.  
To add insult to injury, these Creole generals decided to work with the French to stamp out 
various pockets of maroon resistance that continued after their surrender.   
Sans Souci was one of the maroon leaders who successfully led this resistance to 
the French as he fought against both the white French army and the forces of the Black 
Creole generals, in particular Christophe.  The resistance of maroon leaders like Sans Souci 
eventually convinced these Creole generals to break from the French and re-join the 
growing popular resistance to the French army.  Sans Souci was asked to make peace with 
the Creole generals and join the reconstituted army of both Creoles and Bossales.  At a 
meeting to make peace with Christophe, Sans Souci and his close lieutenants were 
murdered by the vengeful general.  To seal his victory over the maroon leader, yet silence 
his name to history, upon becoming King of Haiti he built a palace on the spot where he 
murdered the maroon leader and named it Sans Souci.  According to Trouillot this can be 
interpreted as Christophe killing, ‘Sans Souci twice: first, literally, during their last 
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meeting; second, symbolically, by naming his most famous palace Sans Souci’.86  To this 
day, while Haitians and the world recognize the castle and its name, it is always attached 
to Henri Christophe and not to Sans Souci despite the fact that he is broadly known to 
scholars of the Haitian Revolution.87  This dissertation begins with the premise that despite 
the growth in research on BCM, a similar silence exists around it in part given the lack of 
engagement with its dogged attempts to form an armed wing.     
 
The Contributions of understanding BCM and Armed Struggle to the Literature   
My dissertation makes a number of contributions to the literature on the history of 
South Africa’s armed struggle, the impact of US/Caribbean Black Power within Africa, 
understandings of forgotten fronts of the Cold/”Hot” War, and the impact silences in the 
history of South Africa’s ANC-SA led national project are having on current political 
tensions.  The first part of my dissertation seeks to excavate BCM’s deep and unrelenting 
engagement with armed struggle throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  As the literature review 
above made clear, this is one of the silenced/hidden histories of southern Africa’s armed 
liberation struggle.  Moreover, the opening chapters will argue BCM’s failure to insert 
itself as the dominant liberation movement had more to do with the maneuverers of the 
ANC-SA, its international allies, and the PAC than inherent ideological/organisational 
flaws within BCM.       
Secondly, through a close engagement with BCM’s armed wings, these chapters 
also uncover the contributions of Palestinian, Eritrean, and European Leftist organisations 
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in the 1970s and 1980s had in supporting southern Africa’s decolonization struggle through 
their support of Black Consciousness.  While literature on the superpowers, the Nordic 
countries, Cuba, and various NGOs dominates the narrative of the Cold War in southern 
Africa88, my work shows how radical organisations such as the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Italian 
Red Berets, and the Baader-Meinhof gang (West Germany) also made a lasting 
contribution to southern Africa’s liberation movements.  Additionally, the critical networks 
they were able to cultivate in exile demonstrate the lengths to which South Africans were 
willing to go outside the ANC-SA and PAC to defeat apartheid.    
Chapters five and six chart the contributions BCM made to the radicalization of the 
ANC-SA/MK.  Chapter five in particular details how BC organisers like Keith Mokoape 
re-energised and re-focused the ANC-SA/MK in the early 1970s after they left South 
Africa for exile in Botswana.  It also charts their disappointment in MK in particular when 
they were denied requests to receive military training as the Luthuli Detachment was 
accepting no new recruits.  It was partly the efforts and dogged determination of cadres 
like Mokoape, who came from and never renounced BC politics, which forced MK to begin 
training new recruits and incentivised key leaders like Chris Hani to open new fronts of 
struggle inside the country.   
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The following chapter focuses on the post-Soweto period, which is seen by most 
scholars of Umkhonto we Sizwe as being a key turning point in which the armed struggle 
in South Africa became more serious although not more successful.  While the Soweto/BC 
generation of MK recruits is praised as being key to this shift, they are commended more 
for providing numbers to the ANC-S/MK instead of tangibly contributing to a radical 
transformation of the movement in exile.89  While others like Archie Mafeje have 
recognised some of their desires to simply receive MK training then leave and promote 
their own BC world-view, it is concluded that this was not possible.90  Still others, a tiny 
minority, see a more Black Nationalist approach within the ANC-S/MK post-1976 but do 
not go deeper into what this looks like or what impact it had.91  This chapter also suggests 
that part of the reason so many cadres were left in the camps and were repressed in places 
like Quatro was because of their BC world-view.       
The conclusion summarises each chapter and then ends by trying to frame this 
history of BC through a reading of current political events in South Africa.  Over the past 
decade, a number of new social movements in South Africa have emerged – namely 
#FeesMustFall, #RhodesMustFall, and Abahlali baseMjondolo to name a few – which the 
conclusion hopes to show represents a resurgent Black Consciousness.92  Broadly, these 
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social movements are challenging the ANC-SA’s non-racialist vision of a post-apartheid 
South Africa where land remains in the hands of white capitalists to the detriment of the 
Black masses.  In the recent elections in the ANC-SA for its new President to replace Jacob 
Zuma, for the first time the two front-running candidates, Nkosana-Dlamini Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa were cadres who had a strong history in Black Consciousness.  While his 
story as union organizer to billionaire is widely known, his roots in BCM are not.93  This 
conclusion argues understanding BCM will be critical to grasping the political potential of 
the new leaders and organisations emerging in South Africa going forward.  By doing so, 
more accurate assessments on the prospects of serious radical economic transformations 
can be given.   
 
Sources for the Dissertation 
Much of the archival and oral interview work used to construct this article was done 
during 2016 and 2017 across South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania, and the United 
States.  In South Africa, where most of my work took place, I conducted over fifteen 
interviews with former members of the Black Consciousness Movement who either formed 
their own wings and/or eventually joined MK in the 1970s and 1980s.  Archival research 
was done at the National Heritage and Cultural Studies Centre (NAHECS) at the University 
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of Fort Hare, the Wits Historical Papers – Karis/Gerhart Collection, the Manuscripts and 
Historical Papers at the University of Cape Town, and the Department of Botswana 
National Archives & Records Service.  Interviews were also conducted with a number of 
former leaders of SWAPO and focused on exploring their viewpoints on Namibia’s 
struggle, the South African struggle, and their own understanding of Black Power and 
Black Consciousness (BC).  Interviews were also conducted with former top ranking 
Tanzanian officials in Dar es Salaam in order to gain an appreciation for how the Tanzanian 
state, which was a critical locus point for the decolonization struggle, interpreted the ANC-
SA, PAC and BCM.  The challenge of this dissertation was balancing the memory of 
interviewees with what we have available in the written record.  In most circumstances 
PAC/ANC-SA notes, briefs and documents were used to confirm the narratives of the BCM 
cadres in exile although these primary sources on the whole did not have an insider 
perspective on things.  Nevertheless, the dissertation has sought to the best of its ability to 
offer an accurate narrative on the development of BCM’s armed struggle from a variety of 







Chapter One: Africa’s Armed Decolonization struggle and the US Black 
Power Movement, 1958 - 1973   
 
This opening chapter seeks to do different but closely interrelated things.  To begin 
with, the First All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) of 1958 will be briefly discussed.  
This was an important event in the African decolonization struggle because it brought a 
number of soon-to-be liberation movement figures together.  Moreover, the First AAPC 
triggered a debate among the conference participants between Kwame Nkrumah’s non-
violent positive action and Frantz Fanon’s armed struggle, akin to Gerhart’s rebel and 
reformist traditions, which would follow organisations like the ANC-SA until 1994.  This 
will be followed by a brief overview of the movements pushed into following Fanon’s 
charted route to freedom.  What this chapter seeks to highlight is how after numerous 
attempts were made at peaceful negotiations with the colonial authorities, brutal repression 
often followed their collapse with the cost of much human life.  It was only then that certain 
movements decided to take up arms.     
After this broad survey we will introduce into this rising southern African struggle 
the figure of Stokely Carmichael who from the vantage point of the Black Power 
Movement in the United States, saw the armed movements as something he wanted to 
physically join.  However, upon his arrival in Tanzania he saw how far his imagination of 
the armed struggle was from the reality on the ground.  His response to this state of affairs 
infuriated certain movements, none so much as the ANC-SA who published a public 
rebuke of Carmichael that found its way into the western press.  Carmichael’s critiques, as 
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well as the reaction to them, foreshadowed future critiques Black Consciousness adherents 
would also level at the ANC-SA.  Furthermore, at the time, Carmichael’s critiques were in 
line with a number of criticisms being made within the ANC-SA and its armed wing, 
Umkhonto We Size (MK). Yet, Carmichael’s trip to Tanzania is remembered by many, 
including himself, as being a failure.   
Carmichael’s most recent biographer, Peniel Joseph, contends the trip was poorly 
received by the African Liberation Movement (ALM) leaders because, ‘The reality of 
African politics blurred distinctions between guerrillas and revolutionaries, statesmen and 
dictators and made Carmichael’s blunt analysis ring false to indigenous leaders who had 
spent a lifetime combating colonialism.’94  The earlier and more complete autobiography 
of Stokely Carmichael, written with the assistance of Ekwueme Thelwell, proposed his 
negative reception was due to comments he made on the limitations of Marxism-Leninism 
for the global Black revolution.  Thelwell speculates this view was criticised by many 
orthodox Marxist groups such as the ANC-SA and its Angolan ally the Movimento Popular 
de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).95  More recently, Seth Markle has argued that the 
negative reactions were caused not by Carmichael’s ideological content but the style 
(brashness, arrogance) and tone of his delivery.  According to Markle many, like the radical 
Zanzibari activist Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, defended Carmichael and his vision of 
Black Power openly.96     
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While these accounts largely see this trip as a disaster, my research shows 
Carmichael’s critiques, while rejected by some of the leadership of ALMs like the ANC-
SA, spoke directly to many of the concerns rank-and-file cadres had of why their armed 
struggle up to that point had been failing.  Furthermore, Carmichael’s mission to spread 
the message of Black Power was received well by many elements of Tanzanian society.  
Moreover, in the aftermath of his visit and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
in April 1968, Black Power took on a new significance for the ALMs.  The murder of this 
man of peace convinced many ALMs to see Black Power’s message legitimate and 
prescient to their own fight against racism, imperialism, and colonialism.   
By utilizing primary and secondary sources not used, or under-used, by the above 
mentioned authors – such as the publications of other liberation movements, internal 
critiques within MK in the late 1960s, and non-mainstream news accounts – this chapter 
concludes that Carmichael’s mission to connect Black Power with the armed struggle in 
southern Africa was successful.  Establishing this foundation is important for later chapters 
because it shows the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM)’s embrace of Black Power 
was not unique among Africans in the African continent.       
This analysis on the relationship between Black Power and the ALMs is also unique 
in that while much is written on the influence of Frontline States, the USSR, and 
sympathetic European governments/civil society organisations on the ANC-SA in exile, 
curiously, the impact of global Black Nationalist currents such as Black Power has still 
been little explored.97  Hearkening to earlier observations of this neglect Hilary Spire and 
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Chris Saunders pointedly remind us that while much is known about, ‘African-American 
and “black diaspora” solidarity with the southern African liberation struggles… the 
attitudes and responses on the African continent itself’ to the militant strivings of Afro-
American/African diaspora peoples in the 1960s and 1970s ‘remain[s] largely 
unexplored’.98   
A similar hole exists within the growing study of the Black Power Movement in 
which scholarship studying its global reverberations have yet to deeply explore its impact 
within Africa.99  Despite pioneering scholars like Brenda Plummer, Fanon Che Wilkins, 
Ashley Farmer and others carefully researching how Afro-American radicals reacted and 
responded to the African liberation project, the inverse relationship has remained little 
researched.100  Did Black Power even have a role in Africa?  Former Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) activist James Forman believed it did and he argued so 
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at a conference in Lusaka, Zambia in 1967.  Here, he declared Black Power posed ‘a threat 
to the existing power structures in many African countries… because certain leaders of 
Africa countries are really agents of the colonial powers’.101  Consequently, for Africa to 
be free of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism Africans ‘must have power, which 
means that the Black Power we are talking about in the United States has to become an 
international concept’.102     
Recently, Seth Markle’s A Motorcycle on Hell Run has charted Black Power’s 
reverberations in Africa through an analysis of its impact on the Tanzanian state.103  
Different than Markle, but operating from within the same Africa-based framework, this 
chapter focuses on another aspect of this impact by chronicling how Black Power impacted 
non-state actors such as the ALMs.  Focusing on ALMs helps us understand the 
interlocution between African and African-descended revolutionary groups across the 
Atlantic.  Being of African descent did not guarantee unity of thought and action among 
militant groups and some of the differences often took a classed and cultural bent whose 
subtleties this chapter will try to capture.   
 
First All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) and Africa’s return to Armed 
Struggle, November 1958 – November 1967 
The independence of Ghana from British colonial rule and the coming to power of 
the outspoken Pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah in 1957 brought much hope to Africans on 
the continent and in the diaspora.  One year later, done arguably to cement his status as the 
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trailblazer for African decolonization, Nkrumah called for a conference of African peoples 
to take place in Accra.  From December 8th – 13th, 1958, over 300 delegates representing 
65 organisations from across the African continent, its diaspora, and the larger Third World 
gathered in Accra for the First All-African People’s Conference (AAPC).  The mission of 
the conference called by Nkrumah and his Pan-Africanist interlocutor and mentor, the 
Trinidadian George Padmore, was to discuss how to win Africa’s freedom through non-
violent positive action.104  Similar to its predecessor, the 5th Pan-African Conference that 
took place in Manchester in 1945, this gathering attracted a number of current and future 
luminaries of the African liberation struggle.  Some of the new faces were Patrice 
Lumumba (Congo), Frantz Fanon (Martinique/Algeria), Robert Mugabe 
(Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), and Holden Roberto (Angola).  They represented a younger and 
less established generation of African freedom fighters whose ideas on what decolonization 
should mean were powerfully influenced by the proceedings of the conference.  According 
to Jeffrey Ahlman, ‘While in Accra’ these figures, ‘not only explored the political and 
intellectual fluidity between the ideal types of violent and nonviolent resistance, but 
attempted to comprehend them in relation to their political and social praxis’.105   
In addition to these younger activists, there were in attendance more established 
political agitators like Tom Mboya of Kenya (named chairman of the conference), Hastings 
Banda (Malawi), and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia).  There were also a number of Black-
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American organisations in attendance such as the Harlem-based United African Nationalist 
Movement (UANM).106  Representing the wider Third World and backed by a USSR 
growing ever more curious about Africa, the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation 
(AAPSO) representative was also in attendance.  Present also were liberal pacifist activists, 
antagonists to movements like UANM, such as the white American George Houser.  
Hovering in the background of this conference was the struggle of the Vietnamese and 
Cuban peoples, the US Civil Rights Movement, and the ever-present Cold War.  Despite 
the multitude of interests and viewpoints at the conference, the AAPC organisers were 
determined to promote a non-aligned stance in which the direction of African freedom 
would be defined by Africans.   
Towards that end, two major viewpoints on the direction Africa’s decolonization 
struggle would take emerged as the conference unfolded.  The first was articulated by the 
host of the AAPC, Prime Minister Nkrumah, who at the opening of the conference declared 
his model of liberation, non-violent agitation or positive action, as the model most 
appropriate for adaptation by African peoples seeking to end colonial rule.107  Nkrumah’s 
vision was comparable with the tactics being utilised across the Atlantic in the Afro-
American Civil Rights struggle by activists like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., A. Philip 
Randolph, and Ella Baker.  Many at the AAPC embraced this idea of struggle but it was 
challenged on the second day of the conference by the young Caribbean-born revolutionary 
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representing the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).108  Emerging from the context of 
Algeria’s violent war of national liberation Frantz Fanon – who was in the midst of writing 
his Wretched of the Earth – took Nkrumah’s call for non-violent agitation to task.  He 
countered by arguing that violence was at times a necessary reaction to the violent system 
of colonialism and hence was an indispensable tool for many fighting for the liberation of 
Africa.109  While conditions in Ghana and other places might not lend itself to the need to 
pick up arms, this was not the reality for other African people suffering under European 
colonialism.  Although his challenge occurred on the second day of the conference it was 
positively received by many delegates, much to the chagrin of Nkrumah.110   
As Chairman of the conference Mboya tried to balance the two positions by arguing 
armed struggle should only be turned to if the former, non-violent agitation, did not work.  
Politically this was important because with international press in abundance at the 
conference, the AAPC was determined to show a unified front that on the whole endorsed 
the non-violent position so as not to alienate potential allies in the West.  However, coming 
from a situation in which the Kenya Land and Freedom Army’s (KLFA) turn to arms had 
galvanised decolonization efforts, Mboya made it clear that violence had a legitimacy in 
situations like Algeria but made it equally clear it could only be turned to after all peaceful 
options had been exhausted.111  Consequently the second resolution of the AAPC stated 
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they (Africans) would, ‘use non-violent means to achieve political freedom, but be 
prepared to resist violence where the colonial powers resort to force’.112  Fanon’s 
intervention not only ensured this important caveat was added, but also paved the way for 
African freedom movements which embraced violence to receive aid from the AAPC.113    
Whether Africans decided to endorse the use of armed struggle or not would be 
irrelevant to many of the colonial regimes desperate to cling on to power.  As Fanon 
correctly asserted at the AAPC and later within the pages of his magnum opus, many 
European colonial regimes and/or their settler populations were so desperate to cling to 
power they would commit horrendous acts of aggression against Africans building 
movements for political independence.  It could only be expected that the response of the 
oppressed and exploited African peoples would be a violent one.  While not embraced as 
of yet by many of the growing liberation movements, examples of its successes were in 
evidence across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.   
Many looked to the KLFA, popularly known as the Mau Mau rebellion, in the mid-
1950s and the war underway in Algeria as the FLN fought to end French settler colonial 
rule.  Cuba’s successful revolution was also an influential event as the 1950s came to a 
close and many African activists organizing decolonization struggles were powerfully 
influenced by the figures of Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.  At the same time, 
the valiant efforts of the Vietnamese people in their war against the French, particularly 
their victory at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, showed Africans as well as the 
rest of the Third World that European powers could be militarily challenged by the darker 
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peoples of the world.  Yet within southern Africa – as protests, demonstrations, agitations, 
and isolated acts of armed resistance swept across the region – four events would lend 
further credence to Fanon’s challenge to Nkrumah at Accra and the later full endorsement 
of armed struggle by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. 
A little over one year after the closing of the First AAPC, African activists in 
Windhoek, the colonial capital of what was then called South West Africa (currently 
Namibia) gathered to oppose a plan by the apartheid regime to move African people of out 
the Old Location (today Pioneers Park and Hochland Park) to Katutura.  The Old Location 
was needed, the authorities argued, for white families and as the policies of apartheid 
dictated whites and Africans could not live in close proximity to one another, the Africans 
had to be relocated.  On the morning of December 4th, 1959, colonial authorities attempted 
to forcibly register Namibians of the Damara community (D5) for the removal.  A local 
leader was beaten as he resisted and with most of the men away at work, the women of the 
community swiftly rose to his defence and attacked the police officers.  Forced to retreat, 
later that day the police returned with reinforcements and arrested four of the women 
leaders of the attack.  This brazen action prompted the rest to organize hundreds of women 
to march on the Colonial Administrators Office, to protest the arrest of their comrades and 
the forced move.114   
As the Namibian women sought an audience with Daan Viljoen, the Colonial 
Administrator, the disrespect shown to them by the colonial authorities infuriated the local 
population and gave further impetus to other organisations such as the Ovamboland 
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People’s Organisation (OPO), the Herero Chiefs’ Council, and the South West Africa 
National Union (SWANU) to join the direct action protests organised and led by the 
African women of Windhoek.  The protest eventually grew to around 4,000 people who 
day after day rallied at Freedom Square to hear their leaders denounce the forced relocation 
of residents.  They also agreed at the rally to boycott the Beer Hall and bus system to attack 
the revenues of the colonial regime.  On the night of December 10th after a day of rallies, 
speeches and denunciations of the forced relocation, police arrested an innocent man near 
the Beer Hall and after protesters demanded he be released, the police opened fire on 
hundreds of peaceful protesters killing eleven and wounding fifty-four.115  In the aftermath 
of this attack a number of leaders like Sam Nujoma were forced to go into exile as dozens 
were rounded up by the apartheid regime for questioning and interrogation.  This attack 
was the final push the Nujoma’s organisation, the OPO, needed to reform itself into a truly 
national organisation.  On April 19th, 1960, it officially reconstituted itself as the South 
West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO).116  In 1962 SWAPO’s external branch 
decided the time was right to secretly train cadres for armed struggle against the colonial 
regime and sent a few to be trained in Egypt and other locations.      
Three months after the Windhoek Uprising, to the south-east, South Africa’s newly 
formed Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) held a national demonstration against the hated 
pass laws.  The PAC was born from a split within the ANC-SA between Africanists and 
non-racialists with the former representing cadres unhappy with the multiracial politics of 
                                                          
115 Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia, pp. 47-49; S. Nujoma,  Where Others Wavered: The 
Autobiography of Sam Nujoma - My Life in SWAPO and My Participation in the Liberation Struggle of 
Namibia (London, Panaf Books, 2001), pp. 71-77.  
116 Important to note that even in OPO there were many from the other ethnic groups who were members so 
this change from OPO – SWAPO was not initially drastic, see A. Moleah, Namibia: The Struggle for 
Liberation (Wilmington, Disa Press, 1984), p. 100. 
 49 
 
the ANC-SA they felt was manifesting itself with the Freedom Charter and within the wider 
organisation.  The idea for this protest had already been discussed while they were still 
members of the ANC-SA but after the split the newly formed PAC immediately announced 
the national action against the pass laws.  Their call was answered by thousands from across 
the country who came out to publically burn their passes and peacefully face arrest.  As the 
day progressed, it seemed the non-violent protest would remain peaceful.  However, around 
mid-day in the town of Sharpeville tensions escalated as police shot into the peacefully 
protesting crowd killing sixty-nine people and wounding one-hundred and eighty.  This 
was followed by protests across the country which triggered even more violent responses 
from the state.  In the ensuing weeks thousands were arrested, dozens were killed, and 
hundreds were injured as the state sought to crush all opposition to its rule.  Within weeks 
of what became known as the Sharpeville Massacre, both the PAC and ANC-SA were 
banned forcing many of their leaders to go underground or flee into exile.117   
On June 16th, 1960, a few months after Sharpeville, the northern Mozambican town 
of Mueda would be the site of another overt act of violent repression by colonialism against 
peaceful African protesters.  Fed up at poor working conditions, racist treatment by white 
Portuguese settlers as well as a list of other grievances, hundreds of primarily Makonde 
peoples marched to Mueda the headquarters of the district ran by the Portuguese.  Despite 
the colonial authorities swiftly rejecting their grievances and harshly commanding them to 
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disperse, the protesters refused to leave until their demands were met.  In response, the 
Portuguese administrator ordered the security forces to fire into the crowd.  Estimates of 
how many were killed range wildly from sixteen, reported by the Portuguese authorities, 
to six hundred, a figure given by the organizers of the protest.  Regardless, the Mueda 
massacre galvanised the Mozambican people and their diaspora.  Two years later on June 
25th, 1962, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was formed from a 
merger of other organisations and Eduardo Mondlane, a US-trained PhD in Anthropology, 
was elected President.118 
As the end of June 1960 approached these acts of naked military aggression across 
southern Africa could not blunt the excitement many felt as the independence of the Congo 
approached.  June 30th, 1960, was the date slated for the official handing over of power 
from the Belgians to Patrice Lumumba’s Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) that had 
won the May 1960 elections.  The young Congolese nationalist who had come to the First 
AAPC as a fledgling activist was soon to be officially named the Prime Minister of the 
newly independent Congo.  From many accounts, Lumumba was determined to implement 
some of the ideas of Pan-African freedom he gained while at the Accra conference to the 
Congo.  He also took seriously the call for Non-Alignment in the Cold War and was open 
to receiving aid and support from Cuba and the USSR.119  However, freedom from colonial 
rule was intended by the Belgians to be one in which Brussels and global capitalist interests 
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would dictate how the development of the African state would proceed.  Not only that, the 
memory of colonialism was to be recast as one of positive upliftment and harmony by the 
departing Belgian colonists.  This whitewashed rewriting of history was challenged by 
Lumumba at the independence ceremony as he strode to the podium un-scheduled after the 
Belgian King’s comments and launched a blistering attack on colonialism.120  The shaken 
Belgian King fled the ceremony in anger and embarrassment, in the months that followed 
all efforts were made by the European powers in coordination with their local puppets in 
the mineral-rich Katanga province to destroy not only Lumumba, but the vision of African 
freedom he represented.  Despite promises of support from the United Nations (UN) and 
Nkrumah’s Ghana after the Belgian/global capitalist backed the Katanga province after it 
broke from Congo, they watched as Lumumba was blamed for the national unrest, placed 
under house-arrest, toppled from power, and finally assassinated on January 17th, 1961.121 
These four events are notable for a number of reasons.  To begin with, the massacres 
of the Namibians, South Africans, Mozambicans, and the violent imperialist backed 
overthrow of the Lumumba government, as well as a host of other similar incidents, made 
it clear to many that Fanon’s call for armed resistance would have to be embraced by some.  
Even the white American pacifist George Houser saw that after the Congo crisis, ‘the 
struggle against colonialism and white domination in southern Africa would be more 
violent.’122  Secondly, as the case of the Congo demonstrated, the imperialist powers would 
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E. Gerard and B. Kuklick, Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2015). 
122 Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain, pp. 148-149. 
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never support a liberation struggle – whether popular or not – unless it secured global 
capitalist interests in the country after independence.  Freedom was to be political with 
economic freedom to be defined as the freedom to subordinate the political economy of the 
country to imperialism.  Thirdly, the UN, while a useful body for the legitimization of 
different liberation movements and for communicating with the global community, was 
exposed to many Africans through the Congo crisis to be powerless.  International 
peacekeepers could not be relied upon to militarily protect African independence, let alone 
help free Africans suffering under colonial rule.  Lastly, although not clear to most at the 
time, it was perhaps the first overt example of Cold War politics entering the southern 
Africa in the form of the CIA.  How would southern Africa respond?                 
The response would be in-line with decisions already made at the First AAPC in 
Accra at the end of 1958.  The events outlined above increased the urgency behind the 
necessity for the return to armed struggle and movements from South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique reached out to allies in in Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, the 
USSR, China, and even Zaire for military training.  Exile in these countries allowed the 
liberation movements fighting for freedom a relatively safe space to organize themselves 
ideologically, communicate their struggle to the global community, receive funds, and train 
new cadres in the art of guerrilla warfare.  Yet, as we shall soon see, taking up arms and 
reorganizing what were nominally non-violent organisations for armed struggle was a 
harder challenge than many originally anticipated.     
The first of the southern African liberation movements to strike militarily against 
colonial rule was the MPLA on February 4th, 1961.  With roots in the Angolan Communist 
Party (PCA) founded in 1956, it was also the brainchild of Amilcar Cabral, the 
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revolutionary leader of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde 
(PAIGC), who was close with MPLA leaders like Agostinho Neto.  One month after the 
assassination of Lumumba by Katangese forces backed by western imperialism, the MPLA 
simultaneously attacked the Sao Paulo security forces and police HQ in an attempt to 
release some of their comrades who had been arrested. The attack left seven Portuguese 
dead with the MPLA suffering forty losses.  Although beaten back, the intent of this 
movement to use arms was clear as was their open acknowledgement that their vision of 
freedom owed a great debt to Marxist-Leninist praxis.123  In the context of the Cold War 
this served as excellent propaganda by the Portuguese regime against the MPLA and helped 
them to receive aid from a US government that up to that point had been hesitant to openly 
back the colonial regimes.   
One month later on March 15th, 1961 African peasants in the predominately 
Bakongo north of Angola also struck for freedom.  Unlike the MPLA whose support was 
drawn primarily from the urban areas and petty bourgeois mulatto/assimilados 
intellectuals, these Africans were primarily coffee plantation workers loosely organised by 
the rural-based União dos Povos de Angola (UPA).124  The rebellion was bloody, 
reminiscent of rebellions of enslaved Africans in the Americas in previous centuries as 
many of those very same conditions were to be seen on the coffee plantations in Angola.  
The uprising lasted six months despite the Bakongo peasants lacking arms and formal 
guerrilla training, at its end over 1,000 white farmers and soldiers were killed and the 
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Portuguese authorities were forced to abandon a number of fortified forts in the area.  The 
Portuguese responded to this rebellion by reportedly killing almost 20,000 Bakongo which 
forced around 150,000 into exile, most of whom fled to Congo (later to be named Zaire).  
After these heavy losses it became apparent guerrilla training would be needed and the 
Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (ELNA), the UPA’s armed wing, was taken 
over by Marcos Kasanga and Joao Batista, former soldiers in the Portuguese army. 125      
Given the massive reprisals against both the UPA and MPLA in Angola, they 
moved their HQ to Leopoldville, Congo.  While Neto had been arrested after the initial 
upsurge of violence, upon his escape in 1962 with the help of an anti-Salazar underground, 
he re-joined the MPLA at HQ.  Around this time the Forças Armadas Populares de 
Libertação de Angola (FAPLA), the armed wing of the MPLA, was formed in response to 
vicious Portuguese response to the African uprisings of February and March 1961.  When 
Neto finally arrived in Leopoldville he was eventually, after some internal struggle, elected 
as President of the MPLA in December 1962.  Neto also tried to unite the MPLA with the 
UPA but to no avail as the latter distrusted the formers embrace of Marxism-Leninism.    
Under the leadership of Holden Roberto, who had like Lumumba attended the First AAPC 
and would eventually cultivate close links with the CIA, the UPA reshaped itself in March 
1962 into the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and tried to project itself 
as the government-in-exile.  By 1963 the FNLA was the most dominant group in Angola 
leading to bitter fighting between them and the MPLA.  Mobutu in Congo/Zaire, backed 
the FNLA which eventually lead to the MPLA being kicked out of Leopoldville in 1963.  
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They moved their headquarters to Brazzaville, Congo which was a boon in hindsight as it 
placed them strategically close to Cabinda and its rich oil reserves.126  
In South Africa in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre and the vicious repression 
of all Black political organisations by the apartheid regime, armed struggle was tacitly 
embraced by both the ANC-SA and PAC.  Beginning in November 1962 and continuing 
on and off throughout the 1960s, Poqo, the underground armed wing of the PAC, terrorised 
white rural communities with its brazen attacks on white farmers.  Similar in form to the 
Bakongo uprisings in March 1961 in terms of its targeting of whites, Poqo was highly 
effective at spreading fear among the white community.  Its goal was to trigger a Black 
uprising in the rural areas.  While this never materialised, it was during this time the main 
South African force engaged in some sort of sustained armed resistance.127  The PAC’s 
headquarters was in Basutoland as they had at the time excellent relations with the ruling 
Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).    
Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC-SA, was officially formed 
on December 16th, 1961 although discussions and decisions to form the movement had 
taken place throughout 1960 in the wake of Sharpeville.  MK was initially conceived as 
separate body from the still nominally non-violent ANC-SA where organisations both legal 
and banned could secretly coordinate and execute armed sabotage actions.  Unlike Poqo, 
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MK did not want to attack whites, or the armed forces, but structures of the apartheid state 
like pass-offices and infrastructure like power-lines.  Doing this would hopefully force the 
government to negotiate with them for free and fair elections.  Nelson Mandela was named 
the first Chief of MK with Joe Slovo of the SACP serving as his deputy.  Under their 
leadership a number of cadres were sent abroad for training (primarily USSR, Ethiopia, 
Morocco and Algeria) and local sabotage actions were carried out.  Unfortunately, on 
August 5th, 1962 Mandela was captured and in 1963 a series of events led to MK High 
Command being eventually discovered at the farm of Liliesleaf in Rivonia. 128  During the 
Rivonia trial of 1963 – 1964 Mandela and others were handed life sentences and shortly 
afterward transported to Robben Island.       
As the Rivonia trial picked up intensity, African states came together to form of the 
Organisation of African Unity in May 1963.  An important body within the newly created 
continental organisation was the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa 
(ALC).  The ALC had its roots in Julius Nyerere of Tanzania’s Pan-African Freedom 
Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), seen as the friendly rival of 
Nkrumah’s AAPC.  Dar es Salaam was eventually chosen as the HQ of the ALC over 
Lusaka as Zambia became independent only on October 24th, 1964, among other 
reasons.129  The formation of ALC was important because it would decide which 
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movements would be officially recognised and how much aid was to be given to each.  
Despite its noble intentions, many have argued that its creation intensified the rivalries 
between liberation movements representing various colonised peoples as each strove to be 
the “sole authentic” liberation movement of a particular colony. 
1964 would be an important year in the development of the armed struggle in 
southern Africa with three more events helping to intensify the armed struggle.  The first 
took place in January 1964 with revolution on the island of Zanzibar.  By April 1964 
Zanzibar had united with the mainland of Tanganyika to form Tanzania, a unification with 
mixed reactions among scholars and activists alike.  Some saw the unification as an 
example of Pan-Africanism in action that helped radicalize TANU.  Others perceived it to 
be an initiative by Nyerere, with lesser or greater impact from the CIA, to control the radical 
forces on the island as it was feared they would become a mini-Cuba and spread socialism 
throughout southern Africa.130  The same month as unification, the second important event 
took place when the Tanzanian government officially opened the Kongwa camp for the 
liberation movements under the administration of two Tanzanian Defence Force officers, 
Major Chongambele and Lt. Muganga.  Kongwa played host to FRELIMO, SWAPO, 
ANC-SA, MPLA, Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and unbeknownst to the 
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Tanzanian authorities the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).  
By 1965 over 1,000 guerrillas from the various movements were in training.131   
In October 1964, shortly after the opening of Kongwa camps, FRELIMO officially 
declared armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism, the last of the Portuguese African 
liberation movements to do so.132  Based in Tanzania, at first in Kongwa and then primarily 
in Nachingwea (southern Tanzania), FRELIMO soon became the most effective fighting 
force in southern Africa without much aid from the USSR.133  FRELIMO and its style of 
organisation became a model many of the liberation movements tried to utilize in hopes of 
replicating its success.    
The unity of FRELIMO as it pertains to its ability to fuse the various liberation 
organisations in Mozambique was one not found in the Zimbabwean movements.  The 
National Democratic Party (NDP) was the immediate petty bourgeois led precursor of 
ZAPU and Joshua Nkomo was the guiding personality which was still, at least on the 
surface, agitating for the British and UN to take a more active role in implementing free 
and fair elections in the white colonialist dominated Rhodesia.  There were various 
attempts made in mid-1962 at armed revolt secretly controlled by ZAPU but publically 
denounced.  Yet, as time went on a number of members became increasingly dissatisfied 
with Nkomo’s leadership.  These elements eventually broke from ZAPU and formed the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in August of 1963.  The Reverend Ndabaningi 
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Sithole was this splinter group’s first President.  Initially there were not many differences 
between the two organisations, ZANU was perhaps more verbally militant, yet the rivalry 
between the two groups was intense as clashes between supporters of the two groups broke 
out repeatedly in the Black areas of Salisbury (Harare) and Bulawayo throughout 1963 and 
1964.  Despite these clashes, it became clear that these forces were growing in power and 
the white government moved swiftly and arrested leaders of both organisations and placed 
them under house arrest.  Among those arrested were Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe 
(another attendee of the First AAPC), and Ndabaningi Sithole to name a few.  Despite these 
setbacks ZANU was the first of the two movements to openly launch the armed struggle in 
1965 and were backed by the Chinese and later FRELIMO, while ZAPU had since 1958, 
according to Vladimir Shubin, been given material assistance by the Soviet Union.134   
Following the tragic assassination of Malcolm X in February of 1965, the white 
government in Rhodesia made its infamous Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
in November 1965.135  This marked an important end to the first stage of the armed struggle 
as now the European colonialists indicated their determination to deny majority rule even 
if it meant going against the UN.  Yet again it was clear that Africans would have to be the 
ones to lead the fight for their own freedom which required increased political mobilization 
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at home, immaculate diplomacy abroad, and dogged determination in the execution of the 
armed struggle.  As this brief survey has shown, a number of movements suffered from 
both internal fractures and rivalries between various movements within the same colony.  
These rivalries would become more vicious as the USSR, China, Cuba and the United 
States entered the fray by financially, militarily and diplomatically backing one group 
against another.136   
 This is the context in which the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) activist Stokely Carmichael arrived in Tanzania in November 1967.  Coming at 
the tail-end of a lengthy tour of the Third World, the young Black Power activist came to 
Dar es Salaam to forge links between the US Black Power struggle and the African 
Liberation Movements (ALMs).  Secretly, Carmichael also wanted to join one of the armed 
wings of the ALMs in order to directly participate in the fight against white settler 
colonialism.  However, upon his arrival, Carmichael was alarmed at how unprepared and 
even lackadaisical some of the liberation movements seemed to be as it pertained to the 
execution of their respective armed struggles.  He made his opinions known publically at 
various speaking engagements but chose to criticize the ALMs collectively, rather than 
individually, so as not to isolate organisations or be seen to favour one group over another.  
Nevertheless, his blunt assessments offended some, chiefly, the ANC-SA.       
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Tanzania, Carmichael, and a Critique of the Liberation Movements 
In early 1967, President Julius Nyerere officially presented his Ujamaa 
(cooperative economics) vision to his people.  At the time this policy initiative electrified 
many as it seemed to offer a plausible path of socialist development for Africa.137  More 
importantly for Black radicals like Stokely Carmichael, Dar es Salaam as we have 
discussed above, was the headquarters of the ALC and consequently many of the ALMs 
had key representatives stationed there.  Moreover, they had guerrilla camps spread across 
the country in places like Kongwa, Nachingwea, and Morogoro to name a few.138  
Additionally, while Tanganyika’s road to political independence had been mostly non-
violent, the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964 had been anything but peaceful.  The 
unity of these two states and the presence of Zanzibari radicals such as Abdulrahman 
Mohamed Babu in the new unity government further increased the global leftist profile of 
the new Tanzanian state.139  This as well as Tanzania breaking off diplomatic relations with 
Britain from December 1965 – June 1968 after the latter refused to condemn the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia further enhanced its radical credentials. 
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For many Pan-African militants on both sides of the Atlantic, these achievements 
made Tanzania, especially after the coup against Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966, a 
location many had to visit.  Malcolm X arrived in Tanzania in October 1964, six months 
after unification, and was able to meet with Babu and Nyerere on his quest to forge stronger 
Black internationalist networks.140  The Chicago born Prexy Nesbitt, future Black Power 
advocate and ally of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), came to the 
University College of Dar es Salaam (UCD) in 1965 for a year on a study abroad program.  
During Nesbitt’s time at UCD he was able to participate with other Africans in a protest at 
the British Embassy in response to the UDI of Rhodesia.141  For a young Yoweri Museveni, 
future President of Uganda, dreaming of a radical education to help him liberate his 
country, the attraction of Dar es Salaam lay in its, ‘atmosphere of freedom fighters, 
socialists, nationalizations, [and] anti-imperialism’.142  For James Forman, SNCC’s 
Director of International Affairs who passed through Dar es Salaam in July of 1967, ‘Our 
first days in Dar es Salaam lifted our spirits high, and we wanted to remain in Africa for 
the rest of our lives… The freedom with which people talked of socialism, armed struggle, 
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the liberation of Africa, was a liberation in itself… coming as we did from the repressive 
atmosphere of the United States.’143       
At UCD countless intellectuals, global activists, TANU officials (even Nyerere 
himself) as well as representatives of the ALMs often spoke and/or hosted events.  At these 
popular events questions on how the armed struggle needed to be carried out, why it was 
important, and what the roles of allies would be were frequently discussed.144  The plight 
of Afro-Americans, and their attempts to resist through non-violence and urban rebellions 
throughout the 1960s, was also closely followed.  Many citizens of Tanzania, particularly 
those located in Dar es Salaam, paid close attention to these debates.  While many of them 
supported the ALMs, some of their actions – or perceived inactions – made a few 
Tanzanians ask some uncomfortable questions of them.  Moreover, as George Roberts has 
shown, intelligence agencies of imperialist powers such as the CIA and fascist European-
based vigilante organisations were very active in Dar es Salaam seeking to cause as much 
disunity and confusion as possible.145 
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When Stokely Carmichael arrived in Dar es Salaam on October 27th, 1967, this was 
the atmosphere he entered.  In his autobiography he recalls, ‘The Dar es Salaam I saw was, 
at that point, a hotbed of international intrigues’.146  He had written to various liberation 
movements a few weeks prior inquiring into the possibilities of him serving as an armed 
guerrilla in their organisations but had only received an affirmative response from David 
Sibeko of the PAC.  Thus, when Carmichael arrived in Dar he stayed with Sibeko and his 
wife Elizabeth for a time to get his bearings.147  Still, with little guidance on the ground, 
Carmichael threw himself into a number of speaking tours and interviews about a range of 
topics concerning African liberation, Black Power, African leaders, Vietnam, Ujamaa, 
armed struggle, and Che Guevara.  On Black Power, Stokely Carmichael defined it as the,  
coming together of black people around the world to fight, wherever they are, for their 
dignity, and the regaining of their Motherland, and to fight for the benefit of the masses of 
our people who are oppressed around the world… for the African-American, Black Power 
would mean the coming together of 50,000,000 Africans inside the United States; 
organizing ourselves into a powerful organisation ready to fight for our rights by any means 
necessary.148   
 
While the race question for Afro-Americans was central, Black Power was to be 
distinguished in Carmichael’s view from the Civil Rights Movement as one which sought 
the destruction of capitalism for a radical reorganisation of society.  The connection 
between the Afro-American and African struggles to him was their shared experience of 
racism and economic exploitation, with the former suffering from internal colonialism and 
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the latter classic colonialism.  For Black people racism was a fundamental experience and 
Carmichael was not shy in his criticisms of Marxists who often dismissed the race question 
as being incidental to the larger class question.  Another point repeatedly stressed 
throughout his stay in Tanzania was the need for both Afro-Americans and Africans to 
embrace the necessity of armed struggle.149  As it pertained to Tanzania, Carmichael 
believed that if they were, ‘going to take the lead in that struggle [liberating Africa] as she 
has shown signs of doing, it must be prepared to fight because it will have to fight’.150          
His second potent message, more than likely the start of his troubles, was that Black 
freedom could not be achieved if it was controlled by whites.  Stokely argued that too many 
movements, on both sides of the Atlantic, were ideologically and financially dependent on 
white support.  Fresh off his experiences in SNCC, in which well-meaning whites had been 
expelled for hindering Black organizing attempts in the US South, Carmichael believed 
whites had a limited role in the African struggle.  While some individuals may have fought 
for Black Africans, as a collective, white people could not and should not be relied on.151  
More importantly than the limitations of whites was his belief, shared by others like the 
Guyanese scholar-activist Walter Rodney, that Black Africans within the liberation 
movements needed to be the ones to independently define the shape and direction of their 
struggle.  Often serving as conduits for the vast material aid flowing from countries such 
as the USSR and socialist/communist groups in Europe, Carmichael felt that white support 
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often entailed the ALMs adopt ideological positions, such as taking sides in the Sino-Soviet 
split, which were not always in line with the interests of the African peoples.152          
Thirdly, Carmichael lambasted African heads of state and some liberation 
movement leaders for living lavish lifestyles, being indifferent to the fight for African 
freedom, or being unnecessarily intimidated/seduced by Western imperialism.153  In an 
interview with The Nationalist when he was asked to further explain why African heads of 
state disgusted him he replied,  
the African continent in general is ruled by clowns who are more concerned about big cars 
than the welfare of their people.  I do not name them because I do not want the white man 
to divide Africa further.  But I think it is crystal clear to all of us that many African leaders 
today are playing with the lives of their people and are traitors.154  
 
Not done yet, Carmichael isolated the leadership of the liberation movements as the 
reason the armed struggle was being setback as, ‘Half of those leaders do not even know 
how to use a gun.  The other half have never seen the inside of a jail inside their country 
and they are fighting revolutions.’155  Carmichael used the example of Che Guevara’s 
recent death fighting on the frontlines, widely covered in the Tanzanian newspapers, to 
argue it was unacceptable for the leadership of the African guerrillas to not be in the field 
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with their guerrillas.156  Instead of prioritizing traveling the world seeking aid they should 
be at home mobilizing their people.157  Carmichael also wanted to see the ALMs promote 
more sustained methods of struggle in their respective homelands even if it meant them 
using bottles and bricks as weapons against the colonial authorities; Afro-Americans were 
doing it he reasoned, so why could not they?  One did not need high tech weapons to fight 
back as seemed to be the pervading logic among some of the liberation movements.158   
Lastly, Carmichael urged the liberation movements to stop inflating the number of 
causalities they claimed to have inflicted on the enemy as it was unnecessary to do so.159  
These exaggerations further divided the liberation movements of the same country by 
forcing them to one-up each other in terms of enemies killed.  However oddly, given his 
fiery oratorical performances across Dar es Salaam, he followed this up with a plea to the 
ALMs to stop publically denouncing each other as that only served foreign/imperialist 
media who hungrily reported these differences.  Similar to his message to Afro-American 
groups claiming Black Power across the Atlantic, Carmichael felt disagreements within 
and among the liberation movements should be done behind closed doors.  Echoing the 
opinions of many in the ALC and allies of the ALMs, he argued that instead of publically 
critiquing one another, more united fronts were needed because they all were Africans 
fighting white colonialism in southern Africa.160  
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The Impact of Carmichael’s Comments on the Leadership and Rank-and-File of the 
ANC-SA  
The ANC-SA leadership reacted none too kindly to these comments, particularly 
the second and third points Carmichael made, and they took it upon themselves to denounce 
Carmichael publically.  Their disparaging remarks were republished across the United 
States even though details of his tour across the Third World to that point, according to his 
biographer Peniel Joseph, had gone mostly unreported.161  His direct statements were also 
not recounted in the mainstream media or Black press and so the prevailing viewpoint 
constructed by unfriendly media outlets was that he had made a fool of himself by 
needlessly critiquing the liberation movements. 
The Standard, a Tanzanian newspaper, reported on the ANC-SA’s response in a 
small piece entitled ‘Attack “Naïve” – A.N.C’ on November 5th.  The South African 
liberation organisation described Carmichael’s discussion of the ALMs as, ‘a stream of 
coarse invectives about Africa and her revolution.’162  The ANC-SA reportedly was upset 
with the “naiveté” shown by Carmichael and they continued by saying, ‘He excelled 
himself in meaningless and arrogant demagoguery.  This amateurism is not conducive to 
the proper co-ordination of the struggle of the Afro-American people with that of the 
people of Africa’.163  The New York Times jumped in on the act by reporting, ‘Carmichael, 
the American black power advocate, was accused today of preaching racial hatred by an 
African national group [the ANC-SA]’.164  The Washington Post gleefully reported, ‘A 
Negro African liberation movement yesterday accused visitor Stokely Carmichael of 
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preaching racial hatred that contradicted the fight against racism’.165  The Amsterdam News 
gave the most balanced although brief report in their issue reporting that Stokely departed 
Tanzania after having left ‘several African guerilla leaders irked over his criticism of them 
and other Africans admiring them’.166 
 Were Carmichael’s comments out of line?  This chapter argues they were not as 
much of what was being said by Carmichael reflected the sentiments of a number of rank-
and-file cadres in armed wings like MK across Tanzania.167  This should not be surprising 
as the strand of Black Power he represented was born from within the Civil Rights struggle 
as younger militants argued more confrontational methods were needed to truly win the 
fight against racism and social inequality.  The mainstream leadership of the Civil Rights 
movement entrenched within organisations like the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) were content with winning legal equality and mostly rejected armed self-defence 
as well as anti-imperialist/capitalist positions.  SNCC and later the Black Panther Party, to 
name just a few, rejected what they felt was a conservative approach towards the liberation 
process in the United States.  Much of the critique Black Power embodied was directed at 
the SCLC and NAACP for not reorganizing itself and its strategies to reflect the desires of 
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the Black masses to fight for, by any means necessary, a radical transformation of the racist 
capitalist system.168   
Unquestionably, the leadership of the US Civil Rights movement was different 
from those in the ANC-SA in exile, nevertheless, it would be the rank-and-file elements in 
MK who would deliver strikingly similar critiques to the ANC-SA for their (mis)handling 
of the armed struggle.  Around the time of Carmichael’s visit to Tanzania, and 
unbeknownst to him initially, the ANC-SA/MK had begun a secret mission to infiltrate 
armed guerrillas into South Africa through Rhodesia.  While risky, the ANC-SA felt 
pressured into this decision due to a combination of internal and external pressures.  To 
help them with this mission, the ANC-SA reached out to its ally ZAPU.  Together, they 
planned a joint operation designed to infiltrate MK cadres into South Africa through 
Rhodesia with ZAPU’s armed wing, the Zimbabwean People’s Revolutionary Army 
(ZIPRA), serving as a guide.  Two operations were launched in late 1967 and early 1968 
called respectively the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns; both failed to achieve their goal 
and dozens of MK and ZIPRA guerrillas were killed or arrested in a number of skirmishes 
against Rhodesian forces.  While these campaigns were outwardly touted as an important 
first step in waging armed struggle against the apartheid state, internally, the ANC-SA was 
reeling.169   
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A little over a year after Carmichael departed Tanzania a number of veterans of the 
Wankie campaign were released from prison in Botswana and allowed to return to ANC-
SA base in Lusaka, Zambia.  Furious by how unofficially they were received and 
determined to debrief about the failed mission, a young political commissar named Chris 
Hani and a few others penned a memorandum to put their thoughts to paper.  Upon its 
completion sometime in January 1969 they eventually circulated this document which 
critiqued the movement in exile for almost exactly the same things Carmichael had pointed 
out earlier.170  The Hani Memorandum, as it later came to be called, pinpointed a number 
of serious issues within the ANC-SA Hani and others felt needed to be addressed.     
Matching the withering opinion Carmichael had earlier expressed about the 
leadership of the liberation movements, the memorandum opened by declaring ‘the 
revolutionary members of M.K. have… lost all confidence in the ANC leadership 
abroad’.171  Much of this was due to veterans of the recent Rhodesian campaigns not getting 
a proper welcome from leadership after their return from imprisonment and having no de-
brief take place.  This perplexed the authors of the memorandum as they were anxious to 
learn from their previous mistakes in order plan better infiltration strategies in the future.  
To their disappointment, it seemed upon their return to ANC-SA HQ that they, and the 
armed struggle, had been forgotten.  This neglect by the leadership was due in their opinion 
to many being comfortable working in offices or traveling abroad instead of struggling 
around the clock to find ways to infiltrate South Africa.  This had transformed them, in the 
                                                          
Democracy in South Africa: Volume 1 [1960-1970], pp. 435-490; T. Simpson, Umkhonto We Sizwe: The 
ANC’s Armed Struggle (Cape Town, Penguin Books, 2016), pp. 133-165. 
170 H. Macmillan, ‘The “Hani Memorandum” – introduced and annotated’, Transformation: Critical 
Perspectives on Southern Africa, 69 (2009), pp. 106-129; J. Smith and B. Tromp, Hani: A Life Too Short 
(Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2009), pp. 83-125. 
171 Macmillan, “The ‘Hani Memorandum’”, 114. 
 72 
 
words of the writers, into ‘professional politicians rather than professional 
revolutionaries’.172     
To add insult to injury, many in leadership were corrupt and flamboyantly drove 
expensive cars, were receiving stipends, stayed in nice accommodations in the city, and 
received better healthcare than the rank-and-file.  They saw this, as Carmichael had earlier, 
as ‘in every way building them up as a middle class in our revolutionary organisation and 
in M.K.’.173  Hani and his comrades argued these attitudes lowered morale and caused 
many who had taken pains to escape the country to train for military combat to question 
how serious the leadership was in carrying out the armed struggle.  Furthermore, and this 
indirectly spoke to the concerns of Carmichael about leaders not knowing how to use guns, 
the writers of the memorandum felt it was ‘strange that its leaders have not been obliged 
to take the M.K. oath’.  If this was truly a revolutionary guerrilla army where leadership 
was no different from the MK rank-and-file, they needed to take this oath.  Finally, echoing 
the call of Carmichael that all efforts needed to be made by the liberation movements to go 
home, the memorandum added, ‘We demand that a serious and genuine effort should be 
made towards the intensification of ways and means of going home’.174   
Upon being read contents of the memorandum, many MK cadres in Kongwa camp 
openly supported it.  To them, it accurately reflected their interpretation of the numerous 
internal obstacles hindering the success of the movement.175  Yet, these opinions did not 
matter much to certain leaders, especially those called out by name in the memorandum.  
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For attempting to push for reform – done internally unlike Carmichael’s public tongue 
lashing – the writers of the memorandum were arrested, suspended, and later expelled from 
the ANC-SA in March 1969.  It is also rumoured they were sentenced to death and if it had 
not been for some quick action by Acting ANC-SA President Oliver Tambo and others, 
they would have been shot.  Chris Hani later recalled that the leadership reacted angrily 
because they ‘were not used to being criticised… from underlings, from subordinates’ in 
such a manner.176  Nevertheless, one month later in response to the memorandum the ANC-
SA held a consultative conference that later became known as the Morogoro Conference.  
Unofficially, the memorandum was used to help think about ways to reform and reorganize 
the party given its recent failures in Wankie and Sipolilo.177  Upon the conclusion of the 
conference, Chris Hani and his colleagues were pardoned, reinstated as members of the 
ANC-SA, and Hani was soon after promoted.   
Although the memorandum did not contest the presence of whites or USSR 
influence, and Chris Hani to our knowledge did not embrace Black Power, Hani would in 
a later interview in the early 1990s admit the ANC-SA had been overly reliant on the USSR 
for tactics, strategy, and ideology which hindered their ability to find their own solutions 
to problems.178  This was something Carmichael and later BCM activists had stressed as a 
trap the ANC-SA was falling into, both were ignored, but by the early 1990s even those 
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strongly in alliance with the fallen USSR were seeing the error their overreliance had 
caused.  Looking back, Hani recalled  
we are aware of the dominant role played by the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union] in the whole international communist movement… in some cases we saw 
internationalism as meaning the endorsement of positions of the CPSU.  In its ideological 
dispute with China, we tended to follow the position of the CPSU.  When it sent troops 
into both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, we endorsed those positions.  And I think generally 
we are all agreed as South African communists that it was not the right thing to do.179   
All the same, they did often uncritically follow the CPSU however Hani was quick 
to point out blame lay not with the USSR, but their own internal contradictions as an 
organisation.  Did this overreliance contribute to the public critique of Carmichael?  In 
some ways this reflection by Hani lends credence to the views of Richard Gibson, a Black 
journalist based in London-based who argued, ‘The ANC attack on Stokely Carmichael 
was… prompted by Russian fears that militant Black nationalism, Black Power doctrines, 
might sweep through Africa, shutting the door on white revisionist Communist “guidance” 
for the African liberation movements’.180  Although he was a dedicated Maoist and was 
working for the CIA at some point, he had cultivated close contacts with ZANU and the 
PAC who provided him with information on the clash between Stokely Carmichael and the 
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ANC-SA. 181  Despite his political leanings Gibson came to this conclusion because 
Carmichael along with James Forman and H. Rap Brown had supported the ANC-SA and 
ZAPU Wankie campaign even though they were advised by organisations like the PAC, 
ZANU and other African leaders to condemn it as a senseless suicide mission.182  Yet, 
Carmichael was still viciously attacked by the ANC-SA which Gibson correctly pointed 
out was uncharacteristic of it.   
Undoubtedly we cannot out of hand dismiss the involvement of the USSR in this 
attack on Carmichael by the ANC-SA.  That said, Gibson’s explanation does not take into 
account the equally, if not more so, vicious response by ANC-SA leadership to the Hani 
Memorandum less than eighteen months later.  Chris Hani was by that time a member of 
the SACP, close with Jack and Ray Simons (key senior white members of the SACP), and 
was seen as a rising star within the organisation.183  Nonetheless these factors did not stop 
Hani and his comrades from being suspended, briefly expelled, and almost executed.  More 
than just the pressure put on them by the USSR was at play in this drama.   
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Another explanation lies in the work of John Marcum.  By the late 1960s the ANC-
SA was in a deep crisis for a number of reasons.  Suffering through this crisis put the 
movement under a lot of stress which lends weight to Marcum’s argument that their severe 
reaction to Carmichael’s ‘unsolicited, critical counsel to the African liberation movements’ 
was due primarily to the vulnerability they felt as it pertains to the status of their armed 
struggle.184  It became easier to blame their failures or struggles on a third party rather than 
internally confront the real problems Carmichael, Chris Hani, and later Black 
Consciousness cadres and groups would highlight.  However, hearing these criticisms from 
inside the organisation, particularly from lower ranking members pushed the ANC-SA/MK 
to the brink.     
Similar to the Black Power critique of the Civil Rights movement – demanding a 
more militant struggle against US oppression to be organised by people such as Carmichael 
– Hani from January-March 1969 represented a similar tendency within MK and the ANC-
SA agitating the older leadership to radically reform itself to better carry out the armed 
struggle.  Read in this light, and speaking to Seth Markle’s argument about the style of 
Carmichael causing more trouble than his substance, the older ANC-SA leadership was 
more connected to the mainstream Civil Rights organisations than to Black Power.  Also, 
given the ANC-SA’s limited presence in Afro-American communities during the 1960s, as 
most of their attention was focused on the United Nations, Carmichael’s style of oratory 
and usage of words could have been seen as being rude and disrespectful.  On top of this, 
Carmichael and Chris Hani were young men in their mid-20s.  For the older male ANC-
                                                          
184 J. Marcum, ‘The Exile Condition and Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation 
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(New York, Free Press, 1972), p. 271. 
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SA leadership who were in their 40s and above, being spoken to so forcefully by younger 
men, not to mention women, grated on them.  All in all, the negative reactions to 
Carmichael’s comments speaks more about how painfully they hit home to some of the 
movements like the ANC-SA, instead of his comments being out of place or him being 
critical of Marxism as Peniel Joseph and Ekwueme Thelwell respectively have argued.  
           
Black Power, the Assassination of Dr. King, and the Project of African Liberation: 
December 1967 – December 1973 
Despite significant negative press among imperialists and the ANC-SA, 
Carmichael’s statements seemed to be well received among Tanzanians.  A close look at 
the two major English-language Tanzanian newspapers of the time demonstrates how 
actively people were engaging with his comments and seemed agreeable to them.  The 
Standard’s editors had perhaps the most balanced take on Carmichael’s visit when they 
wrote, ‘In spite of his gratuitous and ill-founded insults… and in spite of all the 
flamboyance and histrionics, much of his accusation and advice has a hard core of practical 
commonsense’.  They agreed with his call for more demonstrations to be organised within 
the colonies by the liberation movements, his critique of inflated causality claims, and 
acknowledged his realism as it pertained to the need for a united African political ideology.  
‘However, like all brash young revolutionaries he would change the world overnight, no 
matter the consequences or the harm that could be done to countless thousands’.185   
                                                          
185 ‘Sunday News Opinion: Mr. Carmichael’ The Standard, Sunday (Sunday News, Special Edition), 
November 5th, 1967, p.4. 
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The TANU-backed paper, The Nationalist, took a decidedly pro-Carmichael view.  
It argued, after he had departed Tanzania, that he had done two important things, namely 
‘the articulation of Black Power, and… the link he forged between the African Americans 
struggle inside the United States and the struggle of the Third World’.  They continued by 
denouncing those who claimed Carmichael only practiced hate speech and they embraced 
Black Power as, ‘a concept that cannot be confined to the United States, because it is also 
particularly relevant in colonies where white settlers and non-black merchants are lording 
it over blacks’.  For them Black Power implied Black self-determination, redefinition, and 
pride in culture – comparable to Ujamaa – and they believed Tanzanians needed to, ‘take 
Black Power very seriously’.186   
How did everyday Tanzanians in Dar es Salaam at the time respond to this message 
of Black Power?  Nothing definitive can be said about this but we can examine the 
regularly-published letters to the Editor of The Nationalist to give us a general sense of 
some people’s thoughts.  One writer named A.S. Mbonda from Dar agreed ‘with Mr. 
Carmichael, the Black Power leader on his views concerning “Freedom Fighters”... These 
people should not be allowed to make any noise here without taking any practical measures 
on the battle spot’.187  A Wasilwa Barasa embraced Black Power as applicable to Africa 
because it was ‘a threat to collective neo-colonialism and gives white racists and their 
lackey’s many sleepless nights’.188  In another piece, a writer named “Revolutionary” 
vociferously critiqued certain liberation movements who ran to the Western press 
complaining about Carmichael’s comments.  ‘By blatantly seeking to denigrate brother 
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Stokely, these so-called freedom fighters would seem to imply that in fact they are here 
waiting for someone to give them armoured cars and tanks to go out and fight their 
oppressors!!’  Furthermore, after making a distinction between revolutionaries and 
professional freedom fighters (a distinction Hani and others would use a little over a year 
later in their memorandum), “Revolutionary” wrote,  
What is even appalling is the way these professional freedom fighters have misunderstood 
Stokely.  When he talked about fighting with bottles he meant, as any other revolutionary 
would have meant, that at least some of these freedom fighters… should go home and 
organize their people for sabotage work which is an important aspect of guerrilla fighting 
instead of flirting around here with whites’.189       
Tanzanians and MK cadres were not the only ones in Africa to react to the Black 
Power Movement.  Kwame Nkrumah, who had briefly met Carmichael before he left for 
Tanzania (and was later to become his mentor when Stokely came to live in Guinea-
Conakry), saw Black Power as intimately linked with the international struggle against 
capitalism.  He wrote a pamphlet about it entitled The Spectre of Black Power which was 
cited heavily by groups such as the PAC in its publication Azania News.  In this pamphlet 
Nkrumah commented that, ‘With a decisiveness and force which can no longer be 
concealed the spectre of Black Power has descended on the world like a thundercloud 
flashing its lightning’.190  Furthermore, it was,  
part of the vanguard of world revolution against capitalism, imperialism and neo-
colonialism which have enslaved, exploited and oppressed peoples everywhere… Black 
Power is part of the world rebellion of the oppressed against the oppressor… It operates 
throughout the African continent, in North and South America, the Caribbean, wherever 
Africans and the people of African descent live.  It is linked with the Pan-African struggle 
for unity on the African continent, and with all those who strive to establish a socialist 
society.191   
 
                                                          
189 ‘Letter to the Editor: Freedom Fighters’, The Nationalist, Friday, November 17th, 1967, p.4.  Later on, as 
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 In the wake of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in April 1968, a 
number of other ALMs embraced the banner of Black Power, none more openly than 
ZANU.  In their publication Zimbabwe News, they condemned the US white supremacist 
system for murdering Dr. King and saw his assassination as a call to arms.  ZANU declared, 
‘Black people, both here and in America, have been singing and praying for too much 
throughout many centuries of enslavement.  There has to be an end to “loving” even those 
who would murder us at the first opportunity, and that can only come about via the use of 
power –black power’.192  A violent response to a violent system was required and this 
separated them from groups such as the ANC-SA which were in ZANU’s estimation, 
‘Southern Africa’s oldest Uncle Tom [who] once denounced Stokely Carmichael as an 
“irresponsible racist demagogue” for urging militancy in the struggle’.193        
For SWAPO, while their Dar es Salaam and London offices did notmention King’s 
death, the Cairo branch did.  In the Namibian Commentator and News Graphic SWAPO 
believed the assassination of Dr. King by white America revealed their determination to 
wipe out Black people and King joined Malcolm X and Medgar Evers as martyrs for, ‘the 
Afro-American struggle for dignity’.  Hence,  
The Blackman’s struggle in the U.S.A like that of his compatriot in another U.S.A (Union 
of South Africa) had reached a stage that there is simply no sense to confront the racist 
maniacs with the non-violence methods… This is why we fully support the call by Brother 
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Stokely Carmichael to his people to get guns in order to protect themselves and wage a 
struggle against the racist suppression and enslavement.194 
 
The ANC-SA’s ally ZAPU would restrict their comments to condemning the life-
sentence given to Dr. King’s assassin as a demonstration of the hypocrisy of US liberal-
democracy.195  In a later piece ZAPU would call out the US government for spending 
billions on space programs while American Negroes lived in poverty and were 
disproportionally drafted in higher numbers to fight in the unjust Vietnam War.196  A few 
years later, ZAPU member Comrade Ziyapapa would in a statement made at the African-
American Relations Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (December 3-7th, 1973) make it 
clear that until Black folks were given equal rights in the United States, all statements made 
by the Americans of their support for freedom and democracy were not to be trusted.197  
The ANC-SA, like ZAPU, was equally elusive on the question of Black Power and 
strangely, Sechaba, the ANC-SA’s publication, did not acknowledge Dr. King’s 
assassination.   
It would take until 1970 for the ANC-SA to break their silence on Black Power and 
they would do so by publishing an interview they conducted with Minister of Defense of 
the BPP Huey P. Newton shortly after his release from prison.198  In this interview Huey 
explained how the Panthers were formed and then proceeded to supersede Black Power as 
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they ‘transformed [it] into a socialist ideology, a Marxist-Leninist ideology.’  When asked 
about future programs Huey talked about the need for armed struggle on a global scale to 
overthrow, ‘the ruling circle in the United States of America’ and as Black America was 
an internal colony, she had the right to claim nationhood.  He closed by asking for more 
information on Southern Africa’s liberation struggle, offered to send people to fight for the 
struggle, as well as provide the ANC-SA with more information on the Afro-American 
struggle.199   
The Panthers and the wider Black Power Movement had an irresistible effect on 
many African revolutionary groups and governments in the wake of King’s assassination.  
The Congolese Worker’s Party was one such group who shortly after their independence 
eagerly invited the International Section of the Black Panther Party to attend their 
International Conference of Solidarity with the People Under Portuguese Domination in 
mid-1971.200  In a series of interviews with Eldridge Cleaver, First Secretary Ndalla of the 
Congolese Workers Party acknowledged the importance of the Afro-American struggle as 
one taking place ‘in the very citadel of imperialism’.201  The Political Commissar of the 
National People’s Army, Ange Diawara, who Kathleen Cleaver would later describe as 
‘the most impressive experience of the visit’, would express similar sentiments.202  
Comrade Diawara it seemed had ensured that before the Black Panther delegation arrived 
‘some comrades made oral reports on the struggle of the Black Panthers in the United 
States… [while] some comrades gave some refresher talks, for in the context of teaching 
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the fighters about the revolutionary struggles taking place in the world, they already knew 
what the Black Panther Party was’.203  The Panthers were so impressed by this 
revolutionary government that they briefly considered moving the International Section 
HQ to Brazzaville from Algiers, Algeria. 
 
Conclusion: The African Reach of Black Power 
In closing, this piece submits a rethinking is needed of some of the interpretations 
of Carmichael’s trip to Tanzania and the wider silence on Black Power’s impact in Africa.  
As it pertains to the works of Peniel Joseph and to an extent E. Michael Thelwell, the 
former believing the guerrilla leaders did not seriously consider his message while the latter 
argued the trouble caused in Dar centred mostly on Stokely’s questioning of Marxism-
Leninism, a closer look at different sources necessitates a more nuanced reading of his trip 
and its impact.  Especially as it pertains to Joseph’s analysis, much of it is trapped by its 
uncritical reliance on United States Information Agency (USIA) documents and 
international media outlets who used the ANC-SA’s critique as speaking defacto for the 
African guerrillas.   
To begin with, Carmichael was enthusiastically received by not only college 
students, but key liberation movements and many citizens of Dar es Salaam who felt his 
message of Black Power resonated deeply within their own experiences as colonised and 
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recently liberated Africans.  Secondly, many of his critiques of the liberation movements, 
while they should have been more tactfully delivered, were nevertheless accurate and even 
more so, Carmichael was not the only figure to point out these issues.204  Finally, 
Carmichael’s presence in Dar es Salaam, the hub of the liberation movements of Africa, 
placed the agenda of Black Power within the context of African freedom and in his wake 
a number of liberation movements and personalities openly aligned themselves with the 
movement’s message.  Hence, his trip was far from being a failure.  Furthermore, the global 
reach of Black Power had laid firm roots in Africa.  More importantly for the purposes of 
this dissertation, it shows the Black Consciousness Movement was not unique among 
organisations in Africa fighting against white settler colonialism to embrace Black Power.    
The deeper question this research poses for continued research on the ANC-SA in 
exile, beyond analysing the impact of the SACP, is what was the impact of radical Black 
Nationalist praxis’s like Black Power and later Black Consciousness on the ANC-SA 
leadership?  Particularly as it pertains to Black Consciousness, why was it so fiercely 
rejected by ANC-SA leadership in exile?  How much or how little did these new recruits 
impact the ANC-SA and MK’s ideological orientations and/or its organisational structures 
in exile?205  The next chapters attempt to answer these queries.      
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The Expansion of Black Consciousness from a Project of Psychological 
Liberation to Physical Liberation, December 1968 – August 1973    
 
 The impact of the Black Power Movement was felt not only in Tanzania, or within 
the African Liberation Movements (ALMs), but also among young Black students trying 
to survive under apartheid rule in South Africa.  While Black Power grabbed global 
headlines, with Carmichael’s visit to Tanzania placing its politics directly within the 
growing regional guerrilla movement, young Black university students in South Africa 
began using its language to chart a new way forward.  Among the resolutions passed at the 
South African Students’ Organisation’s (SASO) July 1970 conference, one stated that as 
‘the Students’ Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee was one of the first organisation to 
adopt the “Black Power” Slogan and to articulate the philosophy after careful 
consideration… [SASO] resolves to instruct the Executive to seek information on the 
SNCC and their approach to Black Power’.206  During their political education sessions 
later that year SASO cadres were very clear that the ‘study of the Afro-American approach 
to their problems offered interesting comparisons between their situation in the [United] 
States and ours in this country.’207     
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As the 1970’s progressed and BCM spread across the country, a rich debate began 
as to how much or little the US Black Power movement influenced it.208  Unequivocally, 
the former was inspired by the latter.  Easier to access than some of the banned communist 
or African Liberation Movement (ALM) literature, Black students listened covertly to the 
speeches of Malcolm X and Dr. King, closely followed the actions of the Black Panther 
Party (BPP) and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), procured 
books of Black Power figures legally and illegally, and in their political discussions used 
revolutionary thinkers such as Frantz Fanon to formulate their own rubric of revolution.209  
Additionally, Black American cultural expression through artists such as Ray Charles, 
James Brown, Nina Simone, and Soul music greatly influenced the style, language and 
attitude of South African Black youth during the 1970s.  The adaptation of the Afro hair-
style became immensely popular during this era as was the carving of Black fists on the 
chests of outspoken activists who proudly declared themselves to be “Black and Proud”.210   
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With BCM’s relationship with Black Power serving as a backdrop, this chapter will 
chart the early formative years of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) from its 
beginnings in December 1968 to the flight of what would become the Azanian People’s 
Liberation Front (APLF)/Bokwe Group core leadership in September 1973.  For scholars 
of BCM, the early formative years is broadly understood to encompass the founding of 
SASO, the activism of Steve Biko, the impact of Black Power on BCM activists, the 
importance of the University Christian Movement (UCM), the formation of the Black 
People’s Convention (BPC), and more recently a historiography of the Black Community 
Programmes (BCPs).211  Fleeting attention has been paid to the importance of BCMs efforts 
to organise waged workers, build literacy programs, debate the merits of taking up arms, 
and the real fears the apartheid regime had about the growing movement.  Even less 
attention has been given to the central role played by Black women in the growth and 
development of these various projects which has hindered a deeper understanding of the 
dynamism of BCM.     
In order to address this hole in the literature, this chapter will be arranged 
chronologically as follows.  The first section will broadly chart the struggles of the African 
National Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA) and Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 
(PAC) to stay relevant to South Africa’s struggle from their banning in the wake of the 
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Sharpeville Uprising to the official closing of MK’s camps in Tanzania in 1971.  The 
following section will delve briefly into a biography of Bokwe Mafuna, one of the 
unheralded founding activists of BCM, and discuss the early formation of the core 
leadership of the movement.  This will be followed by an engagement with the Black 
Consciousness (BC) project of psychological liberation through the renaming of 
themselves as Black, how the message of BC was spread at universities, and how its ideas 
were taught to new members.  The next section will discuss the central role Black women 
played in the expansion of BCM from a university movement to the urban and rural areas 
of South Africa.  The next two sections will trace the formation of the BPC and the 
watershed Tiro Affair which opened the space for a more open discussion of armed 
struggle.  This will be followed with a brief engagement on the relationships between the 
BCM activists who would go on to become to core leaders of APLF in Botswana.  The 
conclusion will recap this rereading of BCM’s formative years (1968-1973), which extends 
the mainstream understanding of these years from 1972 to 1973, and then discuss why this 
new movement was seen as a threat to the apartheid regime.       
 
A Flailing Armed Struggle: MK and APLA Searching for Answers, 1960-1971  
In the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre which took place on March 21st, 1960, 
where the apartheid government killed sixty-nine and injured well over one-hundred 
peaceful PAC-led protesters across South Africa, the ANC-SA and PAC were banned as 
organisations.  In response, the ANC-SA and its ally the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) formed Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) whose initial purpose was to sabotage vital 
infrastructures across the country in hopes of putting pressure on the regime to negotiate 
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with them for free and fair elections.212  According to ANC-SA/SACP historian and activist 
Frances Meli, this turn to armed struggle was seen as necessary among key leaders as they 
believed if they were not seen by the masses to be leading efforts to respond to the state’s 
violent attacks, they would lose credibility as an organisation.213  Unfortunately by 1964 
after a few isolated actions Nelson Mandela and eventually most of MK’s High Command 
were in prison leaving the remaining leadership in exile and the internal sabotage missions 
in tatters.     
 After the arrest of the PAC’s founding President Robert Sobukwe in the wake of 
the Sharpeville Massacre, Potlako Leballo rose to leadership in the early 1960s.  Arianna 
Lissoni and Kwandiwe Kondlo’s excellent research on the early phase of the PAC’s history 
in exile has shown that while based out of Lesotho (at the time called Basutoland) in 1963, 
Leballo ordered secret networks of underground PAC activists who later became known as 
Poqo (meaning “pure” or “alone” in Xhosa), to attack white farmers and policemen in order 
to end apartheid once and for all.  His statement, foolishly made to the press, tipped the 
apartheid regime off to the plans of the PAC and hundreds of its members were arrested 
under suspicion of being Poqo.  In spite of this monumental blunder, some Poqo guerrillas 
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were able to evade capture and over the next few years a number of isolated attacks against 
white settlers were carried out.214 
Forced to flee to Tanzania and Zambia, ANC-SA and PAC leaders and rank-and-
file members who were able to evade arrest attempted to reorganize themselves after these 
crippling setbacks.215  Due to a combination of internal (MK restlessness) and external 
(Organisation of African Unity) pressures, the ANC-SA reached out to its ally the 
Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) for assistance in infiltrating South Africa.  
Together, they planned a joint operation designed to infiltrate MK cadres into South Africa 
through Rhodesia with ZAPU’s armed wing, the Zimbabwean People’s Revolutionary 
Army (ZIPRA), serving as a guide.  Two operations were launched in late 1967 and early 
1968 called respectively the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns; both failed to achieve their 
goal and dozens of MK and ZIPRA guerrillas were killed or arrested.  While these 
campaigns were outwardly touted as an important first step in waging armed struggle 
against the apartheid state, internally, the ANC-SA was reeling.216   
Upon the return of some veterans of the campaigns to ANC-SA headquarters in 
Zambia after almost two years in Botswana prisons, a small group led by Commissar Chris 
Hani wrote and circulated a memorandum identifying top ANC-SA/MK leaders and the 
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lack of internal democracy as the primary reasons for the current failures of the armed 
struggle.217  In response, this group was arrested, stripped of membership, and almost 
executed for insubordination.  Acting President Oliver Tambo and others eventually 
intervened to release Hani’s group and postpone the decision on their expulsion.  In 
response to one of the critiques in the memorandum, Oliver Tambo called for an ANC-SA 
consultative congress at Morogoro, Tanzania in early 1969 where a number of reforms 
were made.  After this conference, the group who wrote the memorandum was pardoned 
and Hani was promoted.218   
This pardon and promotion was met with anger from a few MK guerrillas and there 
were whispers that some were plotting a mutiny against Tambo.  Working with the Zambian 
army these disillusioned comrades were contained.219  To make matters worse, after the 
conclusion of the Morogoro conference the President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere ordered 
all of MK’s camps closed.  This was prompted by suspicions that the ANC-SA was either 
complicit in or in support of a coup attempt against Nyerere by his former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Oscar Kambona.  These suspicions combined with how close the ANC-SA 
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was to the USSR prompted the Tanzanian government to expel MK from Tanzania until 
the middle of 1971.220 
Around the time of the Sipolilo campaign in 1968 the PAC entered into an alliance 
of its own, however, they chose to work with the Comité Revolucionário deMoçambique 
(COREMO) who was a rival to the larger Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(FRELIMO).  The hope was that by working together the PAC’s reformed armed wing, the 
Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), could find a way to infiltrate some of their 
cadres into South Africa through southern Mozambique.  This campaign, named Operation 
Villa Piri, also failed but was important according to APLA guerrillas because it gained 
them the respect of liberation movements across southern Africa.221  Unfortunately, in the 
wake of this unsuccessful infiltration internal splits and arguments between Templeton 
Ntantla, the head of APLA, and Potlako Leballo began to tear at the seams of an already 
struggling organisation.222   
 For both organisations these challenges, combined with the limited support from 
the fledgling Botswana government and the continued strength of the white settler regimes 
across southern Africa, effectively closed them off from South Africa.  Consequently, they 
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felt forced to halt recruiting efforts for their armed wings and their internal networks 
suffered as attention now turned to surviving in exile.  It was within this context, what Tom 
Karis and Gail Gerhart have described as a hole in South African Black politics, that BCM 
under the stewardship of SASO began to rise in influence among the Black masses of South 
Africa.223  Among these new activists Bokwe Mafuna would emerge as a guiding 
personality among those convinced that armed struggle was the only way they could free 
themselves from apartheid oppression. 
 
Bokwe Mafuna, the “Small Broederbond”, and the Founding of BCM 
Bokwe Mafuna was born in Mafeking on January 14th, 1937 to working class Xhosa 
parents.  By the mid-1950s, unable to finish Form II, he moved to Johannesburg to find 
work to help support himself and his struggling family.  In these early years Mafuna 
supported the ANC-SA but later joined the PAC as he embraced their explicit Pan 
Africanism which rejected the non-racialism practiced by the ANC-SA.  In a later interview 
Mafuna recalled that part of the allure of the PAC to him at the time was he ‘was young 
and was thinking emotionally like any young man.  I hated the system, I hated what was 
happening to me, I was full of anger and revolt, but I did not know how to express it.’224  
This anger intensified after the banning of the ANC-SA and PAC.  After both organisations 
were banned he briefly worked for the Engineering Worker’s Union (EWU) but after a 
fallout left to take a job as a freelance writer for the Rand Daily Mail (RDM) newspaper in 
1968.225  As a freelance writer Mafuna made it his mission to track down stories about 
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Black life in South Africa, particularly African life in the townships, and use his pen as a 
tool to expose the suffering apartheid was inflicting on his people.     
While Mafuna was finding his way with the RDM, university students like Steve 
Biko and his colleague Barney Pityana were growing increasingly frustrated at the 
multiracial National Union of South African Students’ (NUSAS).  In particular the white 
members’ lack of militancy and desire to dominate discussions of freedom despite their 
position of privilege under apartheid.  While individually they had good relationships with 
some of the more leftist-leaning leadership of NUSAS, the larger white student body was 
mostly moderate or conservative.  Black students constantly found themselves having to 
either mediate their criticisms of the system of apartheid through this predominately white 
leadership or quickly found that these students, for all their preaching of non-racialism and 
equality, were not willing to challenge their own racism let alone effectively attack the 
apartheid regime.226   
Rejecting this, a number of Black students like Steve Biko who were members of 
NUSAS broke from the organisation in order to create an autonomous Black organisation 
where they could discuss among themselves what the problems of apartheid were and plan 
how to dismantle this oppressive system.227  From this SASO was founded in December 
1968 at Marianhill with its unofficial headquarters located at the University of Natal Non-
European Section (later Black section, UNB) in Durban where Biko was studying 
medicine.228  The year 1968 was significant as it was one of student protest and radical 
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action world-wide.  Some scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein have termed this moment as 
a second wave of global anti-systemic movements, the first being 1848, seeking to 
challenge the capitalist world-economy.229  South Africans were not immune from this 
global current as many like Biko, Mafuna, Barney Pityana and another rising SASO 
activist, Randwezi Nengwekhulu, paid close attention to its dynamics.  By melding this 
global wave with their local experiences under apartheid, a new political space began to 
form where the voice of the oppressed majority began to rise with confidence and 
purpose.230   
After SASO’s December 1968 opening conference, Biko was clear that his 
organisation believed in ‘the principle that blacks should work themselves into a powerful 
group so as to go forth and stake their rightful claim in the open society rather than to 
exercise that power in some obscure part of the Kalahari.  Hence it belies the belief that 
our withdrawal is an end in itself’.231  While tentative at first in their break with NUSAS, 
eliciting some criticism from some militant students, SASO eventually found its footing to 
make a public break with NUSAS during the term of its 2nd President Barney Pityana.232  
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By 1971 SASO had openly condemned all multi-racial organisations as working against 
the interests of Black liberation.233 
The formation of SASO caught the attention of Bokwe Mafuna who began to take 
more of an interest in the budding moves of these university students.  He was eventually 
able to meet with UCM activists Stanley Ntwasa and Justice Moloto who, as scholar Daniel 
Magaziner has correctly shown, were critical to the early development of SASO.234  
Through them Mafuna met Steve Biko in 1969; the two men had many similarities such as 
coming from a PAC background and being avid readers of Black radicals like Malcolm X, 
Stokely Carmichael, and Frantz Fanon.235  Saths Cooper and Wally Serote, two early 
converts to Black Consciousness, remember Mafuna having an excellent Jazz record 
collection which made his small house in Alexandra township a party/meeting-spot for 
Black Consciousness activists.  Eventually, Mafuna began to attend UCM and SASO 
events and regularly covered them for the Rand Daily Mail.236 
The addition of Mafuna and Nengwekhulu to the growing movement introduced a 
level of working class activism into SASO.  Mafuna and Nengwekhulu, having had a 
history in labour organising and university activism prior to the formation of SASO, were 
with Biko and Pityana some of the founding activists of key BCM organisations like the 
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Black People’s Convention (BPC, the leading Black political organisation for adults), 
SASO, National Youth Organisation (NAYO), the BCPs, BWP (the labour union/workers 
wing of BCM) and the Union of Black Journalists (UBJ).  Nengwekhulu cheekily called 
this group the “Small Broederbond” who quietly, and in similarly patriarchal fashion to 
their unwitting namesakes, guided the movement during these formative years.237    
  
Psychological Liberation: Becoming Black, Spreading the Gospel of BC, and 
Formation Schools (FS) 
 
This “Small Broederbond” was central in the early years of BCM in promoting, as 
a part of the project of psychological liberation, efforts of non-whites to rename 
themselves.  Up until the formation of SASO, Blacks were legally and informally referred 
to as non-whites/Europeans.  This classification was something the early BCM activists 
began to forcefully reject in favour of being identified as “Black”.  This was important, and 
unquestionably inspired by Black Power, in the first instance because it was a clear 
assertion of self in direct contention with the concept ‘non’ which implied one was not 
something, i.e. the standard that was white or European.  Being Black became a way to 
assert ones being in and of oneself.  Additionally, BCM used the concept Black to pull all 
the racially/ethnically (Zulu, Xhosa, Tsonga, etc.) oppressed Africans under one political 
identity.  Consequently, and controversially among some among the older generation, 
Indians and Coloureds were included in the definition of Black showing it to be an identity 
grounded in socio-economic and political factors of exploitation and oppression.  SASO 
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began to frame this population as the majority who would eventually reshape and re-
Africanize South Africa and give the world its human face, a Black one.238  They also 
began to refer to Bantustan leaders and others who supported the system of divide and rule 
as “non-whites” showing that scholars like Salim Badat, Anthony Marx and others who 
have argued that BC was trapped by a level of Black chauvinism are mistaken.   
Armed with a core leadership, a new political identity, and a rejection of Bantustan 
and other apartheid created avenues for Black political expression, the movement now 
began to take seriously the mission of spreading “the gospel of Black Consciousness” 
throughout the universities and high schools.  In these early years Biko, Nengwekhulu and 
Pityana were tasked with going to the Black universities such as Turfloop, Ngoye, Fort 
Hare and the Western Cape to convince Black students to disaffiliate from NUSAS and 
join their new organisation.  Working with and within the Student Representative Councils 
(SRC’s) as well as radical Christian groups like the UCM was critical to their success.  
Being initially officially recognised by university administrators made it easier for SASO 
to build its membership without gaining the disapproval of university officials or the state 
so soon.   
Welile Nhlapo and Mosibudi Mangena, young cadres who would later become key 
leaders in a second wave of BCM leadership after the “Small Broederbond”, both recall 
coming into contact with SASO while at university in early 1971.239  In a recent interview 
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Nhlapo recalls Biko making ‘a speech, we were listening very careful and attentively to 
him and then a select group of us met with him afterwards to respond to the call he was 
making to the University of Zululand to join SASO.’240  Similarly, Mangena in his early 
memoir noted that these ‘early visitors [Biko and others] made a powerful impression on 
us [students]’ with their preaching on the importance of Black unity and their subtle 
criticisms of the apartheid regime.241   
As new cadres like Mangena and Nhlapo entered the still fledgling movement a 
method needed to be developed to teach the politics of Black Consciousness to more 
people, study previous South African movements, learn about global events, and create a 
space where young cadres could themselves add to and expand upon what BCM would and 
should mean for the liberation of South Africa.  One of the institutions built by SASO to 
accomplish this were the Formation Schools (FS).  Keith Mokoape, the younger brother to 
PAC and later founding BCM activist Aubrey Mokoape, recalled in a recent interview that 
in these FS, which would usually take place over the weekends or during holidays,  
we would… compare the different revolutionary movements and where they were, where they failed.  So we 
had ample literature, I really can’t remember how we used to get these documents whether it is a book by 
Malcolm X, whether it is Black guys in the United States who were the Black Panthers, so, Amilcar Cabral, 
you name it, we used to read a lot.  And at this workshops, I remember I was in a workshop that was studying 
the positives and negatives of the ANC and another group was studying the PAC and another group was 
studying the Unity Movement another group was studying the Communist Party and then we would come 
back together to plenary and say all of them ultimately failed and we must do something better242 
 
These national and regional FS were essentially training seminars held by the local, 
regional, and national sections of SASO.  According to notes from one the first FS 
meetings, FS were designed ‘to allow the participants the chance of self-development 
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through participation in discussions and other group projects.  In this way this offers also 
a training in leadership qualities’.  Furthermore, those who participated in these training 
seminars were encouraged to ‘contribute in ideas towards the running of the organisation’ 
so that ‘most of the work done by the participants forms the basis of the way in which 
SASO functions’.243  Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, they were designed ‘to 
create a core of people in each campus who not only understood in detail what SASO is all 
about, but, also who are prepared to do SASO work’.244  This investment in grooming 
leadership at all levels of BCM set it apart from previous South African organisations.  It 
grew out of an understanding by the founding leadership of BCM that eventually they 
would be banned and/or arrested by the apartheid regime and if this happened, they did not 
want a void in Black radical politics to emerge in South Africa as had been the case in the 
wake of the bannings of the ANC-SA and PAC.           
 
Black Women and Black Consciousness: Spreading the Movement beyond the 
University  
Another element integral to the project of psychological liberation, 
conscientization, and activism was the gender question.  Although not engaged in with the 
tenacity of the race question, it held some significance to early BC activists.  More 
importantly, it was a debate and discourse which evolved over time and often took place 
not in written form but in the grassroots activism of the movement.  This section will begin 
with some initial thoughts that one woman, Maphiri Masekala, expressed in written form 
on the role of Black women to the movement and will then move to a discussion of pivotal 
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BCM community projects that developed in the early 1970s that were staffed and run by 
women.  Leslie Hadfield has been central in excavating this history in ways other scholars 
before her have not.  She has argued convincingly that paying attention to grassroots 
organizing, which is work that often goes unheralded in accounts of liberation struggles 
everywhere, by default centres and illuminates the contributions of women given their 
strong representation in these arenas of struggle.245     
In a piece written by Masekala for the SASO newsletter in the early 1970s, it was 
made clear that the women of Black Consciousness, similar to the women of Black Power 
in North America, ‘must appreciate that we are Black first and then women.  Thus Black 
Women must play a meaningful role in the struggle of the Black community’.  Given this, 
Black women were not to be neglected and ignored in the movement as had been the case 
in previous freedom struggles in South Africa.  Moreover, the role of Black women should 
and must ‘be relevant to the role and meaning of Black People as a whole.  It has to be seen 
within the context of Black Consciousness.  Our struggle calls for the involvement of the 
entire Black Community.  It is therefore essential that Black Women must shed that built-
in feeling of inferiority that dogs even the most courageous Black woman’.  Masekala 
would continue by pointing to two areas where Black women could make the best 
contributions to the movement: politically educating/conscientizing Black children and 
leading efforts in BCM’s economic self-reliance projects.  Furthermore, white feminism 
was to be rejected as theirs was a ‘tactics designed by the enemy to divide [the] Black 
Community and we must refuse to be part of a conspiracy against ourselves’.246   
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In addition to making critical if questionable interventions around the question of 
the role of women within Black Consciousness, Maphiri Masekala would also play a 
decisive role in thinking through how to cultivate better relationships between SASO, 
community organisations, and development programs.  She and the other founding minds 
of this new movement were keenly aware of the relative privilege they held as university 
students in comparison to the majority of Blacks in South Africa.  Consequently, they were 
determined from BCM’s earliest days to find ways to have their members deeply engage 
with the lives and struggles of their people outside the university.247  One of the main 
challenges these young activists faced when it came to expanding their movement into the 
non-university Black population was their lack of access to financial resources.  Not to be 
discouraged, activists like Masekala joined relatively well-funded white liberal multi-racial 
groups like the Special Project for Christian Action in Society (SPROCAS) I and II.  While 
in this organisation Masekala fought to push whites members out of the space so that Black 
Consciousness adherents could run the organisation the way they saw fit for their own 
community.  After 1972, SPROCAS I and II would dissolve and become the BCPs which 
Hadfield’s work as accurately shown was the key arm in BCM’s rural community outreach 
efforts.248   
Formation School seminars in July and December 1971 were incubators for this 
SPROCAS I and II takeover as participants debated how BCM should organize with and 
within the community.249  Masekala was present at both meetings with other BCM activists 
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like Ben Khoapa and Nengwekhulu present to help guide the sixty participants from 
various SASO branches.  In the minutes of the July meeting it was stressed that their goal 
was ‘to combine Black Consciousness and Community Development… with a view to 
showing the inter-relationship between those concepts and how necessary an understanding 
of Black Consciousness was in the implementation of Community Development 
projects’.250   
By the middle of 1973 these community projects seemed to be the most effective 
among women’s federations forming in Soweto and Durban as, ‘Black Women wanted to 
form themselves into some organisation so that they could be better equipped to meet the 
challenge of present day oppressive society, and be able to mount the liberation wagon 
from another angle’.251  The BCP’s Women and Welfare Programmes were crucial in the 
growth of these often localised independent projects as they helped some ‘women’s groups 
to see more clearly the importance of joint planning and the advantages of cooperation and 
also demonstrate that pooling of resources can be done without loss of identity and 
autonomy by the cooperating parties’.252  Much of the impetus for women in the building 
of these self-reliance projects was to ensure they and their families’ maintained a level of 
economic and material independence from men who, given their demand as labourers in 
the waged economy, disproportionately held influence over women in the household.  At 
the same time, these projects were also turned to by those who needed to supplement the 
meagre income their male family members made in the apartheid economy.     
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In addition to the community projects being run by women in places like Soweto 
and Durban, the Literacy Projects of BCM also played a key role in making the work of 
Black Consciousness practical to the every-day people they hoped to reach.  The purpose 
of the Literacy Projects was to mobilise  SASO students and those in the youth 
organisations outside the university inspired by Black Consciousness into a force of cadres 
determined to share their skills and provide a service for the Black community.  According 
to Dr. Diliza Mji who was a member of the Literacy Projects and later President of SASO, 
the Literacy Project was ‘an attempt by SASO to forge links with non-students or 
community groups, and extend its influence beyond its constituency’.  Psychological 
liberation needed to have a material component or it would mean little to the wider masses 
of Blacks they sought to conscientize.  It also would serve as a way to break some of the 
elitism present in many Blacks who had been able to get to university.253  By forcing Black 
university students affiliated to SASO to physically share their skills with the Black 
masses, the praxis of Black Consciousness could hopefully develop into something real 
and living which would enable them to better communicate and marry their visions of 
freedom effectively with that of the masses.254   
The Literacy Projects could not have succeeded without the tireless work of its 
founding activist, Deborah Matshoba.255  In the literature on BCM, the Literacy Projects 
are scarcely discussed outside of some recent work done by Hadfield, consequently, names 
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of BC activists who developed this organisation who were primarily women have been 
lost.  Matshoba joined SASO in 1972 after meeting with Bokwe Mafuna and Steve Biko 
on separate occasions.256  Importantly, she joined the movement having already come to a 
level of political consciousness due to her work with the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA) who she had been able to represent in a conference in Ghana in 1971.  
When she joined SASO in 1972, she became one of the first women on SASO’s National 
Executive serving as the Educational Coordinator.  In this position she, with the white 
American activist Anne Hope, trained young people from the universities who wanted to 
become active in SASO’s Literacy Projects in Paulo Freirean methods of teaching.257  
Charles Mthombeni, an activist in the BC-aligned Transvaal Youth Organisation 
(TRAYO), a sub-sect of NAYO who would later join the Azanian People’s Liberation 
Front (APLF) in Botswana, confirms that he and others were trained by Matshoba and 
Hope in Paulo Freirean methods of teaching.258     
Musa Mdlalose, another who would eventually join the APLF, recalls that in 
addition to the Literacy Projects they [BCM] ‘used to do… community health projects’.  
Mdlalose had transferred to the University of Natal Black Section (UNB) in 1971 to pursue 
dreams of being a doctor.  Already active in SASO from his time in Turfloop prior to his 
transfer, he came to the bustling coastal city with a clear vision of what BC was and how 
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he would contribute to it.  While he did some work with the Literacy Projects, most of his 
time was spent helping cadres like Mamphela Ramphele run ‘a clinic at Wentworth [and]… 
on Sunday, helping the community around and so forth.  Even outside we were outside in 
Durban, Tintown… teaching people how to make water safe to drink and such things’.259  
Projects such as these were some of the many active attempts by SASO to engage in 
effective community organising.260 
These community projects/programs, staffed and run by women like Matshoba, 
Masekala, and Ramphele were key components to the broader mission of BCM to promote 
self-reliance, cultural leadership, and educational independence within the Black 
community.  Black Consciousness activists believed that the dehumanization of Blackness 
and deification of whiteness in apartheid society needed to be combated by both intellectual 
critiques and the creation of practical projects run by Blacks that could address the 
struggles people faced in their daily lives.  Biko made the point even clearer when he said, 
‘Our projects are not so much oriented towards getting or achieving something for the 
people.  We would rather have people getting it for themselves, and therefore being able to 
utilize that critical awareness for ever so many things, including a possible retaliation or 
measure against the system’.261  This was inspired partly by Tanzania’s Ujamaa initiative, 
briefly referenced in chapter one, as well as the community projects a number of Black 
Power groups were creating for their people in the United States.262  None of this would 
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have been possible without the contributions of women like Masekala, Matshoba, 
Ramphele, Hope, and numerous other women.   
 
The Formation of the Black People’s Convention (BPC) 
This emphasis on community was critical during the formative years of BCM and 
needs to be emphasised as much of the literature too often frames it as a student-lead 
intellectual movement, divorced from the daily struggles of the people.  While indeed there 
were elements of the movement like this, many of this first wave of Black leadership 
understood that given the relative privilege of Black university students SASO could not 
in the long-term be in the vanguard of the fight against apartheid.  Understanding this in 
December 1971 SASO organised a meeting with leaders from various local and national 
African organisations like the Association for the Educational and Cultural Advancement 
of the African Peoples of South Africa (ASSECA), Interdenominational African Ministers’ 
Association (IDAMASA), the National Council of African Women (NCAW), and The 
World newspaper (largest Black run newspaper in South Africa at the time) to discuss what 
needed to be done to formally bring the political ideology of Black Consciousness to the 
masses.  Winnifred Kgware, Drake Koka, Temba Sono, Nengwekhulu, Aubrey Mokoape, 
Biko and Khoapa were some of the key Black Consciousness cadres present at this meeting 
with Aubrey Mokoape playing a central role in the proceedings.263   
Initially, there was a split among those present on whether to create an informal or 
formal political organisation.  Nengwekhulu through SASO made a strong push for the 
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creation of a political organisation that would embrace Indians and Coloureds in the 
definition of Black.  During the meeting, the BC activists also successfully pushed for the 
rejection of multi-racialism and were key in getting Drake Koka, a staunch SASO ally, 
elected Convener of this conference and the steering committee moving forward.  
Moreover, the conference importantly passed a motion stating that members of government 
created institutions like the Urban Bantu Councils (UBCs) and Traditional Authorities 
(TAs) could not be members of this organisation.264        
This meeting would form the foundation for what later would be called the Black 
People’s Convention (BPC) and Winniefred Kgware, a Black woman, would become its 
first President.  This organisation was envisioned by many in the leadership of SASO, in 
tandem with later attempts to form a Black workers union, as a vehicle through which 
Black people could ideologically and politically unite under the banner of Black 
Consciousness.  Nengwekhulu, one of the “Small Broederbond”, was clear at a 
commemoration for Sharpeville in 1972 that Black people in South Africa needed to ‘unite 
under an ideology, unite under a philosophy.  And the only philosophy we can unite under 
is that of Black consciousness’.265  Later that year the BPC would formally be launched.  
In hindsight, the timing could not have been better as students who had been a part of BC 
since its inception now felt that since they had achieved political consciousness and freed 
their minds, what was the next step?      
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Stage Two: Exploring the Roots of Black Consciousness’s turn to Armed Struggle 
          
While scholars such as Daniel Magaziner correctly emphasize that the 1968 – 1972 
period was one of growth and consolidation for Black Consciousness, Magaziner in 
particular is incorrect to argue the turn to more confrontational politics, which included for 
some a turn to armed struggle, signified a break from BCM’s foundational beginnings.266  
As many who were building the movement during this period attest, the question of armed 
struggle was on the table from as early as 1969.  Literacy Project activist Charles 
Mthombeni remembers that the question of armed struggle was ‘always there, there was 
absolutely no way we could bring down this regime by any other means but through armed 
struggle’.267  Bokwe Mafuna argued something similar, ‘we were fully supportive of the 
armed struggle which was then being pursued by the two liberation movements then… in 
the Black Consciousness Movement we were quite clear that it was important in much as 
it was necessary’.268  Nkosazana Dlamini, former Vice President of SASO and key member 
of BCM in the early 1970s, also recalled many in the movement believed that ‘eventually 
armed struggle would have to be employed’, the question was, ‘Would Black 
Consciousness have its own army or would we have to work with the existing liberation 
movements’?269   
In another example Marti Mueller, a white American union organizer who briefly 
had an affair with Biko during a trip to South Africa, described in an interview with Gail 
Gerhart a conversation Biko and other BC leaders had in private in early 1971 on what 
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armed action in Durban or Johannesburg would look like.  Maps were laid out and targets 
to hit were pointed out during this meeting.  While there was some light-heartedness and 
jesting throughout, this demonstrates SASO cadres were constantly thinking about what an 
armed struggle could look like.270  The challenge was they could not openly or loosely talk 
about it because the initial plan, tactically, was to keep SASO and other growing BC 
organisations legal for as long as possible.  On this point Tebogo Mafole, another cadre 
who would later join APLF and the ANC-SA/MK, recalled in an interview with Gerhart 
and Karis that, ‘Everyone felt that armed struggle was inevitable; the question was how to 
relate to it as an organisation’.271  To openly declare support for armed struggle and/or 
publically embrace its execution by the banned movements ran the risk of having SASO 
and/or the BPC banned before they could really consolidate themselves with the masses.272   
It would ultimately take a fiery speech by Onkgopotse Tiro at the graduation 
ceremony at Turfloop on April 29th, 1972, to elevate the voices of the few willing to 
embrace armed struggle.273  At this ceremony Tiro critiqued Bantu Education, apartheid, 
and the overall hypocrisy of the system in front of National Party (NP) representatives, 
Afrikaner university officials of Turfloop, and the wider body of Black students.274  Tiro 
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was immediately expelled for his bold statements and denied entry into the graduate 
program he had been accepted in.  In solidarity Turfloop students boycotted classes.  In 
retaliation, the university under pressure from the regime expelled them all and forced 
those who wanted to return to re-apply.  Black students across the country rose up in 
solidarity with those expelled at Turfloop and demanded SASO lead efforts to organise 
student resistance during what became known as the Tiro Affair.  The University of Fort 
Hare, located in the small town of Alice in the Transkei (what is now called the Eastern 
Cape Province), became the centre of the Black student response to this unfolding crisis 
and the SASO Executive, chief among them the President of UNB’s SRC Keith Mokoape, 
converged on its campus to strategize the way forward.275  After a few days of intense 
discussion on May 14th, 1972, the Alice Declaration was released which called for an 
official boycott of classes on June 1st in solidarity with the expulsions of those at 
Turfloop.276  Over the next few weeks and months many like Welile Nhlapo at Ngoye and 
Tebogo Mafole at Turfloop answered the call.  Unlike others, when these SASO members 
left, they knew they would not to return.  For them, this was the moment they had been 
waiting for, the beginning of Stage Two in their struggle against apartheid.277   
With the Black university student population on the verge of open rebellion, those 
in the local and national leadership of BCM were split on what to do.  The newly formed 
BPC was too weak to do anything more than send messages of support to the students 
across the country protesting.  Biko was hesitant to engage in protest actions that would 
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bring down the wrath of the apartheid regime on the still growing political movement.  
Younger activists like Keith Mokoape, Makwezi Mtulu, Gwaza Twalo, Malebo Malebo 
and Archie Tshabalala who were in the leadership of SASO at UNB wanted to begin 
sabotage actions immediately.  In late May, during the boycott, they secretly tried to bomb 
their ‘classrooms at Alan Taylor Residence [at the UNB in Durban] where preliminary 
studies’ were underway even though the Alice Declaration had issued a call for Black 
students to boycott all classes.  Mokoape recalls their attempts failed ‘dismally because I 
think we mixed some chemicals and a little bit of this from and a little bit of what we were 
learning in chemistry and I think a small window was broken’.  Police came the next day 
to investigate but could not find enough evidence to catch anyone.  Encouraged by this 
mini-success, Mokoape and his comrades then tried, but failed, to ‘burn the college itself, 
the medical college, at King Edward Hospital’ in order to force the university to shut-
down.278   
With some like Mokoape and his colleagues already plotting sabotage, cadres such 
as SASO President Temba Sono and Onkgopotse Tiro were engaging with Black 
communities across the country that BCM had, through the community projects and 
literacy classes, formed connections with to attempt to explain what these university 
students were doing and why.  Mthombeni remembers in the middle of the university 
student uprising getting word of Tiro coming to speak in Soweto at a local Catholic church 
near to where he was living.  He recalled that Tiro came one afternoon to this church and 
addressed about three-hundred youths and elders on ‘what was going on at the 
universities’.279  Some locally respected elders like Dr. Nthato Motlana disagreed with the 
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decision of students to walk out of classes as it hurt their future job prospects and took 
exception to youths telling elders to support a student strike.280  Tiro and a number of others 
at the church came down hard on him and eventually Dr. Motlana was forced to retract his 
statements given the popularity of the action being taken by the students.281   
Consequently, the stage was set for the July 1972 SASO GSC to become a critical 
space for university student activists to discuss and chart the way forward.  Gail Gerhart, 
Mosibudi Mangena, Daniel Magaziner, Julian Brown and other scholars and activists on 
BCM broadly agree on the importance of this meeting as a turning point in the history of 
SASO and the wider BCM.  However, none have centred it as the moment which would 
eventually solidify the determination for some in BCM to leave the country and form an 
armed wing.  This latter contribution will be explained within the context of two major 
events that occurred during the opening day of the SASO July 1972 GSC that need to be 
highlighted.282  To begin with, Temba Sono the outgoing SASO President made a speech 
that infuriated the fiery delegates leading to his expulsion from the organisation.  At the 
same time, Keith Mokoape began to openly agitate for students not to return to school and 
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suggested they make plans to begin Stage Two, which everybody knew meant armed 
struggle.  I will address each of these responses in turn, but will focus more intently on 
Mokoape’s intervention as recent interviews with him have provided more clarity into what 
has generally been a little known discussion on the question of armed struggle.   
Outgoing SASO President Temba Sono was not originally slated to speak to open 
the GSC.  That honour had been given to Professor Robert Williams, a proponent of Black 
Power in the United States at the time who had been asked to say some words on ‘Creativity 
and Black Development.’  He was unable to attend the SASO GSC after the South African 
government denied him a visa after having agreed to give him one a few weeks earlier.283  
Nengwekhulu recalls he had some trepidation with asking Sono to speak but others did 
notshare his reservations.284  Sono’s speech began with him arguing, strangely to the 
delegates, in favour of working with the Bantustans and white liberals which went against 
SASO’s stated policy of non-cooperation or recognition of state created forms of self-
governance and whites.  He followed these comments by saying SASO needed to engage 
better with those who disagreed with them in order to convert them to their cause which 
included ‘everybody – black and white whether they are security police, liberals, non-
whites etc’.285   
The second contentious section of his speech was his rejection of taking up arms 
against the regime and him denouncing SASO students seeing themselves as 
revolutionaries.  He stated ‘we should never allow our fantasies to deceive us because we 
shall be engaging ourselves in one of the greatest exercises in human self-deception that 
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the world has ever known’.286  Towards the end of his speech he curiously said the 
following,  
‘The Whiteman differs from the blackman not in terms of his human nature… but differs in terms of his 
social nature and since it is true that the whiteman behaves in compliance to his… leadership complex, while 
the blackman behaves in terms of his dependency complex, therefore our strategy should be to avoid any 
physical confrontation with the whiteman’.287   
 
Taken together, he seemed to be saying Black people were not psychologically 
ready for a physical confrontation with the state and this was not the time for Stage Two.  
His comments set off an inferno of rejection from the assembled delegates.  An author of 
a recap of Sono’s speech, probably Strini Moodley, had the following to say,  
What the entire conference expected from the address was an unflinching, unapologetic address that would 
place SASO in perspective and give some insight into SASO’s future, and her role in society.  In her three 
years of existence SASO had moved from strength to strength; she had progressed; she had stood firm.  Now 
she had to move further forward; make further progress… A million burning questions echoed in the minds 
and hearts of the 200 or more delegates and observers.  The Free University, the relationship between student 
and worker, the impact of Black Consciousness, SASO’s future on and off campus, new methods of 
Conscientization, a complete new look at the role of the Black student, the need for a BLACK press, on and 
on students were probing, wanting to know288 
 
Furthermore, Sono had not shared his ideas for his remarks with the leadership of 
SASO prior to making the speech, which went against SASO policy.  Whenever points 
were to be made in public speeches that departed from the stated goals and public 
statements of the organisation, they were to be discussed so all could decide whether it was 
appropriate or not.289  To add insult to injury, cadres were expecting a rousing anti-system 
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speech, to have him instead endorse Bantustans and reject revolutionary thinking 
embarrassed many of the delegates.290        
In response to the conservative remarks from Sono, or despite them, Keith 
Mokoape and Mosiuoa Lekota pressed for a motion to be passed demanding all students 
refuse to attend classes for the rest of the academic year.  The fiery Mokoape continued by 
saying that any of the delegates who returned to university were ‘reinforcing the Bantu 
education system and that we should go do other things’.291  These “other things” clearly 
meant for all those who were deeply involved in SASO that Mokoape felt the time was 
right for stage two, armed struggle.292  He then closed by openly saying he would not be 
returning to school even though he was a few years into his studies for his medical degree.  
A break was then called and some cadres came to Mokoape and his inner circle of Mtulu, 
Malebo, Twalo, and Tshabalala to ask if they had a plan.  Mokoape made it clear he had 
one, but would not tell anybody what his plans were unless they accepted it and agreed to 
not speak of it.  Only his inner circle agreed and so others were not given details.  It seems 
a few hours later the motion was defeated after which Biko and Tiro pulled the younger 
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Mokoape brother aside and told him bluntly if he was serious about armed struggle he 
should go into exile.  He knew where the liberation movements were, so they would rather 
he go and not put SASO in jeopardy with his call for Stage Two.  Another option was he 
could join the BPC which was designed for those who either were done with studies or 
who wanted a different organizing space outside of the university.293  Mokoape was clear 
he was unwilling to continue being a student or join the BPC as he ‘knew already that I am 
beyond that, I wanted the armed struggle’.294   
Nonetheless, Mokoape and his comrades were in the minority, so the conference 
continued with questions of psychological liberation, building movement strength, SASO 
Executive Board elections, unification of the ANC-SA and PAC, and building relations 
with domestic Black organisations taking precedence over discussions of armed 
struggle.295  At the forefront of all this, the question of how to make BC a living philosophy 
in the minds of the people was the most critical issue to be tackled.  The results of this 
conference and the rich ideas being produced in its formal meetings and informal side 
conversations and planning sessions were the official founding of working people-based 
organisations like the BCPs and BWP.296   
 Writing about South Africa’s armed struggle in the 1970s in the Eastern Cape, 
Timothy Gibbs argues that the ANC-SA underground was, ‘at least in part, a nationalist 
movement constituted through regional networks’.297  This article importantly built on 
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earlier work that sought to highlight the importance of native reserves in South Africa to 
the growth, development, and support of African Nationalism.  As an example Gibbs 
showed how MK commander Chris Hani, who was born in the rural village of Sabalele in 
the Cofimvaba region in what is now the Eastern Cape, utilised his strong connections to 
the area to recruit for the ANC-SA while he was posted to Lesotho.  Many of those who he 
recruited were people Hani knew directly or indirectly through their 
family/teachers/friends which enabled him to trust them more than others.  In this section, 
we wish to argue something similar happened with Bokwe Mafuna when he was in 
Botswana recruiting for the APLF, many of those who were able to enter its inner circle 
were cadres he had direct interactions with during his years organizing for BCM before his 
departure in September 1973.   
As the July 1972 SASO conference came to a close, Mafuna, who had been unable 
to attend, began to have problems with his editors at the Rand Daily Mail.  While the 
problems were surely multifaceted, much of it centred on the overtly political tone of 
Mafuna’s articles and his insistence that he use the word Black instead of non-white to 
describe the people and events he was covering.  The fights had gotten so intense with his 
editors, who often changed the wording right before it went to print, that Mafuna resigned, 
or was fired, from the Rand Daily Mail.298  This enabled him to spend more time and energy 
building up SASO and forming other BCM organisations such as the Union of Black 
Journalists (UBJ), the BPC, and the BWP, the latter which was officially formed at the 
close of the July SASO GSC.299  Being about ten years older and coming from a more 
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urban working poor background than most of the SASO student activists, in addition to 
never having been based at a university, Mafuna took the question of organizing workers 
more seriously than others.300     
After leaving the RDM Mafuna found employment with the newly formed Black 
Community Programmes (BCPs) as a Research/Field Worker.301  This was a paid position 
and helped replace some of the income he had lost after leaving RDM.  Around this time 
he was also central in starting up the Black Review, a Black Consciousness publication that 
was a counter to the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) publications that 
many in the movement felt embodied the very white liberal politics they were fighting to 
overcome.  For Mafuna, the Black Review was critical because it was an active example of 
BCM not just talking about Black potential but actively working on it.302 According to 
Mamphela Ramphele the major issue they had with the white liberal South African Institute 
of Race Relations (SAIRR) and its yearly publications was, ‘Nothing positive about what 
blacks did was reported with any prominence… Blacks were depicted as the ultimate 
victims, lacking in agency’.303   
During this flurry of activity Mafuna also found time to have a discussion with 
Mokoape and his inner circle about their plans moving forward shortly after the July SASO 
GSC.  Mafuna cites this conversation as the key moment that convinced him to eventually 
leave the country to find the armed struggle.  Shortly after this conversation, around late 
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September 1972, Mokoape and his inner circle disappeared.304  Mafuna was not ready to 
leave yet, but after this talk with Keith Mokoape he was firmly convinced leaving was a 
necessity, however, this was a conclusion others in the “Small Broederbond” like Biko and 
Pityana did not embrace.305        
While Mokoape and his colleagues left to find the armed struggle, Bokwe Mafuna 
began to devote more of his time and energy to the BWP which was officially launched on 
September 1st, 1972.  Mthuli Shezi, as SASO activist who was close with Mosibudi 
Mangena, was named its Field Officer.  Operating mostly out of Johannesburg, the BWP’s 
mission was to approach already existing trade unions, help unite Black workers, 
conscientize them, and assist them in the training of leadership.  Some unions they worked 
with and helped form were the Allied and Transport Workers Union, the UBJ, and the 
Black Union of Shop and Office Workers.  In line with SASO, BPC, and BCP’s emphasis 
on combining radical theory with practical assistance to the Black community, the BWP 
also organised concrete programs for the workers such as providing financial services, legal 
funds, health-care, and funeral help.306  Despite facing constant police harassment, BWP 
was able to model itself on the Industrial and Commercial Worker’s Union (ICU) which 
Biko and Mafuna believed had been a more radical body than the ANC-SA backed South 
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).307   
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However, this ICU model was not an organisation strategy shared by all in BCM.  
Drake Koka, who was also a union organizer under the banner of Black Consciousness, 
created and led a parallel organisation called the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU).  
BAWU differed from Mafuna’s BWP as it pertained to the broad strategy of how to 
organize workers and on what types of protest actions would/should be utilised.  BAWU 
was designed to be a ‘national unitary body to which all workers could directly affiliate 
irrespective of their craft, industry or location’.  This made BAWU a more national body 
than the BWP although the latter did have a sizeable base in the urban centres of 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth.308  Mafuna disagreed with this style of 
organising as he believed, ‘what we should do is to have the different unions in different 
sectors, different industries, and to have an overall umbrella union which could serve as a 
federation umbrella’.309  Regrettably, these disagreements hindered the ability of the BWP 
and BAWU to work together effectively and created some tension between Koka and 
Mafuna.310   
 Despite these tensions one of the key people to work with Mafuna and Shezi on the 
BWP was Welile Nhlapo.  Unlike others, Nhlapo grew up in a relatively political middle 
class household where he did not experience poverty the same way many others did.  
Growing up in Alexander Township, Nhlapo had from a very young age known of Bokwe 
Mafuna prior to officially meeting him.  Nhlapo recalls that Mafuna ‘was in Alexander 
Township, he stayed there.  He was a journalist.  Same street where I was staying.  So I’ve 
always known him, we used to call him Bra Bob’.311  Yet, it was the 1972 student protests 
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which pushed him and his good friend Tebogo Mafole closer to Mafuna.  Mafole had also 
grown up in Alexandra township and lived about a two minute walk from Nhlapo, 
furthermore, he was one of the students who rebelled at Turfloop in the wake of Tiro’s 
expulsion.312  Under Biko’s suggestion Mafole and Nhlapo registered as students through 
UNISA in order to continue their organizing work with SASO.313   
From that point on Nhlapo remembers ‘we [he and Mafole] were always with 
Bokwe Mafuna’.314  Mafole worked more closely with the BPC in Johannesburg as the 
Central Organiser while Nhlapo after the murder of Shezi in December 1972 became Field 
Worker for the BWP.315  Nhlapo believes that it was this turn to organising workers, in 
addition to the numerous projects BCM was starting across the country and the potency of 
the Durban Strikes, which drew the attention of the state more closely to him and the 
broader movement.316  Eventually, Nhlapo was issued banning orders in late 1973 or early 
1974 and was arrested a number of times for breaking them while doing BWP work.317   
 
Conclusion: The Threat of BCM and the move Towards Armed Struggle 
The growth of BCM during these early formative years began to worry the 
apartheid regime more than a clearly diminished ANC-SA and PAC struggling to survive 
in exile.  The connection BCM had with the Black Power Movement played an important 
role in this rising fear as from as early as November 1970, reports in newspapers like the 
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Daily Nation stated, ‘The Black Power movement poses a threat to South Africa by the end 
of this decade’.318  In the Sunday Express it was reported in October 1971 that the Chief of 
Security Police Major-General “Tiny” Venter had sent some of his staff to investigate 
SASO and the ASSECA because he had proof that both groups were in contact with U.S. 
Black Power groups.319  Shortly afterwards the same paper would report that ‘The Minister 
of Interior, Mr. Theo Gerdener, has information that a Black Power movement – which 
rejects total cooperation with whites – is fast developing in South Africa along the lines of 
its Negro counter-part in the United States’.320 
By 1973 a number of Black South Africans from all walks of life, rural and urban, 
were approached by the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to infiltrate the 
growing movement.  Stanley Manong, a future mid-level commander in MK, was one of 
those approached.  In his detailed autobiography Manong recalls that in early 1973, when 
he was still politically inactive, he was approached by a Mr. Gogo to infiltrate the BPC.  
According to Manong, Mr. Gogo approached him by explaining that a  
new menace and threat was now emerging in our country in the form of the Black People’s 
Convention (BPC) and the South African Student Organisation (SASO) who were pawns of the 
Communists.  The State wanted to know exactly what these organisations were planning’.321   
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His mission would be to infiltrate these organisations as his strong connections in 
the Transkei would make him less suspicious.  Mr. Gogo knew that Manong was working 
at the Ciskei office because he did nothave enough money to immediately go to university 
so he also offered to pay all his university fees if he agreed to infiltrate the BPC.  Manong 
rejected the offer but Mr. Gogo continued over the next few weeks to keep the offer open 
which showed Manong how worried the state was about BCM.322 
Even anti-apartheid states in the international community like Sweden and its 
various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) recognised and respected BCM.  
According to Swedish historian Tor Sellstrom, when the Swedish state finally recognised 
the ANC-SA as the leading South African liberation organisation in November 1974, they 
already given BCM 175,000 SEK in aid, 25,000 SEK more than the ANC-SA had received 
up until that point.323  In Sellstrom’s view, ‘The most important reason for the 
comparatively late assistance to ANC… was the liberation movement’s precarious 
situation in the 1970s’.  This lead many in the Swedish government like First Secretary 
Govan Hasselmark, who worked in Sweden’s Tanzanian embassy, to remark in November 
1975 that both the ANC-SA and PAC were ineffective organisations.  Instead of 
recognizing the ANC-SA as the government was doing, Hasselmark believed BCM/SASO 
needed to be given more attention as they were the most active organisations inside South 
Africa.  This outlook was not isolated, it was supported by the international secretary of 
the Swedish Metalworkers Union who visited South Africa in early 1975.324   
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This expansion of the Black Consciousness project formed an important backdrop 
for the eventual five-year banning orders given to Nengwekhulu, Pityana, Strini Moodley, 
Biko, Jerry Modisane, Mafuna, Saths Cooper, and Drake Koka in March 1973.325  In its 
aftermath even the ANC-SA’s National Executive Committee (NEC) was forced to admit 
that, ‘In the last few years… there has come into being a number of black organisations 
whose programmes, by espousing the democratic anti-racist positions that the ANC fights 
for, identify them as part of the genuine forces of the revolution [emphasis in original]’.326  
Later, this praise of BCM by the ANC-SA turned to rejection as unbeknownst to them 
while sitting in jail in Johannesburg a recently re-arrested Mafuna was plotting his escape 
from South Africa in order to form an armed wing.   
Little is known about an important interaction he had during his short prison term 
stint in the middle of 1973 with PAC members Mark Shinners, Isaac Mafadzi and Dikgang 
Moseneke who were being held there as they transferred out of Robben Island.327  While 
locked in separate cells, Mafuna remembered that there were times during their morning 
or afternoon walks when ‘we were locked out together at the same time… So we were able 
to have some exchanges that were not deep enough.  That were not precise enough’.  The 
PAC activists wanted to know from him what the mood was inside the country ‘and I 
[Mafuna] was able to feed them the idea that people are more than ready and are tired of 
the fact that nothing is happening... We promised each other to have a follow up as soon 
as I was released’. 328  
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However, after his release his banning orders meant he was unable to go and meet 
them to continue the conversation.  In his stead, he sent his now trusted Lieutenants Tebogo 
Mafole and Welile Nhlapo to speak with them to gauge their readiness to perhaps depart 
the country together.329  They also carried Mafuna’s message to the rest of the “Small 
Broederbond” who were banned informing them of his plans to leave the country, Mafuna 
also wanted to know their thoughts on his desire to find the armed struggle or form an 
armed wing.  Besides Nengwekhulu, the message back from everyone else was they were 
not ready to leave the country.  Mafuna recalls that Nhlapo told him that Biko ‘said that he 
did not think it was the right time, but he would not stand in front of us and stop us’.330  
Although this cannot be seen as the development of a faction or split within BC, it does 
clearly indicate a difference of opinion and strategy among some of the founding minds of 
Black Consciousness.331  Nengwekhulu himself later recalled that among the “Small 
Broederbond” Mafuna was always ‘the activist; somebody who wanted armed struggle.  
He wanted to fight’.332   
As an only child, Welile Nhlapo was unable to leave with Mafuna due to the failing 
health of his single mother.  He would leave in the middle of 1974 after his mother passed 
away of a heart-attack.  This is of importance because it speaks to the gendered elements 
of even who could join an armed wing in exile.  In families with daughters and sons, the 
sons would be the ones more likely to leave in part because daughters were expected to 
stay behind and take care of parents or their own kids.  Nhlapo was an only child and his 
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mother was single so he had to stay behind to take care of her which delayed his flight into 
exile with Mafuna and the rest.  Countless women, and most assuredly a number of men, 
faced similar situations throughout the history of the African Liberation Movements and it 
is important to understand this when we discuss how gendered the movement was. 
Despite having to stay behind to take care of his sick mother, Nhlapo would play a 
central role in planning Mafuna’s escape.  He and Mafole, who was ready to leave, planned 
their route out of Johannesburg through to Lobatse, Botswana where they had heard the 
liberation movements were located.  In addition to wanting to find the liberation 
movements and see what was happening as it pertained to armed struggle, they also wanted 
to find out what happened to Mokoape, Gwaza and the others who had left the previous 
year as there had been some rumours that they had been killed by the ANC-SA/MK.333  In 
addition to Mafole, Mafuna and Nengwekhulu, the younger sister of Debs Matshoba, 
Nosipho Matshoba, also came with them.  She seemed to have been working closely with 
the founding members of the BPC in 1972 and 1973 and is listed in the minutes of some 
of those meetings as a Typist.334  These relationships are important to understand as in exile 
Mafole, Nhlapo and Matshoba were some of the few Bokwe Mafuna trusted explicitly and 
they formed the core of what would become known as the Bokwe Group.      
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Chapter Three  
Arming the Movement: The formation of the Bokwe Group/Azanian 
People’s Liberation Front (APLF), September 1973 – September 1976  
 
Brief Literature Review 
Continuing our narrative of the departure of Mafuna, Nengwekhulu, Mafole and 
Matshoba as they left South Africa for Botswana, this chapter will explore attempts by 
these Black Consciousness (BC) cadres to form an independent armed wing in exile in the 
mid-1970s.  Upon their arrival in Botswana in September 1973, this group of activists set 
out to organize a broad South African/Azanian Liberation Front with the African National 
Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA) and Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC).  When 
this failed, they formed the Azanian People’s Liberation Front (APLF) to complement the 
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM)’s growing non-violent protest actions inside the 
country and open a third front of struggle.  In time, driven by ideological affinity and 
practical expediency, the APLF aligned itself with the PAC.  Through this alliance they 
were able to send cadres for military training to camps in Libya and Syria. The PAC 
interpreted this alliance as having assimilated the APLF into its structures, yet, they 
remained independent causing conflict between the two.  Between this disagreement and 
crippling infighting within the PAC itself, the APLF abandoned the alliance.  In its 
aftermath some of its members joined the better organised but ideologically suspect ANC-
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SA.  As a result, the APLF had effectively been disbanded as the Soweto Uprising of June 
1976 unfolded before it launched a successful attack inside South Africa.   
While the APLF failed militarily, this chapter argues it succeeded as a political 
project in three ways.  To begin with, forming an armed wing helped transform BCM from 
a non-violent movement into an armed national liberation movement on par, albeit briefly, 
with the PAC and ANC-SA.  Additionally, the process of building support for the APLF 
expanded the politics and presence of Black Consciousness outside South Africa’s borders.  
Lastly, it forced the ANC-SA’s armed wing Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) to revamp its 
armed struggle plans which up to 1976 had been disturbingly uneven.   
This global and more militant aspect of BCM’s projects, what I argue was an 
extension of their internal organising, remains little known or explored.  As previous 
chapters have already outlined, scholars like Gail Gerhart, Daniel Magaziner, Julian Brown 
and Leslie Hadfield have conducted research primarily on BCM’s evolution, student 
activism, theological interventions, and rural community programs.335  Others, mostly from 
the activist tradition of BC, have focused on exploring the life, politics and legacies of 
BCM and excavating the life of Steve Biko.336  At the same time, centring the exile 
experience, newer research on South Africa’s armed struggle has emerged offering fresh 
insights into the inner workings and missions of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) and the 
                                                          
335 G. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: An Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1979); D. Magaziner, The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in 
South Africa, 1968-1977 (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2010); L. Hadfield, Liberation and Development: 
Black Consciousness Community Programs in South Africa (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 
2016); J. Brown, The Road to Soweto: Resistance and the Uprising of 16 June 1976 (Johannesburg, James 
Currey, 2016).   
336 A. Mngxitama, A. Alexander, and N. Gibson, eds., Biko Lives!  Contesting the Legacies of Steve Biko 
(New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); X. Mangcu, Biko: A Biography (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2012). 
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Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA).337  While these new insights have added depth 
and complexity to our understanding of the uneven development of South Africa’s armed 
struggle, none have engaged in a sustained excavation of BCM’s contribution to the armed 
struggle.338  Lastly, while writings on Black Internationalism have praised and incorporated 
the political action of Steve Biko and the rebellion of the Soweto students into an 
understanding of what Cedric Robinson once termed the Black Radical Tradition (BRT), 
they too have overlooked attempts by BCM elements to form an armed wing.339   
The absence of systematic research on the APLF in the vast literature on South 
Africa’s freedom struggle is peculiar given a number of primary documents and secondary 
sources reference its existence.  Early mentions can be found in the late 1970s in ANC-SA 
reports to senior leadership on BC activities in Botswana.340  Former APLF members who 
joined the ANC-SA/MK, Welile Nhlapo and Tebogo Mafole, chart the development of 
                                                          
337 T. Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol. II: Solidarity and Assistance 1970-
1994 (Stockholm, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), pp. 394-579, 698-863; K. Kondlo, In the Twilight of the 
Revolution: The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) 1959-1994 (Switzerland, Basler Afrika 
Bibliographien, 2009); H. Spire and C. Saunders, eds., Southern African Liberation Struggles: New Local, 
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Mobile Soldiers and the Un-National Liberation of Southern Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
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Democracy, Governance, and Service Delivery (DGSD), Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 
(August 1st, 2013), available at www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-data/ktree-doc/13802, retrieved February 15th, 
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1994/Liberation War Countries (continued), Vol. 3 (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki Na Nyota, 2014), pp. 539-745; 
T. Simpson, Umkhonto We Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle (Cape Town, Penguin Books, 2016); also see 
the impressive volumes of the Road to Democracy in South Africa. 
338 The Road to Democracy in South Africa: Volume 3, International Solidarity, Part I and 2 (Pretoria, UNISA 
Press, 2008).  In over 1,000 pages there is no mention of the support given to BCM organisations by European 
groups like the Red Army Faction in East Germany or Palestinian groups like the PFLP/PFLP High 
Command.   
339 C. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000, org. 1983); M. West, W. Martin, F. Wilkins, eds., From Toussaint to Tupac: The 
Black International since the Age of Revolution (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2009) 
340 ANC Archives, Fort Hare University, Alice, South Africa (hereafter ANC Archives): OTP/035/0304/01, 
D. Gadibone and B. Nguna, ‘The Joint Statement’, 9/7/1977, pp. 1-5; ANC Archives Lusaka Mission Part II 
(hereafter LUM) 088/0043/02, W. Nhlapo and T. Mafole, ‘The Exile: Black Consciousness Movement 
Students’, 6/12/77, pp. 1-5.      
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Black Consciousness groups in exile from 1973 to 1976.  This was followed by a report 
written by ANC-SA underground activists D. Gadibone and B. Nguna who were assigned 
to spy on BCM groups in Botswana.  While they mostly followed the chronology of Nhlapo 
and Mafole, their overview painted a more disapproving narrative driven by their suspicion 
that Steve Biko was a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  Whereas both are 
useful as historical documents, neither provide detailed accounts of why the APLF/Bokwe 
Group formed, how it grew, why it fell, and what its impact was.   
The next fleeting engagement with this group of BCM activists came from 
Mosibudi Mangena’s first autobiography in which he mentions his own discovery of the 
Azanian People’s Liberation Front (APLF, official name of the Bokwe Group).  Prior to 
becoming the new President of the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) in 
exile and attempting to form a new armed wing in the 1980s, he had no knowledge of the 
APLF.341  A few years later Nhlapo, Thenjiwe Mtintso, and Keith Mokoape – all former 
Black Consciousness activists who joined the ANC-SA – wrote a chapter summarizing the 
movement’s contributions to South Africa’s armed struggle in an edited volume entitled 
Bounds of Possibility.342  Here the authors sketch how some of them, in this case Nhlapo, 
obtained military training through the PAC in Libya but after a fallout eventually joined 
the ANC-SA.  More recently an article by G. Houston, T. Plaatjie and T. April on the camps 
and training programs of APLA briefly discusses how in 1975 the PAC went with a group 
                                                          
341 M. Mangena, On Your Own: Evolution of Black Consciousness in South Africa/Azania (Braamfontein, 
Skotaville Publishers, 1989), pp. 150-151. 
342 K. Mokoape, T. Mtintso, and W. Nhlapo, ‘Towards the Armed Struggle’ in B. Pityana, M. Ramphele, M. 
Mpumlwana, and L. Wilson, eds., Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness 
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of SASO activists from Botswana for military training in Libya.343  In 2016 Mosibudi 
Mangena released an updated autobiography where he marginally expands on his earlier 
engagement with the APLF.344  As his focus is more on how the Azanian People’s 
Organisation (AZAPO) evolved in the post-1994 period, the details of how APLF was 
formed, why, and for how long was not covered.      
This begs the question, why is reconstructing a history of this attempt by BC cadres 
to form an armed wing, that was ultimately unsuccessful, important?  To begin with, 
excavating the work of the APLF illuminates BCM’s rich Third World internationalism 
beyond their powerful internal activist projects.  Additionally, an analysis of the APLF puts 
into context how other South Africans responded to the relative inability of MK and APLA 
from the mid-1960s up to the Soweto Uprising to effectively launch armed actions against 
the apartheid regime.345         
This chapter will begin by tracking five Black Consciousness activists as they 
entered Botswana in September 1973.346  It will then examine some of the challenges they 
                                                          
343 G. Houston, T. ka Plaatjie and T. April, ‘Military Training and camps of the Pan Africanist Congress of 
South Africa, 1961-1981’, Historia, 60, 2, November 2015, pp. 42-43. 
344 M. Mangena, Triumphs and Heartaches: A Courageous Journey by South African Patriots (Johannesburg, 
Picador Africa, 2015), 59-60. 
345 H. Macmillan, The Lusaka Years: The ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963-1994 (Johannesburg, Jacana 
Media, 2013), pp. 101-106. 
346 Efforts were made in this article to balance both oral testimony and archival research in order to construct 
as accurate a picture of events as possible.  Each piece of evidence radiates from particular concerns, biases, 
stresses and pressures of those who constructed them and so generally neither was used unless multiple 
sources matched what they were saying.  Particularly as it pertains to testimonies given under interrogation 
a careful process was used to determine which documents were more reliable than others.  During the 
interrogations a number of dynamics were at play.  On the one hand those being tortured did not want to 
reveal all that they knew, or did not know, about attempts to organise a BCM inspired armed wing.  At the 
same time, some did succumb to the torture.  For those who did, it becomes difficult to tell whether they 
admitted to certain things because they were violently coerced to, as they claimed, or because this was 
actually the truth.  On the other hand, the security forces were able to eventually piece together elements of 
what the Bokwe Group was doing and so their presumptions about what was happening give us an interesting 
insight into their fears about this movement, whether true or unfounded.  Moreover, multiple testimonies 
were given in the months leading up to the trial and the lawyers on the case independently formulated their 
own sequence of events based on their personal discussions with their clients after months of torture.  This 
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faced trying to construct an armed wing, forge international support structures, and build 
internal networks.  This will be followed by a more in depth analysis of the trainings they 
went through in Libya and Syria while also exploring in detail why some left to join the 
ANC-SA/MK.  The conclusion will assess the importance of this movement, why it failed, 
and what lessons can be learned from this fascinating, but little known project of BCM.  
       
Find their Way: Early Trials for BCM Exiles, September 1973 – February 1974 
Bokwe Mafuna, Nosipho Matshoba, Tebogo Mafole, and Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu 
arrived in Botswana in mid-September 1973 after a harrowing escape from South Africa.  
While exile had always been accepted as a possibility, banning orders given to Mafuna and 
Nengwekhulu in February 1973 expedited this process.347  Determined to advance the 
struggle for Black Consciousness in exile as a support to the internal struggle against 
apartheid, the four activists initially settled in Lobatse to attempt to reach out to the 
liberation movements as well as sort out their refugee status.  A few days later they were 
joined by another Black Consciousness (BC) activist, Onkgopotse Abraham Tiro, who had 
received word he was to be banned leading him to skip the country as well.348  As Tiro had 
                                                          
need not make these documents the truth, as the objective of the accused was to not be convicted and not 
sell-out their comrades, all complicated testimonies were always given.  Due to these complexities, and 
confusions, oral interviews and other archival sources were used to match what was said in the various 
statements to establish its veracity.  In other sections of this chapter and dissertation, especially those relying 
more on the memory of various participants, if archival evidence could not be found especially in establishing 
dates of certain events or decisions, multiple oral interviews were read together and compared to try to 
approximate the precise chronology of events as possible.       
347 Botswana National Archives (hereafter BNA), Office of the President (hereafter OP), Lobatse Refugee 
Advisory Committee, ‘Bokwe James Mafuna: Notice in Terms of Section 10QUAT(1) of the Suppression of 
Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44of 1950)’, February 26th, 1973, pp. 1-7; BNA OP, Lobatse Refugee 
Advisory Committee, ‘Randwedsi (misspell in original document) Harry Nengwekhulu: Notice in Terms of 
Section 10(1)(a) of the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 1950), pp. 1-6.  
348 BNA OP27/21, Gaborone Refugee Advisory Committee (Reports), ‘Application for Political Asylum: 
Tiro Onkgopotse Abram’, October 5th, 1973, p. 1; BNA OP16/1, Lobatse Refugee Advisory Committee, 
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deeper connections in Gaborone with the University of Botswana given his position as 
President of the Southern African Student Movement (SnASM), he settled at the house of 
Mr. K. H. Mogapi of St. Joseph’s College to be closer to the students of the university and 
local high schools.349   
For these new exiles, especially those who had grown up in the burgeoning 
metropolis of Johannesburg, living in Gaborone and Lobatse was a jarring experience.  
Founded in 1964 when it became clear independence for Botswana was imminent, 
Gaborone by 1974 had a population of only 18,000; Lobatse was even smaller.  Ranwedzi 
Nengwekhulu remembers that, ‘we expected to find [a] small and younger Pretoria in 
Lobatse, here we arrive, in a one street town [laughter]’.350  In addition to being small and 
very rural, Botswana did not have a standing army, instead, it had a Police Mobile Unit 
(PMU) comprised partially of local volunteers.  Moreover, as the discovery of diamonds 
in exportable quantities only occurred in 1982, throughout the 1960s and 1970s this 
landlocked nation was surrounded on all sides by white minority regimes placing it in a 
very vulnerable geo-political and economic situation. 351  In spite of this, Botswana offered 
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the Southern African Students Movement (SnASM) because it is often confused with SASM, the South 
African Students Movement.  In a number of interviews and academic pieces these two are conflated with 
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A2675/III/788, ‘The Southern African Students Movement: Constitution’, Annex VIII, n. d., pp. 1-9. 
350 Toivo Asheeke interview with Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu (hereafter Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu interview), 
Pretoria, January 17th, 2017, p. 21. 
351 T. Tlou and P. Mgadla and Research Team Leaders, ‘Botswana’s Role in the Liberation of Southern 
Africa’, in A. Temu and J. Tembe, eds., Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous 
Documents, 1960-1994/Liberation War Countries (continued), Vol. 5 (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki Na Nyota, 
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 135 
 
the BC activists a freedom they could not find in apartheid South Africa.  They were finally 
removed from the constant direct surveillance of Special Branch (SB) forces and could 
more easily access books on Marxism, Black Power, Maoism, Vietnam, African Liberation 
and other radical materials and not fear arrest.  Furthermore, they could actively engage 
with banned organisations, travel relatively freely around Botswana and learn the 
international political landscape.         
However, disaster struck in Gaborone on February 1st, 1974, when Tiro opened an 
IUEF package mailed to him and was killed in the ensuing blast of a hidden parcel bomb.352  
In later years the South African Bureau for State Security (BOSS) admitted to having sent 
the bomb, however at the time, they denied all accusations.353  Not being fooled by the 
denials from BOSS, Tiro’s assassination was a wake-up call to Mafuna, Mafole, Matshoba, 
and Nengwekhulu – if they wished to go down the path of armed struggle, their lives were 
literally on the line.354  They were forced to re-evaluate what it meant to have a secure 
group and it re-enforced the reality that they, despite being seasoned labour and student 
activists, knew little about what it meant to create, run, and execute a guerrilla 
movement.355  It also raised difficult questions about how democratic and open they 
could/should be as an organisation whilst embarking on this very different form of radical 
politics.  It was also felt that they would be better able to manage their safety in Gaborone 
                                                          
352 WHP, South African Institute of Race Relations (hereafter SAIRR) AD1912/239, ‘Tiro Bomb “A Real 
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instead of Lobatse so they moved to the capital shortly after the assassination of their 
comrade.       
Inside South Africa, Tiro’s assassination infuriated youths and BC activists.  Many 
began to openly question whether they as Black South Africans would, ‘ALLOW these 
KILLERS of OUR TIRO’s to continue daily with their MURDEROUS plans and not 
REPLY in a manner that they and the whole WORLD will see that WE are prepared to 
FIGHT for that which is RIGHT’.356  Even for those who never formally joined BCM, such 
as Stanley Manong who we met in our previous chapter, ‘the assassination of Tiro and Boy 
Mvemve, coupled with the listening to Radio Freedom marked the beginning of our active 
political involvement’.357  Upon hearing the news of Tiro’s assassination South African 
Student Movement (SASM) activist Omry Makgoale, who was schooling in Orlando where 
Tiro had previously taught, remembers that his colleagues ‘were very unhappy about it, we 
did talk about it in school… one of my teachers and the principal, Mr. Mathabathe… 
actually went to Botswana to go and bury him’.358   
The funeral for Tiro in Botswana drew thousands of mourners, many of whom came 
from South Africa.359  Mpotseng Kgokong, a SASO/BPC activist expelled from Turfloop 
during the Tiro Affair, and Pumza Dyantyi, who had briefly engaged with various BCM 
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 137 
 
organisations, came to Botswana together from South Africa to attend.360  Dyantyi had 
briefly met Bokwe Mafuna and his wife Jane Mafuna in November/December of 1972 and 
then Mafuna again fleetingly towards the end of 1973 in Johannesburg.  While at the 
funeral she again met Mafuna as well as Tebogo Mafole and Nosipho Matshoba.361  She 
stayed with this group in Botswana for a few days after the funeral and began to cultivate 
a friendship with them.  Because Dyantyi had a passport, over the next few months she was 
able to regularly visit them on weekends.362     
 
Diverging Visions of BCM in Exile: Bokwe Mafuna and Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu  
Shortly after the funeral of Tiro, Mafuna travelled to Lusaka to attend another 
funeral.  A week before Tiro’s assassination Mafuna’s brother-in-law Boy Mvemve, MK 
name John Dube, was killed by a parcel bomb.  At the funeral in Lusaka he met a number 
of ANC-SA/MK comrades, some of whom he knew from his days living and working 
inside South Africa.  After unsuccessfully trying to recruit him to their organisation James 
Stuart gave Mafuna a portion of The Collected Works of Lenin to help sharpen and broaden 
his understanding of revolutionary politics.363  Upon Bokwe Mafuna’s return to Gaborone 
he rapidly solidified himself as the leading personality among BC exiles serious about 
armed struggle.364  In addition to his extensive work as a member of the “Small 
                                                          
360 WHP A2675/II/7, State Versus JM Molokeng and 6 Others, Yate MF, ‘S.V. Joseph Molokeng and others 
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Broederbond”, according to Musa Mdlalose who was soon to join the Bokwe Group, 
people turned to Mafuna because he ‘had the experience that we did not have.  His 
experience came from his days working as a reporter for the Rand Daily Mail… he knew 
languages… he could speak Xhosa, Tswana, he could speak this and that… even the 
hierarchy, the authorities in Botswana they respected him because of that’.365     
However, in the wake of Tiro’s assassination Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu became the 
international face of Black Consciousness and it was with him that organisations like the 
International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) and the World University Service (WUS) 
began to directly communicate with.366  In addition to this international support and access, 
Nengwekhulu had contacts in the ANC-SA with Thabo Mbeki, the PAC through David 
Sibeko, and with the Algerians.367  Mafuna and the others wanted him to use these 
connections to help them smuggle students abroad for military training; however, 
Nengwekhulu refused.  In a recent interview with Nengwekhulu he explained that he did 
not think it was possible for them to build an armed force, keep it secret, and attack the 
apartheid regime effectively.  Rather, he believed they should focus on building a legal 
aboveground Black Consciousness organisation in exile to support the internal 
movement.368  Additionally, while Mafuna believed forming a BCM armed wing could 
serve as a means to unifying the fractured liberation movements, Nengwekhulu felt its 
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formation ran counter to Black Consciousness’s stated aim of bringing the various 
movements together as it would make them competitors with MK and APLA.369   
In the same interview Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu says he came to this conclusion after 
he had made contact with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) of Algeria to train him, 
Mafuna, and the others in guerrilla warfare.  This was apparently agreed to and some 
arrangements were made to get this small group to Algeria.  Unfortunately, the ANC-SA 
Representative in Algiers caught wind of this plan and successfully suppressed it.  When 
this happened Nengwekhulu thought there was no other way to get this type of training and 
decided to accept a researcher position at the University of Botswana.  He promptly moved 
out of the house where all four had been staying and began renting a place close to the main 
campus.370        
His actions shocked the other BCM activists who were now unofficially being 
referred to as the Bokwe Group.  Unlike Nengwekhulu, their brief time in exile had 
convinced them that forming an armed wing under BCM was the best way to unite the 
fractured South African movements.  As they continued to read and digest revolutionary 
texts and engage in deeper discussions with other liberation movement activists in 
Botswana, they began to gravitate towards the praxis of Mao Tse-tung, Amilcar Cabral, 
Ho Chi Minh, and the concept of a “People’s War”.371  While scholar Xolela Mangcu has 
striven to centre the evolution of BC as a political ideology from within radical South 
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African, primarily Xhosa, traditions of activism and intellectual thought, this has 
constrained our ability to appreciate BC’s deep interlocution with radical currents across 
the Third World.372  This engagement of BCM with Third World radical currents lends 
weight to recent arguments of scholars like Mabogo More who centres both local and 
global intellectual currents in the formation and Black Consciousness in South Africa.373  
    
Beginnings of a Third Force: Engagements with Thabo Mbeki and the ANC-SA 
Despite their disagreements with Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, Mafuna and the others 
did believe it was necessary to meet with the older liberation movements in order to find 
ways to unite them.  As Thabo Mbeki was a frequent visitor to Gaborone he and other 
ANC-SA cadres had a number of conversations with Mafuna and his Lieutenants about 
their plans to obtain military training.  Surprisingly to them, Mbeki had a firm grasp of 
Black Consciousness ideology, Marxist-Leninism, and the politics of the Black Panther 
Party.  Snuki Zikalala, one of the key members of the ANC-SA/MK underground in 
Botswana in the 1970s who worked with Mbeki remembers ‘discussions would go on for 
hours, with Mbeki explaining in detail the importance of a well-organised front to fight 
against apartheid’.374  Mbeki felt they could find an ideological home within the ANC-SA 
and obtain the military training they desired.  However, to get this material and logistical 
support he insisted they join the ANC-SA as individuals, not as a group like the South 
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African Communist Party (SACP) and South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
had done.  Despite the deep respect many in the Bokwe Group had gained for Mbeki, this 
offer was rejected.375   
This offer was rejected for a number of reasons.  To begin with, the Bokwe Group 
believed the ANC-SA/MK was disproportionately dependent on the USSR for materials, 
money, training, ideological influence, and other resources.  This was concerning to BCM 
not because the comrades from the USSR were white as authors such as Vladimir Shubin 
have argued or because they were influenced by anti-Communist propaganda such as that 
of M. Norval.376  It was influenced by their analysis of ‘Moscow as revisionist in a sense, 
even in the communist context’ given its repressions of radical movements in Hungary in 
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.377  Since the SACP often followed the directives of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and seemed to be dominated by whites, they 
were concerned about their own ideological independence if they joined as individuals and 
not as a group.  Connected to this, they, in-line with the PAC, took issue with the Freedom 
Charter clause championed by the ANC-SA which stated ‘South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, black and white’ as it was incompatible with their vision of taking land from the 
whites to redistribute it to the Blacks.378 
                                                          
375 Bokwe Mafuna Interview; ANC Archives OTP/035/0304/01, D. Gadibone and B. Nguna, ‘The Joint 
Statement’, 9/7/1977, pp. 1-5; ANC Archives LSM 104/0038/01, ‘Present Tasks of the Azanian Revolution’, 
in Ikwezi, October 1979, No. 13, p. 32.   
376 M. Norval, Inside the ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist Organisation (Washington, DC, Selous 
Foundation, 1990); Shubin, ANC, pp. 124-135. 
377 WHP A2675/I/3, Gail Gerhart interview with Steve Biko, October 24th, 1972, p.2; ‘Speech by Reverend 
Mashwabada Mayatula, first national congress of the Black People’s Convention, Hammanskraal, December 
16th, 1972’, From Protest to Challenge, pp. 519-524.  
378 ‘The Freedom Charter’, in T. Karis and G. Gerhart, eds., From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary 
History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, vol.3, Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964 (Stanford, 
Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 205-208; WHP A2675/III/753, ‘Minutes of the Proceeding of the 4th 
General Students Council of the South African Students’ Organisation’, July 14th – 22nd, 1973, pp. 23-24. 
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Most importantly, none had seen any successful MK operations carried out inside 
the country.379  Welile Nhlapo recalls their ‘impression at that time was that the ANC was 
not serious’.380  For them, as well as most South Africans, most of what they knew about 
the armed struggle in southern Africa came from the actions of other African liberation 
movements and to a lesser extent the armed actions of Poqo.381  Tied to this was their 
rejection of MK camps and ANC-SA/MK leadership being headquartered in Tanzania and 
Zambia, far from the borders of South Africa.  The BCM exiles believed this distance from 
South Africa hindered the ability of the military and political leadership to be directly 
engaged with and guided by the popular forces inside the country.  In their opinion, this 
was one of the main reasons why MK and APLA had been unsuccessful and they were 
determined not to make the same mistake with their war effort.382       
 
Forging the APLF in the Shadows of Botswana: March 1974 – February 1975  
It was of prime importance not only for their safety from South African Defence 
Force (SADF) attacks and Special Branch (SB) infiltration, but for the continued good-will 
of the Botswana government that their attempts to build an armed wing in Botswana be 
hidden.  According to APLF members numerous Batswana officials and citizens knew their 
intentions but agreed to turn a blind eye towards it if they were discrete.  This was a similar 
                                                          
379 Mafuna Interview, p. 5; S. Zikalala, ‘Snuki Zikalala’ in S. Ndlovu and M. Strydom, eds., The Thabo Mbeki 
I Know, p. 321. 
380 W. Nhlapo, ‘Welile Nhlapo’ in S. Ndlovu and M. Strydom, eds., The Thabo Mbeki I Know, p. 270  
381 WHP A2675/I/17, GG interview with Bokwe Mafuna, p. 8; S. Manong, If We Must Die, pp. 22-23 
382 Note, this was one of the central critiques of the Hani Memorandum in 1969, the leadership of both the 
army and political wing were constantly traveling and were far from home hence they were unable to 
effectively think through and build the armed struggle at home.  See, H. Macmillan, ‘Commentary: The “Hani 
Memorandum” – introduced and annotated’, Transformation, 69, 2009, pp. 106-129. 
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strategy employed by a number of small states bordering South Africa such as Lesotho and 
Swaziland who were heavily dependent on South Africa economically and outmatched 
militarily, but were determined to find some way to support the various liberation 
movements.383        
Given this need for secrecy the process to join the Bokwe Group was stringent in 
order to ensure those interested were ready to dedicate themselves to the discipline required 
to form and maintain an effective guerrilla army free from spies, indiscipline, and 
overreliance on foreign backers.384  At its peak they had successfully recruited over one-
hundred members and were forced sometime towards the end of 1974 to form a Central 
Committee of which Mafuna, Mafole, and Matshoba were members.  They also created 
task specific committees to collectively share responsibility for the running of the 
movement.  Yet, as the Bokwe Group was still very inexperienced in the realm of armed 
struggle, they continued to read books and pamphlets from across the radical Third World 
whilst tapping into their own experiences as activists inside the country in order to think 
through and formulate different ways to organize themselves.  Mafuna remembers that, 
With the books and with a [the] kind of discussions that were taking place about the role 
of the people in a liberation war, that was a new idea for us.  The Maoist idea.  The ideas 
of Cabral.  These were new ideas for us which made us realize that when we were talking 
of armed struggle it is not just a question of arming people and training them, and whaap 
sending them in to go and fight the opposite number and shot them.  It is a much more 
complicated interaction over years with your own people.385 
                                                          
383 W. Morapedi, ‘The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwean Liberation 
Movements and Botswana, 1960–1979’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 38, 1 (2012), pp. 73-90; L. 
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in The Road to Democracy in South Africa: Vol. 5, African Solidarity, Part I, p. 417; T. Simpson, ‘The ANC 
Underground in Swaziland, c. 1975 – 1982’, in H. Spire and C. Saunders, eds., Southern African Liberation 
Struggles, pp. 96-116; H. Macmillan, The Lusaka Years, pp. 35-37; Bokwe Mafuna interview, pp. 9-11. 
384 Bokwe Mafuna interview, pp. 7-8. 
385 Bokwe Mafuna interview, p. 7. 
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Eventually they began to sharply differentiate themselves from other BC 
individuals and South Africans congregating in Botswana.  It became increasingly clear to 
the local population, the government, and some South Africans inside the country that they 
were different.  According to Puli Moloto-Stofile, sister of Papi Moloto a former student 
of Turfloop who left to join the Bokwe Group, she remembers them as being ‘the more 
organised group, in the sense they were the more cohesive and structured group’ compared 
to the others in exile.386  Although she regularly visited her brother in Gaborone, and heard 
rumours of their intentions to form an armed wing, she was unable to get direct answers on 
what they were doing.  Even Malusi Mpumlwana, a new SASO activist working under 
Biko who arrived in Botswana in May/June 1974 to meet the Bokwe Group, found them 
unwilling to tell him what they were doing.387   
Some of the houses where Puli and Malusi would have met this militant group had 
been acquired through the help of Mafuna’s cousin Trevor Duiker.  Duiker worked for the 
government of Botswana and held both South African and Batswana citizenship.  He was 
critical to the Bokwe Group’s plan of staying close to home as he was able to acquire 
houses for them at affordable prices through his government connections.  According to 
immigration documents from known Bokwe Group cadres such as Welile Nhlapo, House 
No. 3376, Gaborone was the address of one of their houses.388  A number of political 
asylum documents filled out by SASO/BPC comrades seeking to join the Bokwe Group 
list Duiker’s name and address as the contact and place they were staying in Botswana.389        
                                                          
386 Toivo Asheeke interview with Puli Moloto-Stofile, August 31st, 2017, Johannesburg, p. 3.  
387 WHP A2675/I/26, GG interview with Malusi Mpumlwana, July 18th, 1994, p.1. 
388 BNA OP/27, Confidential Interrogation Report B.P. No. 84, ‘Welile Nhlapo’, October 1st, 1974, pp. 1-2.  
389 Bokwe Mafuna interview, p. 6. 
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While forming bases in Botswana would be challenging, it was seen as necessary 
to building the needed support amongst local Batswana so that when they conducted 
sabotage or attacking missions across the border they could easily disappear among the 
people to avoid detection.  It also meant their leadership could respond quickly and 
decisively to events taking place inside the country.  Consequently, the houses and villages 
in which they stayed across Gaborone, Mochudi, Lobatse and Tlokweng morphed into a 
different type of guerrilla camp.390  Mdlalose remembers the daily regimen of the Bokwe 
Group in one of these houses in the following way: 
Regular day, wake up in the morning, we go to gym, all of us… we come back, you sit 
down, we listen to the news.  We wake up early in the morning, come back sit here, listen 
to the news.  And then we analyse the news, what it means to us.  In a group, a big group.  
We did not have furniture, this is a big group.  And others are preparing breakfast and all 
of that.391   
Their exercises consisted of running, jogging, and strength work-outs, for cover, 
they claimed to be a football team in training.  After preparing breakfast they would sit 
together and listen to the news on the radio, mostly BBC shows on Africa and South 
African news.  All cadres, regardless of gender, participated in the preparing of each meal 
and in the clean-up duties.  This would be followed by an hour long discussion about what 
the news meant in relation to their struggle.  Upon the conclusion of these long discussions 
time was then set aside to read the texts they acquired while those who had jobs left for 
them; others were free to roam around Gaborone as long as they did not abuse alcohol 
and/or cause trouble.392 
                                                          
390 Charles Mthombeni interview, p. 11-12. 
391 Musa Mdlalose interview, p. 9. 
392 WHP A2675/I/26, ‘Gail Gerhart interview with Malusi Mpumlwana, July 18th, 1994’, p.1; Charles 
Mthombeni Interview by Toivo Asheeke, Soweto, Orlando East, 14:03, November 30th, 2016, pp. 10-12; 
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Charles Mthombeni recalls that, 
the way they lived, they did not live in a typical camp.  So a house like this [referring to 
his own house where the interview was conducted] would be a camp.  With its own regime, 
structure and political commissar, social commissar and so on.  So when you came in you 
would find us living like this.  Even with children or somebody going to work because 
people were encouraged to find work so that they can get houses, you see, yea to house 
us.393   
In theory and practice this idea had potential.  The Tswana people living on the 
borders had historically crossed into South Africa, and vice versa, to conduct trade, go to 
school, seek medical attention, or just herd their cattle/goats.  Until the late 1970s these 
crossings weren’t as closely monitored by the authorities on both sides of the border as 
they would be in the following decade.394  The Bokwe Group quickly realised having 
people based within these Tswana villages as trusted members of their communities would 
make getting people in and out of the country much easier.395  More importantly in the 
short term, it enabled them to briefly host cadres from inside the country who managed to 
cross the border to meet them.  This close interaction with organisations and individuals 
made it easier for them to quickly create an informal yet active underground in ways the 
ANC-SA and PAC had failed to do.396         
 
Building an Underground: NAYO and Molobi/Williams Cell, July 1974 – March 1975 
                                                          
393 Charles Mthombeni interview, p. 10. 
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One of the groups that consistently came to Gaborone to meet, discuss, and at times 
train with the Bokwe Group were members of an underground cell created by Eric Molobi.  
According to Murphy Morobe, one of the key organisers of the June 16th march, Molobi 
was one of the many youths who was close with Bokwe Mafuna before he had gone into 
exile.  Morobe believed he was recruiting cadres for the Bokwe Group instead of the ANC-
SA/MK as has been often assumed.397  Timothy Williams, a SASO activist who grew into 
consciousness in the early 1970s, was one of those who joined this cell created by Molobi 
when it was formed in the weeks following Tiro’s funeral.  This group would secretly meet 
to read banned literature provided to them primarily by the Bokwe Group and discuss 
different ways to liberate South Africa.  After the brutal reaction of the state to BCM in the 
wake of the FRELIMO rallies, as well as the fall of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, many 
of them began to vigorously embrace the decision to form an independent armed wing as 
they were growing tired of being beaten and killed by the state with no response from MK 
or APLA.398       
Another group the Bokwe Group reached out to and built connections with was the 
National Youth Organisation (NAYO).  In mid-1974 this Dyantyi received a call from 
Bokwe Mafuna at her place of work, Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto, asking her to get a 
                                                          
397 WHP A2675/I/25, ‘Gail Gerhart interview with Murphy Morobe, Cambridge, Mass., May 4th, 1991’, p. 
15; WHP A2675/I/18, ‘Howard Barrell second interview of Mac Maharaj, November 20th, 1990’, p. 376; In 
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398 G. Houston, ed., G. Houston and B. Magubane interview, ‘Williams, Timothy’, in A. Temu and J. Tembe, 
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message to Malebelle Molokeng the President of NAYO.399  According to MK historian 
Thula Simpson, during the mid-1970s NAYO was one of the most active BCM 
organisations operating outside of formal above-ground circles.400  Dyantyi did not know 
Molokeng but was friendly with Thato Bereng whom she knew was close to Molokeng.  
She reached out to Bereng who promptly informed Molokeng about Mafuna’s request for 
a meeting.401  In mid-September NAYO sent a delegation to Botswana led by Molokeng 
and guided by Welile Nhlapo to attend the meeting.       
During the meeting, Mafuna updated them on some of his group’s conversations 
and discussions with the liberation organisations.  He also stressed to the NAYO comrades 
that they were doing all they could to work for unity among the movements.  However, 
this was proving difficult as the ANC-SA wanted to absorb them.  After this, Mafuna 
broached the topic of conducting military training for South Africans.  According to some 
accounts of this meeting Mafuna claimed to have contacts in Europe who were willing to 
facilitate this training.402  Apparently, they ‘were prepared to give military and political 
training to about a hundred people over a period of three months, outside South Africa’.403  
They agreed to have deeper discussions later on this issue which shows that like Molobi’s 
group, NAYO was looking for other ways to carry out resistance against apartheid.  Unlike 
                                                          
399 Some historians have noted attempts by NAYO to organise their own armed wing, what they did not 
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MK or APLA, the APLF in Botswana offered a possible alternative to the non-violent 
direct action of groups like SASO, BCPs and BPC. 
 
A Breakthrough: An Opportunity Presents Itself for Military Training, February – 
August/September 1975 
 In February 1975 Mafuna and Tebogo Mafole, according to Botswana immigration 
documents, left for studies in Nigeria.404  In fact, this was an elaborate deception as they 
were actually headed to Dar es Salaam for a meeting with Tanzanian officials and more 
than likely a meeting with the PAC.  After Dar they were to fly to Beirut to meet some 
Palestinian groups who had sent word through their European allies that they would be 
willing to train some of them.  The meeting with the Tanzanian officials confirmed the 
unlikeliness of them ever obtaining funding from the African Liberation Committee (ALC) 
as they were seen as a group trying to compete with the ANC-SA and PAC.  According to 
a recent interview with Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim and other sources, countries within the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) were divided on which movements they supported 
and there was a fear that introducing a third South African movement would promote 
unproductive infighting within the OAU.405     
Fortunately, the meeting with the PAC was successful as they were able to secure 
an agreement from Viktor Mayekiso, the PAC representative in Libya, to train the Bokwe 
                                                          
404 BNA OP15/1/1.XVI (117), Emigration/Refugees, ‘Bokwe James Mafuna’, February 6th, 1975, p. 1; BNA 
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Group with their own cadres in their newly opened Libyan camp.406  To the outside world 
they would be members of the PAC but this was merely a cover as they would retain their 
independence and be allowed to come back to Botswana to execute their own armed 
struggle plans.  According to Mafuna, Mayekiso also suggested plans be made to conduct 
joint operations inside South Africa with APLA.  These discussions opened up a whole 
new range of possibilities for APLF and a group was put together to go for training.407  
Despite their commendable achievements, the importance of this alliance cannot be 
overstated.  Mdlalose was clear that before the PAC alliance their own independent 
discussions of armed struggle were ‘raw, we did not know what is what… we needed 
somebody to give us guidance’.408     
The trip to Beirut to reach out to the Palestinians however was not successful.  After 
finalizing the agreement with the Viktor Mayekiso the two APLF activists flew to Beirut 
via Cairo.  When they landed in Beirut their timing could not have been worse as according 
to Bokwe Mafuna, the Lebanese Civil War had just broken out.409  Consequently, they 
were marooned in the airport for a few days and eventually forced to return to Botswana 
without having spoken with the Palestinians. 410  Though they could not meet the 
Palestinians, during their time abroad, which also included some time in Rome, Mafuna 
and Mafole had been able to receive crash courses from European underground leftist 
                                                          
406 According to Ndlovu, Houston and Magubane, APLA did not have enough recruits to fill up the camp 
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groups on how to make fake passports and currency, conduct basic intelligence work, build 
basic explosives, and construct underground cells.411     
When Mafuna and Mafole returned to Botswana they added these new lessons to 
the Bokwe Group’s daily regime.  Charles Mthombeni remembers that the Bokwe Group 
helped train ‘people from the country.  People would come in, get trained, and go back.  
Like we did.  I was trained in how to form cells and then sent back’.412  While this type of 
training was not in advanced weapons or explosives it was useful for the recruiting and 
conscientizing work APLF operatives like Mthombeni were doing throughout 1974, 1975, 
and parts of 1976.413   
  Regrettably, while Mafuna and Mafole were abroad, Eric Molobi was arrested and 
brutally beaten by the police.  Before succumbing to police torture, he managed to smuggle 
a letter to his unit stating he was going to break as he could no longer take the torture.  This 
prompted the cell to leave for Botswana immediately.414  On July 25th, 1975 Molokeng was 
arrested by Special Branch.  Over the next few weeks and months dozens of activists, 
including Jane Mafuna, Bokwe’s wife, were arrested and detained in connection with the 
APLF.   
   
Achievements and Disenchantments: To Libya and Syria for Guerrilla Training     
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While the Bokwe Group’s internal network was slowly being uncovered, in late 
September 1975 twenty six APLF cadres left Gaborone with the PAC for Libya.  From the 
perspective of Mafole, Williams, and Nhlapo who were a part of this group, they saw no 
indication at this point that they were being absorbed into APLA.415  They relaxed even 
more when in Uganda, on route to Libya, their group was joined by BC cadres who had 
left South Africa through Swaziland with the PAC like January Masilela (later to be known 
in MK as Che Ogara) who were part of a BC-aligned group called the Anti-Coloured 
Representative Council Front (AFRO).416  They were also joined by recruits who came 
directly from the PAC underground in South Africa and some Lesotho Liberation Army 
(LLA) cadres, the armed wing of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), allied to 
PAC/APLA.417   
Upon arrival in the military camp outside Tripoli, the first signs of trouble began to 
show themselves.  While the APLF had asked to be trained to survive alone or in small 
units in cities or the countryside, their Libyan and APLA commanders forced them to 
participate in conventional army drills against their wishes.  As the weeks unfolded into 
months, among the APLA cadres, constant disagreements emerged between those loyal to 
Templeton Ntantla and Potlako Leballo which often erupted into violence.418  The 
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 153 
 
indiscipline wracking the PAC/APLA began to show the Palestinian and Libyan trainers 
that certain comrades, unbeknownst to them those of the APLF, were different given their 
high discipline, independent thinking, and willingness to blend their Black Nationalism 
with Marxism-Leninism.  This threatened to blow their cover and made APLF vulnerable 
to deportation or imprisonment if those training them found out they were not actual 
PAC/APLA recruits.419     
Nevertheless, after a few months Nhlapo, Mdluli, Mafole, Williams, and a few 
others were chosen to undergo a higher level commando course in the Golan Heights of 
Syria in December 1975/January 1976.420  This commando training, run by the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) High Command is remembered by Nhlapo as 
being much better than what they received in Libya.  In the Golan Heights they were trained 
to survive in the mountains, received further advanced weapons and sabotage training, and 
had ‘long walks, marching and carrying all sorts of things, and mock attacks and all those 
things.  It was a very very interesting course of training, very rigorous’.421  Despite the 
improved training and better food, Nhlapo remembers camp life in the Golan Heights as 
tough, with lice being a constant nuisance.  Moreover, the APLF cadres had heated 
ideological disagreements with this Palestinian faction who did not care much for Yasser 
Arafat.  Given their growing understanding of global movements, the APLF saw Yasser 
                                                          
419 Welile Nhlapo interview, p. 11. 
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Arafat, Fatah, and the PLO cadres as heroes leading the fight against Zionism and 
imperialism.  Moreover, while they respected and admired the PFLP High Command’s 
courage and convictions, they disagreed with their suicide bombing tactics as a waste of 
the valuable lives of their people.422 
  
Betrayals, Infiltrations and Court Cases, January 1976 – July 1976  
While these dozen or so cadres were undergoing specialised training in the Golan 
Heights, the remaining APLF members were sent back to Botswana with some PAC cadres.  
When they got to Uganda the PAC suddenly and without warning tried to force them onto 
a plane to Dar es Salaam so they could be sent to their guerrilla camp in Chunya.  The 
APLF refused based on their earlier agreement which created an uncomfortable standoff 
in the airport.  Fortunately, a message explaining the situation had been sent to Mafuna 
who happened to be in Dar es Salaam with Ntantla discussing further cooperation between 
APLA and APLF.423  It was only when Mafuna arrived that he began to see the deeper 
issue.  Mayekiso, whom they had made the agreement with, was allied to the Leballo 
faction of the PAC so when the agreement had been made the APLF unwittingly became 
entangled in Leballo’s schemes against Ntantla and the broader exile politics of survival.  
To the latter point, Leballo’s faction was trying to reroute these newly trained cadres to 
Chunya to show the OAU-ALC that the PAC was actively recruiting guerrillas and so 
deserved an increase in funding, at the expense of the ANC-SA.  Additionally, these 
                                                          
422 Welile Nhlapo interview, p. 12.  
423 WHP A2675/III/621, H. E. Isaacs, ‘Reflections of a Black South African Exile’ (MA Thesis, 1986), pp. 
341-342; Bokwe Mafuna interview, pp. 12-13.     
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recruits had a chance to be used against Ntantla’s factions within Chunya as at this point 
both sides were openly in conflict with one another in their camps in Tanzania.424   
With some cooperation from Ntantla the APLF was able to get tickets back to 
Botswana.  However, Mafuna decided they could no longer work with the PAC which 
forced them to cancel sending another group of trainees to Libya.425  This was a devastating 
blow to the APLF as the PAC/APLA did have global networks they could have used to 
better organise and arm themselves in exile.  It also shattered Mafuna’s vision of a united 
South African/Azanian armed wing made up of MK, APLF, APLA, and possibly other 
organisations like the LLA.426 
In addition to the betrayal of the PAC, the way these cadres had been trained went 
against the desires of the APLF.  As mentioned above, the APLF had wanted cadres to be 
trained to operate alone or in small groups, yet, it seemed that most of what they had learned 
was how to march and shoot like a conventional soldier.  Believing that most of their 
training had not prepared them to survive in South Africa some dispersed, others began 
abusing alcohol, and still others began to prioritize their education and abandoned the 
armed struggle.427  However, some like Jerome Kodisang refused to give up and began 
training others in what they had learned.428  Later BCM activists in exile recall him being 
a part of ‘the first people to come back from the Bokwe Mafuna group trained and now 
                                                          
424 ANC Archives LSM/016/03, ‘The Profiles of Leballo’s Gang’, May 5th, 1978, pp. 1-27; Bokwe Mafuna 
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426 Musa Mdlalose interview, pp. 14-15. 
427 Musa Mdlalose interview, pp. 14-15. 
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doing, starting to do their cell-work with people like Charlie and so on to prepare this’.429  
While some of the training was not  what the APLF commanders had wanted, a handful 
were infiltrated into the country to carry out a number of other smaller operations which 
targeted white South African business interests in Botswana and South Africa.  
Mthombeni, who was released from prison in January 1976 calls this ‘to repossess, if it 
was something of use, go in and steal’.430      
While Kodisang and Mthombeni planned and executed their armed infiltration 
missions in the country, the NAYO Trial was underway.  Finally given access to lawyers 
in January 1976 after months of torture while imprisoned, the accused began their 
testimonies on March 17th, 1976.  The trial had to be moved from its original location in 
Johannesburg to Pretoria after police unleashed dogs on a crowd of Black supporters who 
were chanting Black Power slogans in support of the accused.431  The accused were charged 
with having made plans to build underground cells, learn about the South African economy, 
and find ways to overthrow the regime through armed struggle, strikes, and popular 
resistance. 432  Because many had been tortured, their legal representation argued the 
testimonies of them and other witnesses were not valid.433  In May 1976 two members of 
the accused were handed guilty verdicts while the rest were released due to lack of evidence 
                                                          
429 Vusi Mchunu interview, p. 12. 
430 Charles Mthombeni interview, p. 12. 
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given most testimonies were coerced and a number of state witnesses refused to testify in 
court. 
                     
‘Total Paralysis’: From the Golan Heights, to Dar es Salaam… to the ANC-SA/MK? 
With the NAYO Trial winding down, Kodisang and Mthombeni doing 
underground work near the border, Welile Nhlapo and the others departed the Golan 
Heights for Libya upon completion of their training.  When they arrived in Libya it seems 
it had been discovered that they were not PAC recruits, consequently, they were 
immediately rerouted to Dar es Salaam where from there they were to get a plane to 
Gaborone.  Similar to the first group, when they arrived in Dar es Salaam the PAC refused 
to give them their tickets for Gaborone as they wanted them to go to their camp in Chunya 
instead.  After they too refused, they found themselves marooned in the airport.  After a 
day or so they saw a white man in their lounge and began speaking in township Afrikaans 
to see what he would do.  When the man immediately got up and left Tebago and Welile 
followed him and realised it was Joe Slovo.434  ‘The following day’ Welile Nhlapo recalls, 
‘Keith and Eric Mtshali and Ready Mazingu came to meet us there.’435  Excited to see 
Keith Mokoape, who they knew from their SASO days, they asked him to explain what 
happened to him and his group when they left in 1972 to find the armed struggle.  They 
also wanted more details on the relationship between the ANC-SA, SACP, USSR and the 
clauses they were uncomfortable with in the Freedom Charter.436 
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Mokoape briefly told them how he eventually joined the ANC-SA and argued that 
the ANC-SA/MK plan for freedom was in-line with theirs through its two-stage strategy, 
National Liberation and then Socialist transformation.437  The National Liberation portion 
entailed achieving the political freedom of the Africans/Blacks which would be followed 
by the socialist transformation.  He also addressed their concerns about communists and 
white control over the ANC-SA which he argued was not true as most of the SACP was 
Black.  More importantly, he agreed with their assessment that the ANC-SA/MK had been 
up till then ineffective in executing its armed struggle, therefore, he argued that as BC 
activists them joining could ‘turn the ANC around into a fighting organisation… we are 
the ones more organised with our networks inside the country, we can swell their ranks’.438  
This conversation with Mokoape combined with the recent PAC betrayal made many in 
this group more agreeable to joining the ANC-SA.439     
Upon arriving back in Gaborone a number of things further convinced Nhlapo and 
others to leave the Bokwe Group.440  After Mafuna had stopped the attempts to divert APLF 
guerrillas to Chunya, the PAC sent a member of their NEC, Elias Ntloedibe, to give a talk 
at the University of Botswana.  In this talk Mcodibe began speaking about the attempts by 
some South Africans in this Bokwe Group to get guerrilla training in exile through using 
fake covers as students.  This exposed the APLF’s real intentions and the infuriated 
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Botswana government ordered its intelligence services to keep a closer eye on them.  
Mafuna was also not in the country, he had eventually made his way from Dar es Salaam 
to Paris where he would remain until the late 1980s waiting for contact from Palestine 
organisations.441  Additionally, in late May, Mthombeni brought word to them that the 
youth in the country, through SASM, were getting ready to take action against the 
imposition of Afrikaans in the schools.  There was a serious threat of violence with the 
authorities and some of the youths wondered if those trained for armed struggle – 
regardless of which movement – could be sent to protect them, provide leadership, or 
retaliate if they were attacked.  Some of those who had been trained abroad believed they 
could support the students militarily.442  Others like Nhlapo believed different, ‘We could 
not.  Total paralysis’.443     
A few weeks after hearing Mthombeni’s warning, Soweto erupted into rebellion.  
Over the next few months hundreds began streaming across the border to Botswana, 
Swaziland, and Lesotho.  Nobody, including the ANC-SA, was able to adequately respond 
to the events of the Soweto Uprising.444  To make matters worse, Kodisang had been 
captured right before the Soweto Uprising began forcing Mthombeni to leave into exile 
shortly after the Uprising.  Kodisang would later be one of the accused in the notorious 
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Bethal Trial.445  From the vantage point of Welile Nhlapo, Tebago Mafole, and others, the 
APLF was the most unprepared to deal with this onrush of exiles, many of whom wanted 
to take up arms against apartheid.  After additional meetings with Mokoape, Snuki, and 
Mbeki they concluded ‘there was a clarity within the ANC-SA compared to the other 
liberation movements’.446  As the Soweto Uprising continued and the APLF/Bokwe Group 
could only watch and analyse, an all-night debate took place at one of their houses in 
September 1976.  Nhlapo lead the charge insisting most of their training was not useful to 
militarily overthrowing the apartheid regime, case and point, they could not even 
effectively support the kids who were at that moment taking a stand against the regime.447   
After the all-night debate Nhlapo and Mafole left with Papi Moloto, Timothy 
Williams, and about fifty other cadres including some new ANC-SA recruits like Nkosana-
Dlamini, former VP of SASO.448  They contacted Snuki Zikalala of the ANC-SA 
underground to inform him that they were prepared to join the ANC-SA and MK and 
needed help to get out of the country.  Tickets were provided to Lusaka from which point 
they were flown to Dar es Salaam and then Luanda.  After a brief stay at Engineering 
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Camp, located outside of Luanda, they were deployed to MK’s newly opened camp Novo 
Catengue in early 1977.449 
 
‘No nice package at the end, only that you would be free’: Assessing the Influence and 
Importance of the Bokwe Group/APLF 
This chapter has endeavoured to reconstruct the early history of BCM’s attempts to 
form an armed wing during the 1970s.  The study of the APLF as an organisation shows it 
to be part and parcel of BCM like SASO, BCPs, BPC and SASM.  Moreover, as MK and 
APLA had no meaningful presence within South Africa or in the neighbouring countries 
until mid-1976, beginning in 1974 up to September 1976, the APLF was arguably the most 
active South African liberation movement armed wing.  This reality pushed the ANC-SA, 
according to Joe Slovo, to restructure the ANC-SA’s National Executive Committee (NEC) 
to refocus efforts on the armed struggle inside South Africa.  Slovo and Ronnie Kasrils, 
both top ranking MK commanders, have both admitted in interviews that their organisation 
had up to that point, from 1963-1976, failed to form an effective ANC-SA or MK 
underground.450  Moreover, Keith Mokoape remembers no MK bases being open when he 
and his cadres left for exile in September 1972.  It took them incessantly prodding and 
hustling to finally in late 1973 receive some informal training in a Zambian game reserve 
and until the middle of 1975 for MK to officially accept recruits for military training.451  
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Interestingly, this change in policy occurred around the same time the Bokwe Group left 
for military training in Libya which lends context to Slovo’s argument that within the 
ANC-SA/MK, and their international allies, ‘there was a feeling that we were being 
upstaged by the emerging Black Consciousness’.452          
While the decision to turn to armed struggle was not uniform among some of 
BCM’s leading personalities like Biko and Nengwekhulu; militant youths inside the 
country seemed to support its creation as knowledge of them grew.  In addition to the 
APLF’s base in Johannesburg, in the Transkei in what is now the Eastern Cape, Stanley 
Manong knew of a man named Simon Mlonyeni who ‘knew people who were operating a 
safe route to Botswana where I could join new recruits being assembled by Bokwe Mafuna, 
who was facilitating military training for new recruits in Libya’.453  At Turfloop, in what 
is now Limpopo but what was then Bophuthatswana, Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini 
remembers hearing from Puli Moloto-Stofile about the activities of the Bokwe Group in 
Botswana.  Although she and Puli did not agree with them forming their own armed wing, 
they and others at Turfloop were aware of what they were doing.454  In Natal, what is now 
KwaZulu Natal, members of the KwaMashu Youth Organisation (KWAYO), an affiliate 
of NAYO, left the group sometime in 1975 in order to join the Bokwe Group.455  Even 
within Robben Island their impact was felt as ANC-SA underground activist Kgalema 
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Motlanthe, arrested in April 1976, recalls militant BC members claiming to have an army 
being trained in Libya.456        
That said, the Bokwe Group/APLF was not able to form and sustain an armed wing.  
Despite their commendable efforts and ideological interlocutions with 
Maoist/Cabralian/Vietnamese/Palestinian revolutionary thought, they ultimately failed.  
Much of this lies at the feet of the PAC whose actions destroyed the potentially 
transformative alliance from growing.  The constant infighting, ideological confusions, and 
the PAC’s attempts to reroute APLF cadres to their own camps in Tanzania to take part in 
their own internal squabbles repulsed members of the Bokwe Group/APLF who left with 
them for military training.  A lack of support from the OAU-ALC was also critical, yet, it 
ended up being a positive as it enabled the Bokwe group to be independent of state support 
to run their movement.  This granted them a level of autonomy in their praxis the ANC-SA 
and PAC were unable to match.     
Even so, all blame cannot, and should not, lie with others.  The constant splits 
between the various BCM aligned cadres in Botswana while never escalating to the 
violence of the PAC splits or the public mudslinging and imprisonments of the ANC-
SA/MK, hindered their ability to effectively organise a sustainable Black radical alternative 
to the more non-racialist socialist ANC-SA.  While the fierce independence of the BCM 
activists is to be commended, it at times worked as their greatest enemy as future iterations 
of the APLF founded in the late 1970s and early 1980s such as the Isandlwana 
Revolutionary Effort (IRE), the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO), 
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and the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA) were never able to cooperate 
efficiently with one another to attack the apartheid regime.457       
Tied to this, the Bokwe Group/APLF left much to be desired in their ability, or 
inability, to seamlessly incorporate women into all strands of its structures.  While Thato 
Bereng and Pumza Dyantyi most probably were members of the APLF, and their role as 
couriers and propagandists for the movement was undoubtedly effective, none were chosen 
to go to Libya with the first group of APLF cadres.  Nosipho Matshoba who was part of 
the original four BC cadres who left for exile and is praised in various interviews and 
testimonies as being present in key discussions, was also not able to travel abroad for 
military training.  While more research is needed, and indeed the strand of Islam practiced 
by Libya likely had an impact in determining who could or could not be trained, the story 
cannot end there.  Despite women and men sharing in all cooking, cleaning, physical 
exercise and discussion duties, Mafuna seems to have never travelled abroad with a 
woman.  In a recent interview with Bokwe Mafuna on the question of women and the 
struggle, he had this to say,  
women had a special role which is not understood, of nurturing, and bringing together… 
there’s always been a lack of spirituality guiding the movement and its ethos and its 
purpose and its philosophy and so when you go into that you are able to realize that women 
have got special powers, the powers of nurturing.  They can create something that you and 
I cannot do, as so they do have a special role of being able to bring people together.  That 
is why power most of the time in patriarchal societies has always been with men and that 
is why there is no peace.  Women are the harbingers of peace and unity… they… bring 
nations together… They’re not great fighters [emphasis mine] but they mould societies 
together and that role of moulding together is much more difficult than waging war against 
each other and it has not yet been tested.  That how do we create a new society, it’s a huge 
task and women have the greater role there.  They have greater power, but it’s a spiritual 
power.458   
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On the one hand, Mafuna’s appreciation for the power of peace making and 
spiritual depth in women could be seen by some as commendable.  On the other hand, his 
belief that women were not good fighters reproduced the same stereotypes about women 
imposed on African peoples by European-Christian colonialism.  This belief in the limits 
of women arguably influenced his decision to not take any with him on this international 
missions or to ensure that those willing to obtain military training were sent to Libya.  
Moreover, by anointing them with the task of spiritual freedom fighters and peace-makers, 
he placed this monumental task on their shoulders alone giving them extra burdens for the 
success of the movement.  By doing this, he removed the responsibility of men, like 
himself, to fight our own socialised oppressive natures in order to be equal partners in the 
creation of this liberatory project.       
In closing, the APLF made an admirable contribution not only to South Africa’s 
freedom struggle, but to the larger global project of Black Internationalism.  Most 
powerfully, the APLF’s grassroots centred approach to organising, their commitment to 
executing a People’s War along the lines of the Vietnamese, coupled with its lack of state 
support, marked it having the potential to be independent in ways the ANC-SA and PAC 
could never be.  All these factors brought them more fully into Cedric Robinson’s Black 
Radical Tradition (BRT).  By approaching the problem of apartheid without ‘the promise 
of a certain future’ it distinguished itself from the ANC-SA/SACP’s Marxism where 
‘victory is an inevitable eventually’.  For the BRT, as it was for the APLF and some of its 
subsequent iterations, ‘it is about a kind of resistance that does not promise triumph or 
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victory at the end, only liberation.  No nice package at the end, only that you would be 
free’.459       
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Chapter Four  
Picking up the Pieces: Fighting for Unity under the banner of Black 
Consciousness, October 1976 – January 1990 
 
Introduction/Literature Review 
 The departure of Welile Nhlapo, Tebogo Mafole, Timothy Williams, and others 
combined with the crackdown of the Botswana authorities almost destroyed the morale of 
the remnants of the Azanian People’s Liberation Front (APLF).  Simultaneously, the 
stream of South African refugees to Botswana eventually grew into an uncontrollable flood 
which the shattered remains of the Bokwe Group were unable to absorb.  Yet, cadres such 
as Musa Mdlalose and Charles Mthombeni were determined to rebuild and as 1977 got 
underway those remaining, with support from some new recruits from South Africa like 
Vusi Mchunu, formed the Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort (IRE).  They picked up the 
networks created by the APLF and used them to obtain intelligence and military training 
across the Middle East.  At the same time, although separately, discouraged at the failure 
of the various South African armed wings to protect students during the Soweto Uprising, 
members of the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC) hatched a plan to form 
yet another armed wing under the banner of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM).  
Eventually, the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO) was formed and 
Khotso Seatlholo was elected its President in exile.   
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 While IRE and SAYRCO consolidated themselves, Barney Pityana was able to flee 
into exile sometime in 1977.  Working closely with Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu and other 
BCM cadres, although not IRE or SAYRCO, plans were laid for a consultative conference 
to be held for the various BCM factions in exile.  Simultaneously, both Pityana and 
Nengwekhulu stepped up efforts to hold a meeting with the African National Congress of 
South Africa (ANC-SA) to discuss prospects for cooperation, or in the case of Pityana, 
unity talks.  The meeting was mostly positive and a foundation was laid for future 
discussions upon the conclusion of the BCM conference.  After many delays the conference 
took place in April 1980 in London; for some, the meeting has been remembered as a 
resounding success.  For others, such as Pityana, the conference made it clear that his vision 
of BCM and its role differed from the majority leading him to depart the conference to join 
the ANC-SA.  Unfazed by his departure, Pityana was promptly thanked by the conference 
participants for his work and the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) was 
officially formed with the implicit understanding that it was to be the external wing of the 
Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO).   
 Initially imagined as an umbrella organisation with a decentred structure of 
leadership, so as to respect the fierce independence of the various factions, the BCMA 
found itself unable to control groups like SAYRCO or IRE.  As an example, one year after 
BCMA was formed, Khotso, tired of remaining in exile training while Umkhonto We 
Sizwe (MK) rose to prominence, led a mission into the country to recruit for SAYRCO and 
promote BC as an alternative to the ANC-SA/MK.  As he mobilise d across the townships 
he was captured and imprisoned which lead to the eventual fall of SAYRCO as a viable 
organisation.  In response to this and other factors, the BCMA reformed itself yet again to 
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become a more centralised organisation, much to the chagrin of IRE.  The arrival of 
Mosibudi Mangena and eventually Nkutsoeu ‘Skaap’ Motsau into exile ushered in the 
creation of the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA) and the solidification of the 
BCMA as the representative organisation for BCM to the world.  Arguably more successful 
than APLF, IRE, or SAYRCO, the BCMA was able to recruit cadres for training, infiltrate 
combatants into South Africa, better incorporate women into its structures, and hold the 
line internationally as a Black radical alternative to the ANC-SA/MK as the Pan Africanist 
Congress of Azania (PAC) fell even further from grace.   
 This period of BCM’s history in exile is one of the most under-researched aspects 
of South Africa’s armed struggle.  Two pieces stand out as the most complete 
historiographies of this important point in the movement’s history.  The first is Bavusile 
Maaba and Mbulelo Mzamane’s chapter entitled ‘The Black Consciousness Movement of 
Azania, 1979-1990’ in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 4 [1980 – 1990].460  
Designed as an overview of BCM’s politics in exile post-Soweto the authors focus on the 
ANC-SA and BCM’s meeting in 1979, BCM’s 1980 conference, and the efforts of 
BCMA/AZANLA in exile to project a BCM position to the international community.  
Although a constructive opening contribution, the chapter suffers from a lack of 
understanding of how and why various disagreements between these activists formed in 
exile.  Moreover, while acknowledging the presence of IRE, SAYRCO, and AZANLA, 
their lack of access to newer research, particularly interviews from former IRE and 
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AZANLA combatants, limits their ability to describe how these armed wings formed, how 
they were trained, and how they were infiltrated into the country.461  
Unlike Maaba and Mzamane, Mosibudi Mangena’s recent autobiography gives a 
more complete and comprehensive account of the evolution of the BCMA/AZANLA, as 
well as a wider history of BCM in exile.462  Beginning with his family’s flight into exile in 
1981, Mangena takes his readers on a journey through the reorganisation of the BCMA and 
the founding of AZANLA during the 1980s.  The strength of this autobiography lies in the 
level of detail Mangena is able to present on events he was directly involved in, as well as 
those of AZANLA combatants who he interviewed for many of the chapters.  He is also 
critical of the state of the organisation prior to his arrival and goes through the clashes 
younger members had with older more veteran cadres like himself.  However, his 
autobiography does not give a detailed look at the IRE and SAYRCO outside of a few 
pages.   
With this in mind, this chapter will begin with exploring the little known origins of 
the IRE.  It will then move to a discussion on how and why SAYRCO formed before 
launching into a brief overview of the meeting between ANC-SA and elements of BCM in 
Lusaka in December 1979.  This will be followed by an analysis of the April 1980 BCM 
conference in London with a critical assessment given on why disagreements emerged.  
The remainder of the chapter will briefly summarize the formation and evolution of 
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AZANLA and close with thoughts on how and why the movement failed to surpass the 
ANC-SA/MK as the dominant organisation in exile.   
      
The Fall of the APLF and the Rise of the IRE, June 1976 – December 1979   
  In the wake of the departure of Welile Nhlapo, Tebago Mafole, and about fifty 
other cadres from the APLF there was an intense discussion on what to do as 1976 drew to 
a close.  Not only had they lost the majority of their comrades who had been trained as 
guerrillas, but the Botswana government was keeping a closer eye on them which forced a 
number of their members to relocate to Dukwe Refugee camp.  The authorities were clear, 
if one did nothave a job or a legitimate business in the cities they would not receive their 
monthly stipend.  Moreover, they faced the threat of deportation back to South Africa if 
they did not comply with government regulations.  Furthermore, according to interviews 
with Musa Mdlalose and Charles Mthombeni, now in the leadership of the APLF, they 
found it near impossible to take care of, let alone offer military training to BC inspired 
refugees who came to them.  For those few who did join, Mdlalose and Mthombeni took 
serious issue with the rudeness many of them exhibited towards with the local Batswana 
and their constant dagga smoking; things that were strictly forbidden among themselves.463   
Despite these challenges, the former APLF cadres had some loyal members and 
strong allies with stable employment and/or businesses around Gaborone, Lobatse, 
Tlokweng, Molepolole, Mochudi, and other villages.  These cadres had been embedded in 
the system not only for their own survival but as a part of the Bokwe Group’s overall plan 
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to create bases/safe houses and covers for their infiltration attempts.  Determined not to 
join the ANC-SA or the PAC, Mthombeni and Mdlalose led the charge for the 
reorganisation of the shattered APLF and formed the IRE.  The members of this new 
formation were drawn from the remnants of the APLF and a few new recruits such as a 
young Vusi Mchunu.464    
In order to fund their operations – as they were not recognised as a liberation 
movement by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), or any 
of the Frontline States – they restarted their taxi businesses, became farmers, raised pigs 
and chickens, and eventually sold eggs and pork meat in the markets of Gaborone.  Other 
work has linked these self-help projects to the BCMA cadres in Dukwe refugee camp in 
the early 1980s, but interviews with members of the APLF/IRE show these initiatives were 
started earlier.465  Using this money, they were able to send some of their comrades to 
Europe to fund-raise and seek military training opportunities.  While rebuilding their 
shattered armed wing, rumours began to reach them in mid-September 1977 about the 
death of Steve Biko.  When this information was confirmed it dealt yet another devastating 
emotional and psychological blow to these comrades, many of whom had known Biko 
personally or at the very least were greatly inspired by him.  Mthombeni recalls them 
feeling they ‘had let Biko down’.466             
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Unfortunately, there was little time to mourn as a few months later the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), whom the APLF had formed contacts with, notified 
them of an opportunity for some IRE member to undergo military training in Iraq.  The 
EPLF offered to assist the first group of IRE trainees on their journey to Iraq where they 
would be trained by the Abu Nidal Organisation, a splinter group from the Palestinian 
organisation Fatah.  Musa Mdlalose, who previously had to stay behind to run operations 
out of Gaborone while others in the APLF were training in Libya and Syria, was now able 
to acquire some weapons training.  According to a recent interview with Mdlalose, four 
IRE cadres including himself travelled from Gaborone to Baghdad on a torturous route 
through southern and east Africa.  A few days after their arrival they met Abu Nidal in 
person; two days later they went to a training camp in Basra located about 450 km south-
east of Baghdad.  Though their instructors did not speak English very well, Mdlalose 
remembers finding creative ways to communicate and eventually he and some others were 
able to learn a bit of Arabic.  The process was slow but they eventually grew proficient in 
using pistols, revolvers, submachine guns, heavy guns, rockets, explosives and guerrilla 
warfare tactics which took place over a period of about four months.467   
A few months into their training word reached the camp that Israel had invaded 
Jordan and Lebanon in Operation Litani, March 14th – 21st, 1978.  Musa remembers 
‘foolishly we wanted to enlist to go and fight’ with their trainers who were being deployed 
to the front.468  Although their offer was politely refused, this showed the depth of respect 
and solidarity that existed between the two organisations.  Despite these good relations, 
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there were disagreements at times between the two groups as Musa recalls the IRE did not 
agree with the militarism of this particular Palestinian group.  They felt, like the APLF did 
in the Golan Heights, that the suicide missions and bombings of civilian targets was not 
the best way to bring freedom to Palestine.  These differences however did not affect their 
training and they left on good terms.469   
As Musa’s group was returning efforts were underway to send other IRE cadres to 
Europe, particularly West Germany, in order to fund-raise for the organisation.  Vusi 
Mchunu, Mandla Ncayiyana, and Charles Mthombeni were among those sent out with the 
money saved by their self-help projects in Botswana.  In Germany, this small group 
travelled around the country under the guise of students fund-raising for their studies and 
living expenses while in Botswana.  While in Germany they received help from Black 
Consciousness-inspired individuals like Anthony Mongamele and Zande Mogwenju who 
was headquartered in Denmark.470  Their main contact in East Berlin however was Kwezi 
Kadalie the grandson of the renowned founder of the Industrial and Commercial Worker’s 
Union (ICU), Clemens Kadalie.  Kwezi was a printer who helped IRE print their 
publication Isandlwana: Official Organ of Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort of Azania 
which they also funded through their self-help business in Gaborone.471        
  The IRE’s West Germany connections were so strong that even the ANC-SA was 
forced to react and a number of members pushed leadership to open an office in West 
Berlin to combat BCM’s rising influence among the anti-apartheid forces there.472  
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According to Vusi Mchunu, the IRE had gained support from the Red Brigades in Italy, 
the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and the Baader-Meinhof Group (Red Army 
Faction) in West Germany.  Mchunu recalls that ‘we worked with them sensitively to sort 
out certain things, movements, resources and so on’.473  While fundraising in Germany a 
chance offered itself in late 1978 to acquire military instruction with Palestinian students 
who were being sent for training by the PLO in Lebanon.  Through underground networks 
a few IRE cadres were able to go to Beirut and over the next few months receive intensive 
training in the usage of small arms, heavy arms, rocket launchers, and explosives; in 
addition to this, they received instruction in the art of forging currency, passports, and other 
forms of underground intelligence work.  They were part of a larger one-hundred person 
group of recruits being trained primarily by al-Fatah who had bases in Beirut and in the 
Sidon/Tyre area as part of their ongoing war against the Israeli state.  The IRE cadres 
gained even more respect for the Palestinians even though they too did not agree with some 
of their methods of struggle such as suicide bombings and the hijacking of planes, 
nevertheless, they respected their courage to do anything for freedom.474   
 By 1979 both IRE groups were back in Botswana and were working closely 
together to restart efforts to organize sabotage and infiltration work in South Africa.  This 
was to prove challenging as the flood of Soweto generation refugees were now mostly 
settled in ANC-SA/MK camps, combined with the contributions of trained BC cadres like 
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Welile and Tebogo, MK strikes were beginning to dominate the headlines.  Furthermore, 
the question still remained where they would get weapons from and once they received 
these weapons, where would they store them?     
 Towards the end of 1979 an opportunity to acquire weapons presented itself when 
a peace agreement was signed in Rhodesia between the major liberation movements and 
the white colonists.  As a part of the process, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army 
(ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe African National Army (ZANLA) forces were to disarm, due to 
sympathies they had with some members of ZANLA, IRE was able to slip into these 
assembly points to obtain some weapons.  Mchunu remembers that he and two others drove 
to a camp in Zimbabwe near the Gwayi River close to Bulawayo to pick up these weapons.  
After filling up about two bakkies full of AK-47s, grenades, bazookas and an assortment 
of other weapons, Mchunu and his comrades drove all the way back to Gaborone.  
According to a recent interview with Mchunu and another by an anonymous woman 
member of IRE, they dropped some of the weapons off in various safe houses and made a 
deal with some Xhosa speaking Batswana close to Tlhareseleele (Borolong), close to the 
South Africa border, to store the rest at a house they built in the area.475   
 
“The Ball of Liberation is in our hands”: A New Vision Merges, August 1976 – May 
1980 
While the IRE was solidifying efforts to restart an armed wing, SAYRCO was 
doing the same separately.  SAYRCO formed from elements of the Soweto Students 
Representative Council (SSRC) who were frustrated at what they felt was a lack of 
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effectiveness of the older liberation movements, including those of the APLF, towards 
bringing about the armed overthrow of the apartheid regime.  Its central figure was Khotso 
Seatlholo who rose to prominence in South Africa as President of the SSRC after the 
departure of Tsietsi Mashinini in August 1976.476  Upon assuming the mantle of President 
at the tender age of eighteen, the Soweto Rebellion increased in intensity as Seatlholo was 
clear that his was a new generation who would, unlike the older generation, ‘succeed.  The 
mistakes they made [older generation], shall never be repeated.  They carried the struggle 
up to where they could.  We are very grateful to them.  But now, the struggle is ours.  The 
Ball of liberation is in our hands’.477   
 The students and youths meant this literally.478  In an undated document written by 
Issa Gxuluwe, deputy President of the SSRC, to Seatlholo, who was forced to flee to 
Swaziland sometime in early 1977, an idea was proposed for the creation of a new 
organisation in exile.  This document, rarely cited in research on BCM, was inspired by 
their experiences during the student rebellion and the practical work of some of their 
members who had been members of the Suicide Squad, a group of youths trained by but 
not under the command of MK to carry out sabotage attacks against the regime towards 
the end of 1976.479  Gxuluwe wrote that while they were inspired to action by the history 
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of struggle in South Africa, they were a Black Consciousness formation as was, at least to 
Gxuluwe, the entire Soweto Uprising.  Furthermore, while praising the resilience and 
resistance of the uprising, the document pointed out that to that point, they had been too 
loosely organised and sporadic attacks were ‘no longer suitable.  They are wasteful and 
inefficient in terms of lives and other resources’.480  Moreover, they could no longer work 
within the law for freedom or look to other liberation organisations or governments to save 
them.    
 Taking all these factors into account as well as the mistaken belief that the OAU 
would support them, ‘we have decided to set up the South African Youth Revolutionary 
Council (SAYRCO)’.481  The document went on to suggest the adaptation of a complex 
organisational structure, SAYRCO’s main body would be the National Congress (NC) 
which would meet once a year, preferably inside South Africa, and would consist of ten 
representatives from each of the eight nationality groups as well as twenty from the urban 
Black areas.  They would also have a National Executive Committee (NEC) that would be 
made up of a National President, Four Vice Presidents, a Secretary General (SG), Head of 
Tactical and Strategy Committee, and a number of other positions.  Not done yet, the NEC 
was to have a Political and Economic Bureau and Tactical and Strategic Unit.  The latter 
seemed to operate as the military wing of SAYRCO which would be headed by a Director 
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with four members: the Secretary-General, one Vice President, External Affairs Secretary, 
and Field Commander.482 
By April 1979 SAYRCO officially announced itself as a new Black Consciousness-
inspired organisation and named Khotso Seatlholo its 1st President.483  According to an 
undated SAYRCO document, they defined armed struggle as the ‘psychological and 
physical transformation of our forces from apologetic and defensive forms of struggle to 
offensive and aggressive ones’.484  More so than Mashinini, Seatlholo was arguably the 
best cadre to lead SAYRCO.485  As leader of the SSRC at the height of the Soweto Uprising 
inspired rebellions he had distinguished himself as ‘a tactician of note, and a leader of 
weight’.486  Gail Gerhart described Seatlholo in comparison to Mashinini as a ‘more 
forceful speaker’.  Furthermore, unlike Mashinini, his speeches were notable for their 
‘unadorned and unqualified anti-whiteism: there is no place for whites in South Africa; the 
whites must get out of South Africa: what has been done to the blacks has been done to by 
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the white man, and the white man is his enemy’.487  His Black Consciousness loyalties 
were clear and as he toured the United States in 1977 after his own hasty departure from 
South Africa after an armed confrontation with South African Police earlier that year.  On 
this tour, Khotso made a point to link the movement in South Africa with the Black struggle 
internationally.488       
 From the balance of evidence, it is clear that Nigeria was supporting SAYRCO 
financially and with military training.489  As of now there are few details available of what 
this training looked like and how many were being trained, however, what we do know is 
Khotso was leading a group of SAYRCO combatants training in Nigeria sometime in the 
late 1970s after his US tour.  Unfortunately, little trust existed between IRE and SAYRCO 
so not much was done to exchange knowledge and/or embark on guerrilla training missions 
together.  Nevertheless, as 1980 began both armed wings felt confident in their ability to 
open an effective third front (the first two being MK and APLA) out of Botswana to bring 
down the apartheid regime.   
 
Negotiations with the ANC-SA and the formation of the BCMA, January 1977 – May 
1980  
 While the IRE and SAYRCO were busy consolidating themselves abroad, inside 
the country attempts were being made to unite the fractured BCM exiles and create better 
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structures to deal with the Soweto Uprising exodus.  In order to do this the Black People’s 
Convention (BPC) at its 5th Congress in Durban from January 28th – 30th, 1977 created an 
External Affairs Secretariat with Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu as its Director-General.  To 
ensure the internal wing had more control over what was happening among the BCM 
exiles, the Director-General was to report directly to Thamsanqa Zani who was named the 
new Secretary of External Affairs based inside the country.490  This move officially handed 
Nengwekhulu a mandate of authority from inside the country.  At the same Congress, Steve 
Biko was elected Honorary President of the BPC as a part of the secret negotiations that 
were going on between the BPC and top ranking officials of the ANC-SA and PAC.491   
These decisions were not met with enthusiasm by some of the members of the IRE 
and other wings of BCM scattered around southern Africa and parts of Europe and North 
America.492  In a publication by some independent Black South African Marxist-Leninists 
called Ikwezi, based out of London and allied loosely with IRE, this attempt by the internal 
leadership to essentially exert control over the exile groups by handing Nengwekhulu a 
mandate was condemned.  For them, the ‘question of the mandate is alienated from the 
masses since it denies dynamism and dialectical process of the development of leadership 
from the people and their struggle’.493  They felt this move by the BPC would constrain the 
secretive work groups like the IRE were carrying out to reform their armed wing.  For the 
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writers of Ikwezi it demonstrated that the internal leadership of BCM, and some externally 
like Nengwekhulu, were out of touch with the desires of the Black masses to launch a Black 
Consciousness-inspired armed struggle.  Moreover, the internal wing seemed unaware of 
the political and diplomatic topography of exile.         
As the various wings of the rapidly fracturing BCM continued to move in their own 
respective directions, they received word about the death of Steve Biko.494  His murder at 
the hands of the apartheid state delayed plans to bring the various BC groups under either 
an umbrella organisation or a unified structure.  His death also setback other plans that 
were being made with the ANC-SA as it pertains to talks on unity.495  In a letter to 
Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu around this time Oliver Tambo, worrying that momentum was 
being lost on negotiations, wrote that Biko’s death must be used to ‘pursue the efforts, in 
which he was deeply involved, to galvanise our fighting people into a united revolutionary 
force’.496   
It is widely known that the last years of Steve Biko’s life were dedicated to forging 
unity among the ANC-SA, PAC, Unity Movement (UM), and BCM.497  Some, like his 
close colleague Saths Cooper, contend he was killed in prison because the apartheid 
                                                          
494 S. Biko, ‘Steve Biko.  Editorial, Pro Veritate’, in T. Karis and G. Gerhart, eds., From Protest to Challenge, 
pp. 744-745; M. Ndlela, For the Fallen: Honouring the Unsung Heroes and Heroines of the Liberation 
Struggle (Sandton, KMM Review Publishing, 2013), p. 19. 
495 ANC Archives LUM/082/0010/67, ‘Letter from O.R. Tambo to Mr. Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu’, n.d. but 
most probably October 1977, p. 1. 
496 ANC Archives LUM/082/0010/67, ‘Letter from O.R. Tambo to Mr. Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu’, n.d. but 
most probably October 1977, p. 1. 
497 WHP A2675/I/13, ‘Gail Gerhart interview with Peter Jones, Cape Town, July 21st, 1989’, pp. 12-18; 
WHP A2675/I/26, ‘Gail Gerhart interview with Malusi Mpumlwana , New York, November 30th, 1987’, pp. 
1-6;  L. Wilson, ‘Bantu Steve Biko: A Life’, B. Pityana, M. Ramphele, M. Mpumlwana, and L. Wilson, eds., 
Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness (Cape Town, David Philip 
Publishers 1991), pp. 66-67; T. Mbeki, ‘Steve Biko: 30 years after’, in C. van Wyk, ed., We write what we 
like: Celebrating Steve Biko (Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2007), pp. 21-40; N. Alexander, ‘An 
Illuminating Moment’, in A. Mngxitama, A. Alexander, and N. Gibson, eds., Biko Lives!  Contesting the 
Legacies of Steve Biko (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 157-180. 
 183 
 
security forces had caught wind of his efforts, and their potential for success, and went 
overboard with their torture of him to gain answers.498  Determined to continue Biko’s 
work, throughout 1977 and 1978 Nengwekhulu exchanged a number of letters with ANC-
SA leaders like Tambo, Alfred Nzo, and others trying to agree upon a date for a meeting 
between him and Oliver Tambo.499  When Barney Pityana came into exile sometime in 
1977, the former Secretary-General (SG) and President of SASO added to Nengwekhulu’s 
efforts although he focused more on organizing meeting spaces for a BCM consultative 
conference.500  Despite Tambo and Mbeki wanting to continue negotiations, the wider 
ANC-SA leadership did not take kindly to these BCM exiles writing letters to different 
embassies requesting space to meet as many were suspicious of their motives.501           
Originally the BCM conference Pityana and others were organizing was set to be 
held in Kenya from December 22nd – 30th, 1979.  In October of that year in London some 
key figures such as Pityana, Jeff Baqwa, Clarence Hamilton, Drake Koka, and Sipho 
Buthelezi organised a pre-meeting to go over some of the main themes they wanted to 
discuss.502  While ironing out plans for this conference, Pityana and Ben Khoapa succeeded 
in organizing a meeting between them and Thabo Mbeki in Lusaka on December 8th, 1979.  
Although Tambo was unable to attend, Mbeki brought with him some former APLF cadres 
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such as Welile Nhlapo to show that the ANC-SA was accepting of Black Consciousness.503  
According to Welile Nhlapo, he, Mafole, Keith Mokoape and Thenjiwe Mtintso (who was 
in Lesotho with Chris Hani) had been asked prior to this meeting to draft a document that 
laid out what the BCM was and suggest some steps to further the discussions that had been 
happening between Steve Biko and the ANC-SA inside the country.504   
As Nengwekhulu had visa issues that hindered his ability to leave Botswana, he 
could not attend this meeting which left Pityana to lead the BCM delegation.  A number of 
BCM activists, particularly the IRE and SAYRCO, while not against this meeting were 
adamant that they did not want to be absorbed by the ANC-SA.  Instead, they wanted the 
talks to focus on ways for a more cooperative relationship to be cultivated.505  While 
scholars such as Maaba and Mzamane have accurately sketched the overall contours of this 
negotiation, they did not provide this wider context of the numerous simultaneous efforts 
by BCM exiles to form armed wings as Pityana entered into negotiations.506  Understanding 
this context is important to grasping why Pityana conceded that he could not speak for all 
factions of BCM, Mbeki complaining at the mixed messages they were getting from BCM, 
and why the April 1980 BCM conference ended with Pityana leaving the movement.   
When the conference began it was noted that besides BCM’s wariness of white 
communists, ‘the two organisations shared in large measure the same ideological 
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positions’.  Furthermore, Pityana proposed that to work more closely with the ANC-SA, 
the ‘BPC could provide training for political cadres who could then be channelled into 
more revolutionary work of the ANC’.507   While this was a positive development, the 
ANC-SA noted that there were a number of different groups who fought under the banner 
of BCM and many of them were openly unfriendly to the ANC-SA.  Pityana responded by 
saying he ‘regretted the manner of their handling that led to bitterness and mistrust’.  He 
also explained that BCM was formed ‘to provide opportunities for all South African 
militants to make [a] full contribution to the struggle’ and so was not designed to replace 
the ANC-SA or PAC.508  Yet, aware of the fierce independence of IRE and SAYRCO, 
Pityana, ever the savvy diplomat, made it clear he did not yet have a mandate from BCM 
organisations to make firm agreements with the ANC-SA as their consultative conference 
had yet to take place. 
This was acceptable to the ANC-SA delegation and as the meeting progressed there 
seemed to be a broad agreement that both organisations would work together to coordinate 
support for legal institutions against apartheid internally and externally.  Pityana also made 
it clear they were against seeking OAU recognition but expressed concern on what the role 
of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Inkatha had with ANC-SA.509  In 
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response, Mbeki laid out that the SACP was part of those national forces against apartheid 
historically.  However, Mbeki bluntly said the ANC-SA did not‘accept responsibility for 
Chief Buthelezi’s and Inkatha’s political stance’.510  This frank response was appreciated 
and Pityana closed by stating that his movement looked ‘forward to the mutual position 
that all militants can be part of revolutionary movement without necessarily belonging to 
the ANC’.511  The ANC-SA seemed generally open to this position but stressed the meeting 
be kept confidential. 
A few months later, after much struggle and toil BCM was able to have its first 
consultative conference in exile in London.512  Yet again, Nengwekhulu was unable to 
attend leaving Pityana to take the lead in the conference proceedings with Ben Khoapa, 
Basil Manning, Sipho Buthelezi, and Jeff Baqwa serving as the other senior leadership.513   
Still in Paris, Bokwe Mafuna was made aware of the conference and received an invitation, 
however, in a recent interview he said due to circumstances beyond his control he was 
unable to attend although he supported their efforts.514  His presence would be missed as 
bringing together the fiercely independent BCM organisations in exile would prove a 
demanding task.   
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According to interviews with various IRE members such as Charles Mthombeni 
and Vusi Mchunu, as well as documents from the conference, the representatives of IRE 
wanted to take the lead in the conference in the discussions on armed struggle.  They 
reasoned that as they had a number of contacts throughout Europe and the Middle East who 
could help train them as guerrillas, and as some of their of their members were already 
trained, they were in the best position to spearhead the building of a new armed wing.  
Mchunu remembers that, ‘We [IRE] were at a peak in terms of our… Europe work, 
networks with liberatory people, we had fighters that [were] working in Botswana and so 
on; we had got strong’.515  They were also pushing for a more umbrella/federal structure 
for the new organisation so the various groups could retain as much autonomy as possible, 
like the PLO, so that eventually they could come together as one as Frente de Libertação 
de Moçambique (FRELIMO) had in 1964.516   
Given this perspective, the delegates of the conference, many of whom did not 
know Pityana, rejected what they felt was his conciliatory attitude towards the ANC-SA.  
A number of the IRE contingent and others like Strike Thokoane felt Pityana had a hidden 
agenda to push them to dissolve as organisations and join the ANC-SA.  These fears 
seemed confirmed when Pityana rejected their desire to continue efforts to build-up the 
armed wings as he felt more efforts should be made to produce a newsletter, Solidarity.517  
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The IRE did not understand this as they already had launched their own publication, 
Isandlwana, it seemed this was not something Pityana wanted to support although 
SAYRCO, who came to the conference with the largest contingent, seemed to embrace the 
idea.  As tensions mounted Baqwa dropped a bombshell when he openly questioned 
Pityana’s notes on the meeting between them and the ANC-SA that he presented to the 
BCM delegates.  This, combined with disagreements with the IRE and the vocal presence 
of some Trotskyite cadres of UM pushed Pityana on the second day to leave the conference 
and openly join the ANC-SA, much to the shock of Nengwekhulu still stuck in 
Botswana.518  Unfazed by his departure, the remaining members of the conference decided 
to retain their full independence from the ANC-SA and PAC.  At the close of the 
conference the BCMA was officially formed, following the IRE suggestion, as an umbrella 
organisation.519 
At the end of the conference the newly minted BCMA stated that ideologically, 
Black Consciousness at the global level embraced the idea of a ‘free, democratic and 
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socialist Azania’.520  Furthermore, making a clean break with some of the contentious 
policies of the BPC prior to its banning, as well as severing claims to leadership by 
Nengwekhulu in Botswana, they voted overwhelmingly to dissolve the External 
Directorate.  They also made sure to recognize all other South African movements fighting 
for the overthrow of apartheid as they felt their role as BC activists was to bring the warring 
factions together.521  Most importantly, determined to learn from the lessons of the ANC-
SA and PAC about being trapped in exile and becoming, at least to their eyes, disconnected 
from the masses, they emphasised that ‘the mainstay of the struggle for national liberation 
in our country rests on the struggling masses within the country, and not on specialised 
entities abroad’.522    
Additionally, a five person interim committee was set up ‘consisting of Basil 
Manning in London, Dodo Motsisi and Mkhalelwa Mazibuku in West Germany, Andrew 
Lukele in the United States and Gerald Phohojoe in Botswana’.523  Yet, in the wake of the 
conference the various BCM organisations were still unable to work together effectively.  
Charles Mthombeni believes this is because despite agreeing to the idea of unity, they had 
not done the necessary practical work to make it a reality.  They did nottrust each other and 
while there was no deep antagonism, according to Mthombeni, this hindered their ability 
to build the necessary structures and communication networks to build their movement 
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further.524  This became even more complicated with the revitalization of AZAPO in the 
early 1980s and their decision, under advisement of some BCMA cadres like Strike 
Thokoane, to send the now released Mosibudi Mangena into exile to lead and reform the 
BCMA.525   
 
Overtaken by Events: The Capture of Khotso, the fall of IRE, and the rise of 
AZANLA, June 1981 – January 1990 
The need for a more centralised BCMA structure became apparent in June 1981 
when Khotso Seatlholo, restless in exile, decided in early 1981 to infiltrate South Africa.  
He wanted to rally support for SAYRCO and the wider Black Consciousness position 
during the five year anniversary of the Soweto Uprising.  Working closely with a woman 
named Loate, he moved around the townships of Soweto spreading information about his 
movement in exile.  Loate had, according to some reports, arranged a meeting between him 
and AZAPO and the PAC’s youth wing the Azanian Youth Unity (AZANYU).  Loate was 
a member of AZANYU and she also helped set up a meeting between Seatlholo and Thami 
Mazawi, the news editor of the Sowetan.  Unfortunately, word reached the authorities that 
Seatlholo was moving around in Soweto.  A few days after his arrival while traveling to a 
meeting with Loate they were ambushed, attacked, and arrested on June 17th, 1981.  In 
court they were charged with terrorism and the promotion of a terrorist organisation.  Both 
were found guilty with Seatlholo sentenced to ten years imprisonment and Loate to five.  
                                                          
524 Mthombeni Interview, p. 21. 
525 WHP A2675/I/16, ‘Lybon Mabasa interview with Gail Gerhart, New York City, April 7th, 1991’, p. 19; 
M. Mangena, Triumphs and Heartaches: A Courageous Journey by South African Patriots (Johannesburg, 
Picador Africa, 2015), pp. 14-17; Strike Thokoane Interview by Toivo Asheeke, Meyerton, December 2nd, 
2016, pp. 16-17; Mchunu Interview, p. 21. 
 191 
 
Their arrests stifled the development of SAYRCO which would be plagued by money 
problems throughout the 1980s.526   
Back in Botswana, according to Mchunu, the government stepped up efforts to 
place people in Dukwe and the house the IRE had built on the border to store their weapons 
became an issue as the person left to watch things vanished along with their weapons.  
Some IRE cadres initially thought the local authorities had done something to him and 
almost retaliated.  Thankfully, cool heads prevailed and they discovered he had just left 
and somebody else had taken their weapons.  Yet, this caused even more frustration which 
was compounded by the fact that many of them were particularly ‘unhappy about the 
leaders that had stayed in Europe’.527  All these frustrations came to a head with the arrival 
of Mosibudi Mangena in Botswana under orders from AZAPO leadership to bring order to 
those in exile.528   
 In December 1981 at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Botswana region 
of the BCMA, Mangena was elected as its chairperson succeeding Mpotseng Kgokong.  
Moving swiftly to counteract the fractured nature of the organisation he, along with others 
not aligned to SAYRCO and IRE in the Botswana region, pushed for a BCMA conference 
to be held to centralize organisational authority and responsibility with an elected 
executive.  At this conference which took place in August 1982, five were elected to the 
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central committee: Mangena (chairman), Mandisi Titi (SG), Tau Morwe (TG), and 
Kgokong (Publicity and Information Secretary).  These four were empowered to co-opt a 
Secretary for Defence which Mangena decided would be Nkutsoeu ‘Skaap’ Motsau who 
was still inside the country serving a banning order.  After the conclusion of this AGM 
arrangements were made for him to escape which led to his arrival in Botswana in February 
1983.529   
As BCMA solidified its structure Mangena remarked at how difficult it was to gain 
international support and recognition for their new effort as often, and here he is referring 
to the ANC-SA, ‘freedom fighters from the same country would try to prevent their 
compatriots from waging the struggle against the enemy, unless those freedom fighters 
affiliated to their organisation’.530  Instead of a fierce spirit of cooperation, there was a 
vicious energy of competition that existed among the South African liberation movements.  
For Mangena, BCMA’s shock at the attitude of the ANC-SA was caused because ‘we had 
come from a culture of free political activity inside our country that fostered solidarity 
rather than division and fragmentation.  We eulogised the imprisoned and exiled leadership 
figures of the older liberation movements and offered our political platforms to activists of 
the banned organisations whenever possible.  Thus, the politics of mutual antagonism was 
a bit weird for us’.531  He also pointed out that many large support groups in the western 
countries were uneasy and distrustful of the pro-Black stance of BCMA and grilled them 
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on their attitude towards whites and were anxious over what they would do if they came to 
power.532 
Nevertheless, there were other BCM adherents in exile who had far more 
experience with the competitive nature of liberation movement politics in exile.  
Furthermore, they had connections to a number of radical organisations across Europe and 
the Middle East.  The IRE cadres were present in Botswana and were willing to assist 
Mangena and the newly reformed BCMA, but, they rejected the authoritative nature with 
which they were approached.  Mdlalose and Mchunu in particular felt that Mangena, 
Mpotseng, and Motsau were not interested in working with the IRE but in dominating 
them.533  This infuriated them because they had been in exile longer and had successfully 
built and rebuilt networks in Europe and the Middle East among radical groups to help 
them receive military training.  Mangena believed these cadres were undisciplined, too 
disconnected from events inside South Africa, and did notwant to submit themselves to the 
internal movement.  The end result was BCMA was unable to incorporate the IRE or 
SAYRCO deeply into its structures.   
When Motsau eventually arrived in Botswana he was given the tedious task of yet 
again reorganizing an armed wing given the inability of the factions of BCM in exile to 
work effectively together.534  Motsau and a few others formed AZANLA and were able to 
quickly get its military programme adopted by the BCMA’s central committee in 1983.  
After its adoption, a similar question faced AZANLA that faced previous BCM formations 
in exile: where to train, where to recruit, and where to get weapons?   Finding help became 
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a serious challenge as most nation-states were either openly hostile towards them (such as 
Zambia), ignored them (Botswana and Tanzania), or politely curbed them (many Western 
and Eastern European states).535 
However, similar to the APLF in 1974 with the PAC, AZANLA got a big break 
when according to Mangena, ‘In the middle of 1984 the EPLF agreed to train us if we could 
make it to their liberated areas within Ethiopia’.536  According to him and Strike Thokoane, 
this offer was first made in the April 1980 conference to the London-based interim 
committee, but, as they were sceptical of the viability of armed struggle they suppressed 
information of this contact.  Motsau and Nlomani Mabusa were the two chosen to go and 
receive this training and were unofficially named the Biko Unit.  Throughout 1985 they 
trained in Nakfa, Eritrea where the EPLF was headquartered while also spending some 
time in Iraq for further instruction.  During this time they were able to meet Isaias Afewerki 
who was one of the leading figures of the EPLF.537  The Biko Unit trained in live combat 
situations and were struck by how many female commanders there were and sought to 
replicate and expand upon this in AZANLA.  Later some of their units were to train in 
Libya after Colonel Gaddafi in 1982 created Al Mathaba of which they became members 
in 1986.538   
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By December 1985 the Biko Unit had returned to Botswana.  Unlike the APLF, the 
BCMA decided to keep much of their armed struggle training activity secret from their 
wider membership who were not on the central committee as conditions in Botswana in 
the mid-1980s were not what they were in the mid-1970s.539  This created some problems 
Mangena remarked as, ‘We had to balance the need-to-know basis of many of our 
programmes with the democratic process that was the hallmark of our organisations.  In 
fact, quite a few rumblings of discontent began to be heard from a few of our members, 
bemoaning the decline of democracy within our ranks.  Some of these ultimately left the 
organisation’.540         
 In 1986 Shaap Motsau informed the central committee of his plan to train cadres in 
the Qwa Qwa Mountains in South Africa, much to the disbelief of the rest of the central 
committee.  Motsau, Kenneth Malele, Naphthalie Mgoaskeng, Frans Pule, Nkosana 
Mavusa and Strike Thokoane went to Qwa Qwa to set things up with the help of a local 
man named Charles Mogotsi.  Mogotsi helped transport cadres to the mountains, most of 
whom were from Soweto.  Much of the training they underwent was map-reading, survival 
in the rural areas, theories of armed struggle, discipline, some of the principals of Maoism, 
and the history of BCM.  There were also a number of women with them in this camp as 
well as those spread out in Botswana.541  According to Strike Thokoane, who was one of 
the leading trainers in Qwa Qwa, teaching these cadres discipline was critical.  In his own 
words, ‘The main thing was the emphasis on discipline because if we do not do that you 
are going to compromise us… so we were training them on how to be disciplined by using 
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the political weapon.  How to form cells, because what we wanted was that these groups 
should go, each individual will form their own cell’.542  
As their units grew more effective they began infiltrating South Africa more and 
more, particularly the Bantustan of Bophuthatswana.  They would sabotage various 
infrastructures, leave pamphlets, and were developing the capability to directly attack the 
security forces.543  On the 17th of June 1990 during a routine armed sabotage mission in 
Bophuthatswana some AZANLA guerrillas clashed with the Bophuthatswana Defence 
Force.544  Though, with the unbanning of banned organisations earlier in February 1990, 
the release of Nelson Mandela shortly after, and the independence of Namibia, global 
events overtook BCMA as pressure mounted for a peaceful solution to the end of apartheid.  
In order to not risk alienation from the masses of South Africa – who at this point were 
heavily influenced by the trade union activism that exploded in the 1980s, the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) and Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), and the figure of 
Mandela –AZANLA was dissolved.        
 
Conclusion: A Missed Chance 
Looking back at the founding conference of the BCMA in April 1980, Charles 
Mthombeni lamented that ‘we missed a chance… to grow you know, effectively, to be a 
force.  We could have been a greater force than what did BCMA later became’.545  This 
chapter closes on this sombre note as we critically analyse why BCM did not grow into a 
                                                          
542 Strike Thokoane interview, p. 21. 
543 Strike Thokoane interview, p. 24. 
544 M. Mangena, Triumphs and Heartaches, pp. 93-124. 
545 Charles Mthombeni interview p. 23. 
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dominant force, on par with the ANC-SA in exile.  Much of this has to do with the ANC-
SA having more resources than BCM, successfully outmanoeuvring them in the diplomatic 
arena, and BCM’s own inability to manage the fiercely independent groups drawn to fight 
under its banner.  We will begin however by recapping certain differences these last few 
chapters teased out between BCM and the ANC-SA/MK and PAC/APLA.         
According to Mdlalose what made BCM formations in exile different from the 
ANC-SA/MK and PAC/APLA were ‘Our interactions with other people and organisations.  
Our willingness to read about other people’s struggles, how they conduct them, especially 
Mao Zedong the Chinese.  Especially the Vietnamese.  Especially the Chinese’.546  
Moreover, they were not funded by the USSR or China which made them far more 
independent than the ANC-SA and the rapidly deteriorating PAC.547  It also forced them 
to rely more heavily on a Black radical South African grounded tradition of struggle, 
something sketched out briefly by Xolela Mangcu and others, that was able to absorb and 
utilize other ideologies and strategies instead of being directed by them.548  This influenced 
the creativity of the movement when it came to rethinking how to open up a new front in 
the war effort against apartheid from Botswana spoken about in chapter three. 
Furthermore, their groundings with the US/Caribbean Black Power Movement, 
especially some of the organizing strategies of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), was deeply influential to their mostly non-hierarchical form of 
organisation.  Most members had a prominent voice in the running of the organisations and 
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SAPEM, July 1989, pp. 17-19. 
548 A. Odendaal, VUKANI BANTU! The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912 (Cape 
Town, David Philip, 1984); X. Mangcu, Biko: A Life (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2014), pp. 33-78. 
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political debate and challenges to leadership was encouraged.  This material and 
ideological independence made BCM more dangerous than others to apartheid because 
other nation-states or global capitalist interests could not strongly influence them if they 
won political power.      
All of this this cannot be said about the ANC-SA/MK or PAC/APLA in exile.  Chris 
Hani, the popular radical of the SACP and Chief of Staff of MK, stated in a 1992 interview 
that the USSR was so willing to supply them with military training and tactics they did not 
explore other ways to independently accomplish these tasks.  Hani recollected that ‘Even 
our Military Combat Work (MCW) theory was really a duplication or a replica of the 
experience of the Bolsheviks, and we therefore failed to take that theory and apply it 
creatively to our own indigenous conditions’.549  For the PAC, their internal problems 
hindered their ability to maintain a viable organisation which infected how they related and 
responded to other organisations such as the Bokwe Group/APLF.  While under Mangena 
and new PAC leadership tensions were mostly healed, trust was never rebuilt and what 
seemed like a natural alliance in exile between BCM and PAC never took root.550  Taken 
together, a larger coalition of radical South African organisations was unable to be formed 
and this only served to prolong the life of apartheid.       
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That said, BCM was outmanoeuvred in exile by the ANC-SA and betrayed by the 
PAC/APLA.  Due to the older organisations having more connections among nation-states, 
the USSR, China, and a number of powerful NGOs, they were able to methodically isolate 
BCM from obtaining broad support in exile.  As previous chapters have outlined this was 
done to ensure they would not threaten in particular the ANC-SA’s claim in exile to be the 
“authentic liberation movement” and by doing so protect their status and financial 
resources.   
Another dimension of this, something we have not spoken about in this dissertation, 
is what many BCM cadres inside South Africa believe to be the violent repression of their 
movement by the UDF and its aligned organisations called the Charterists.  According to 
Puli Moloto-Stofile, Black Consciousness lessened in influence due to ‘the rise of UDF 
[United Democratic Front].  The rise of UDF came with the Charterist [who] were actually 
murdering… BC people… It was a violent repression of Black Consciousness’.551  This 
dissertation purposefully steered away from a close examination of the internal situation in 
the 1980s between AZAPO, UDF, Inkatha, the trade unions, and MDM because of how 
convoluted the narrative is.  There was violence on both sides which was encouraged by 
the apartheid regime to sow as much confusion as possible as their regime lost legitimacy.  
This broke the alliances many of these organisations formed during the 1970s during 
BCM’s height of influence.   
 At the same time, as previous chapters have also noted, all blame cannot and should 
not be placed on others.  As Mthombeni discussed above, the various activists in exile were 
                                                          
551 Puli Moloto-Stofile Interview by Toivo Asheeke, Johannesburg, August 31st, 2017, p. 7. 
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unable to effectively unite and share skills and knowledge to build a stronger BCMA.  The 
challenges of being in exile effected them in similar ways to the ANC-SA and PAC in the 
sense that it created distrust among activists who once were close friends or at the very 
least fellow activists.  Furthermore, despite getting better with the gender question over 
time, this was something the movement still struggled with in the context of a South Africa 
and wider global context saturated with patriarchy and misogyny.552  Moreover, until the 
BCMA, the movement lacked sophistication in deft political and diplomatic manoeuvrings 
among nation-states and other powerful NGOs that the ANC-SA mastered.  Although this 
was part of its strength, it also hindered its ability to outmanoeuvre the ANC-SA’s attempts 
to discredit them in the realm of global public opinion.            
In terms of the impact of BCM on the South African struggle in the 1970s and 
1980s, Vusi Mchunu compared it to the Industrial and Commercial Worker’s Union (ICU) 
in the 1930s.  Mchunu argued that during this time the ICU was more radical and 
widespread than the ANC-SA, due to this, and the lack of global connections, they were 
more easily violently repressed and politically outmanoeuvred.553  It also provided a Black 
radical alternative for activists in South Africa during the 1970s to find a way to strike out 
at the apartheid regime when the ANC-SA/MK and PAC/APLA proved ineffective.       
Sam Nolutshungu, one of the best scholars of BCM, concluded that the movement 
and its various organisations had a revolutionary impact.  This was not so much because 
of its ideology or organisational structures ‘but also by the nature of the political terrain 
                                                          
552 As a researcher searching for interviewees it took an inordinate amount of effort to find women to 
interview for this project.  As time went on and more connections were found, it became clear that women 
were central to the founding and functioning of BCM from SASO/APLF up to BCMA/AZANLA.   
553 Vusi Mchunu interview, p. 22. 
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and the effects of the terrain on its political practice’.554  Essentially, the apartheid system 
needed white supremacy in its most crude form to accumulate capital and reproduce itself.  
Moreover, it needed violence and co-optation to maintain and expand this structure.  Due 
to this, although sounding a bit too structuralist, Nolutshungu argued BCM ‘was a product 
of revolutionary circumstances which was itself driven to a profoundly subversive political 
role.  It not only upset the rationalisation of capitalist, racial domination but provoked a 
state response which, in its turn, created greater militancy among young Blacks who 
became susceptible to radicalisation’.555  Indeed, thousands subscribed to BCM 
organizing/mobilizing tactics and strategies and harnessed them to create entities such as 
APLF, SAYRCO, IRE, and BCMA. 
Like Nolutshungu and others, this dissertation does not argue that BCM would have 
been drastically different than the ANC-SA if they came to power.  What radical post-
colonial governments across Africa and the Third World have shown is while seizing state 
power, either through peaceful means or force of arms can be useful, our economies and 
hence countries remain trapped in neo-colonial relationships.  BCM in and of itself would 
not have been able to resist this alone and this is something their activists understood.  What 
they offered was a rubric for mostly non-hierarchical organisation and a committed 
engagement with the grassroots movements in South Africa today who are returning to 
BCM need to understand to better guide their contemporary struggles.   
As APLF, IRE, SAYRCO and BCMA tried to get themselves organised Black 
Consciousness cadres who had joined the ANC-SA/MK were rapidly radicalizing it and 
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rebuilding it into a proper liberation movement.  Yet, Welile Nhlapo, Thenjiwe Mtintso, 
Tebogo Mafole, and others were not the first BC cadres to join the ANC-SA/MK.  Keith 
Mokoape and his group held that distinction and it is to their story that we turn to in the 
next chapter set in the context of the ANC-SA in exile’s evolving relationship with the 







Chapter Five  
The African National Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA)’s Evolving 
Relationship with the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in Exile, 
1969 –1979  
  
An under-researched dimension of the exile politics of the African National 
Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA) revolves around how they reacted in exile to the rising 
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) during the 1970s.  While much has been written 
about the ANC-SA’s relationship with the Pan African Congress (PAC) in exile and at 
home, similar attention has not been given to how the ANC-SA responded to BCM’s rise 
outside South Africa.556  From what has been written, the dominant narrative argues BCM 
was not a serious threat and that despite some early tensions was eventually absorbed into 
ANC-SA structures.557  This hegemonic narrative continues by arguing those who refused 
to be absorbed constituted a “Third Force” that was supported by international and national 
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elements unfriendly to the ANC-SA.  These dominant narratives while all-together not 
inaccurate, downplay the real anxieties felt by elements of the ANC-SA in exile during the 
1970s and side-steps the righteous determination of some elements of BCM to form 
independent organisations.   
Following Chris Saunders who argued that ‘The relationship between the history 
of the ANC and that of the broader liberation movement needs to be teased out in greater 
detail’, my research has found the interactions between the two movements in exile was 
dictated by a struggling ANC-SA reacting, at times constructively, to the growing 
legitimacy and independence of BCM in the early 1970s and in the aftermath of the Soweto 
Uprising.558  While B. Maaba and M. Mzamane have correctly pointed out that ‘The 
relationship between the BCM and the ANC in exile began on a fairly high note but in a 
short space of time it evaporated’, they did little to excavate why and how this relationship 
soured.559  This chapter, focusing on exile politics not the internal situation, argues that it 
was the ANC-SA who considered BCM a threat to its influence and in response proceeded 
to systematically discredit and marginalize it internationally.  At the same time, they did 
accept some new recruits from BCM such as Keith Mokoape and his group of exiles 
although their absorption into the ANC-SA and its armed wing Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) 
was not as smooth as some would imagine.  Excavating this overlooked history offers 
another perspective on how the ANC-SA ensured it would emerge in the post-1976 
moment as the dominant South African organisation.    
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Literature Review 
My initial interest in this particular topic came from the work of Raymond Suttner 
who explored conflicting and contradictory ideological currents within the ANC-SA and 
the South African Communist Party (SACP).560  Unlike other ANC-SA scholars, Suttner 
questioned ‘the tendency to see BC as an immature political maturation, which people left 
behind them in a process of political maturation to join the ANC’.561  He was one of the 
few who argued against older scholars such as Stephen Ellis, Gregory Houston, Vladimir 
Shubin, and Ben Magubane who contended the ANC-SA convinced the upstart BCM to 
“mature out of” its Black radical ideology for a non-racialist class-based analysis.562  
Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane champion this perspective as they trace the 
contours of the relationship between the two movements inside the country from the 
perspective of a growing ANC-SA underground.  While they overstate their case as to the 
growing strength of the underground and downplay BCM’s central influence during the 
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1970s, they also do not track the complex processes a number of BCM activists like 
Mokoape had to undergo in exile to join the ANC-SA.   
Even though Suttner is critical of how flippantly BCM has been dismissed by 
scholars like Houston and Magubane, he, like those he critiques, downplays how threatened 
the ANC-SA felt at the rise of BCM.  In this, he is more akin to Hugh MacMillan who 
argued against those suggesting ‘the ANC was hostile towards the Black Consciousness 
Movement’, instead, ‘it [ANC-SA] was generally open to people of the Soweto generation, 
who strengthened and rejuvenated it at all levels.’563     
Paying closer attention to how the ANC-SA interacted with BCM in exile disrupts 
Suttner and MacMillan’s contentions and makes a number of contributions to the literature 
on the exile experience and, to a limited extent, the importance of the Soweto Uprising.  To 
begin with, as Tom Lodge and Macmillan have argued, the ANC-SA in exile over time 
began to take on the characteristics of a government-in-exile.  In part, this was due to the 
dependency a number of ANC-SA members had on the leadership for their day-to-day 
survival and how dependent the organisation was on other nation-states for their 
survival/legitimacy.564  To this latter point, the ANC-SA according to Macmillan, began to 
act like a party in political power and exerted its power in such a manner.  Moreover, 
maintaining and expanding support from other nation-states was often based on proving 
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other political organisations did not have mass support and events like the Soweto Uprising 
were led, or at least decisively influenced, by the ANC-SA.   
According to Sifiso Ndlovu, the creation of this dependency was mostly 
unproductive as it lead to ‘nepotism and created clientele networks that were divisive’.565  
Despite Ndlovu and earlier scholars like Scott Thomas illuminating how the ANC-SA 
shaped its diplomacy in exile, little attention was paid to how these efforts during the 1970s 
were directed at discrediting, co-opting and incorporating elements of Black 
Consciousness (BC).566   
As it pertains to the expansive literature on the impact of the Soweto Uprising, 
Baruch Hirson’s detailed account of the student rebellion notably tracked some of its 
intricate details and was one of the first to connect the BC-inspired protests with a wider 
Black working class revolt.567  Julian Brown’s recent work, building on the earlier work of 
Sam Nolutshungu, charted numerous seemingly disconnected political actions prior to the 
Soweto Uprising in order to contest narratives of the event as spontaneous.568  More 
recently, a number of scholars have sought to explore the build-up to and broader national 
impacts of the Soweto Uprising from newer perspectives.569  Despite the breadth and depth 
of this research from a domestic point of few, none have systematically focused on the 
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fights in exile between primarily ANC-SA and BC activists on who could lay claim to 
being the guiding force of the uprising.570    
Moving past these debates this chapter draws on the pioneering work of Haitian 
scholar Michel-Rolph Trouillot and his concept of silences in history, referenced in the 
introduction.571  As mentioned earlier engaging with his insights offers a different way to 
imagine how future research should engage with South African liberation movement 
historiography.  Similarly to Trouillot, although in a different context, more recently 
scholars such as Jon Soske and others have pointed out that countering ANC-SA centric 
narratives on the history of South Africa’s liberation struggle requires the complication of 
‘a single heroic narrative of liberation’.572         
That said, the first section of this chapter will excavate some of the positive early 
responses of the ANC-SA and SACP to the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO).  
The chapter will then suggest it was the decision by some BCM activists in Botswana to 
form the APLF that prompted the ANC-SA to change its relationship to BCM.  We will 
then sketch how the fight over the Soweto Uprising caused the ANC-SA to redouble their 
efforts to systematically marginalize BCM.  Throughout this narrative we will keep an eye 
on the activism of Keith Mokoape and how his influence was central in convincing a 
number of BCM activists, in particular disgruntled APLF cadres, to radicalize the ANC-
SA and its armed wing by joining.  We will then conclude with some final thoughts. 
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Early Encounters with Black Consciousness, 1969 – 1972  
While the ANC-SA in exile struggled to hold itself together in the wake of the 
Wankie/Sipolilo campaigns, the Hani Memorandum, and the Morogoro Conference, Black 
students in South Africa were beginning to assert themselves as a powerful political 
presence inside the country.  One of the first indications of the ANC-SA’s engagement 
with BCM comes in mid-1969 when they reported in their main publication, Sechaba, on 
a meeting where four white student leaders were removed from an all-Black meeting taking 
place at Alan Taylor residence at the University of Natal.573  When SASO finally 
announced itself as an organisation for non-white students only there was some initial 
hesitancy to this as the ANC-SA in exile felt alliances with white students would be 
necessary.574  However, knowing they had little influence on events inside the country, 
both the ANC-SA and SACP publications adopted a supportive paternal attitude to the new 
student activities taking place in the country.  Furthermore, because they had little contact 
with this emerging generation of young activists these events forced both organisations to 
make efforts to reach out to them.      
In addition to this initial curiosity at the budding activism of the movement, the 
ideas of Black Consciousness were debated and in surprising ways embraced among some 
of the highest leaders of the ANC-SA.  One of the first indications of ANC-SA leadership’s 
serious engagement with the ideas of BC are found in a letter by Oliver Tambo to an 
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unnamed member in the organisation in 1970.  Tambo’s biographer Luli Callinicos cites 
this letter as an example of Tambo’s breadth of ideology, but does not place it within the 
wider context of a growing BCM.575  In the letter Tambo writes that he believed the usage 
of the word “black” was a radical way to reshape the psyche of the population to better 
resist the dehumanization of apartheid.  In BC fashion Tambo stated, ‘Insofar as they are 
the opposition to white rule, they must recognize themselves as Black opposition’.576  
Furthermore, he argued that when we say, ‘Africans, Coloureds and Indians are victims of 
white rule, what we are saying is that whether they are resisting or not, they suffer as 
Blacks’.577   
Tambo followed this up by fiercely critiquing white progressives for trying to 
dictate the course of South Africa’s struggle while not wielding much political power in 
white spaces.  He argued that while as individuals some could identify with the Black 
struggle, as a collective, whites were the enemy.  Additionally, Tambo believed using the 
term Black linked South Africans with the global struggle of Black people at the forefront 
of radical movements sweeping the globe.  This latter point was not an isolated observation, 
as chapter one demonstrated in the early 1970s the Black Power Movement was at the 
pinnacle of its global influence.  With Dar es Salaam serving as the unofficial headquarters 
of the African Liberation struggle the language of Black radicalism was the currency of 
many anti-colonial movements.  Closely mirroring another prominent African leader 
praising Black Power at the time, Kwame Nkrumah, Tambo believed its development was 
important to understand as after centuries of oppression through slavery and colonialism 
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Black people were now the ones ‘transforming the international structure of human 
relations’.578      
By the end of 1970, the ANC-SA was quietly embracing the formation of SASO.  
In a document entitled “Suggested Tactics and Strategy in the Mobilisation and 
Organisation of Africans for the Revolution” ANC-SA cadres wrote approvingly of 
SASO’s recognition of ‘the inadequacies and deficiencies of NUSAS’.  The document also 
approved of SASO’s mobilising efforts in the country but internally emphasised that they 
as the ‘ANC must give direction to the students by drawing closer to them and encouraging 
cadres to provide SASO with leadership’.579  The youth were showing through their actions 
that they were ready to fight apartheid and this energy needed to be harnessed by the 
ANCS-SA to emerge from its own ‘period of discord, demoralization, defection and 
cynicism’.580  According to Alfred Nzo, the ANC-SA’s Secretary-General (SG), since the 
failures of the Wankie/Sipolilo campaigns, top leadership within the ANC-SA themselves 
admitted ‘there has existed an outwardly prolonged period of lull’.581  Even the SACP was 
forced to admit by the middle of 1971 that the emergence of SASO ‘could well be the most 
important event of the year’.582   
However, while many within the ANC-SA were encouraged by the formation of 
SASO, some were growing wary.  Much of their anxiety rested on their suspicion that this 
                                                          
578 ANC Archives OTP/004/0033/01, ‘Letter from Oliver Tambo to Unknown’, 7/11/70, p. 8.  On Nkrumah’s 
public embrace of Black Power as a global movement relevant to Africa see K. Nkrumah, The Spectre of 
Black Power (London, Panaf Books, 1969). 
579 ANC Archives OTP/029/0248/09, ‘Suggested Tactics and Strategy in the Mobilisation and Organisation 
of Africans for the Revolution’, n.d., but probably 1970/1971, p.5. 
580 ANC Archives OTP/029/0248/09, ‘Suggested Tactics and Strategy’, n.d., but probably 1970/1971, p. 13 
581 ANC Archives LUM/053/0007/21, ‘Report of the Secretary-General to the July Session of the National 
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582 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, A. Sibeko, ‘South African Students Protest’ in African Communist, 
No. 44, 1st Quarter 1971, March 1st, 1971, p. 51. 
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formation would be used by the apartheid regime and its global allies to discredit the ANC-
SA further, or (if not and), the Black masses of South Africa would stop looking to the 
older liberation movement for leadership in the fight against apartheid.  In some internal 
notes, briefs, messages, and articles in its publication African Communist, this was a prime 
concern for the SACP.  While they recognised their critiques of SASO had to be tempered, 
as their information on them was not complete as well as them deciding to operate as a 
legal organisation, SASO’s focus on social welfare programs, cultural activities and 
scholarships was seen as being reformist.  Furthermore, SASO’s rejection of armed 
struggle disqualified them from being considered a revolutionary party.  It was also 
emphasised that SASO was not  the first group to push this seemingly radical Black 
Nationalist position, it had been done earlier they argued by the African National Congress 
of South Africa Youth League (ANCYL) and African Students Association (ASA) in the 
1940s and early 1960s respectively.583 
Nevertheless, the ANC-SA/SACP knew they did not have a strong presence within 
the country.  Given this and the unfeasibility of starting a separate organisation inside the 
country to counter SASO many of its members, led by those in its Youth Section, advocated 
for more efforts to be made to win SASO to their side.  It was also argued, in some ways 
in opposition to the two stage theory of revolution embraced by the ANC-SA/SACP at the 
time, that one of the positive contributions of SASO was its emphasis on the national 
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Archives NAHECS collection, J. Kumalo, ‘Letters to the Editor: South African Students’ Who’s Who” in 
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question which for them seemed to be side-lined for the socialist revolution question.584  
At a paper delivered at an August 1971 ANC-SA Youth and Student Summer School in 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) it was stated that in this regard ‘the role of black 
consciousness, its progressive side, not black chauvinism and exclusiveness, was discussed 
with understanding’.585  In response to this an NEC meeting later that month resolved to 
establish contact with SASO ‘with a view to assisting them in their objectives and 
facilitating their contribution to the advancement of our struggle’.586 
These statements came as pressure was mounting on the ANC-SA and PAC from 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)’s African Liberation Committee (ALC).  In an 
internal brief from the ANC-SA dated February 8th, 1972, the annual OAU-ALC report is 
referenced in which both liberation organisations in South Africa are being reprimanded 
for their ineffectiveness.  In the context of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(FRELIMO) and the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)’s 
growing successes against the Portuguese, and other armed guerrillas across southern 
African becoming more visible in their armed confrontations, many were wondering why 
similar successes were not seen in South Africa.  The ALC seemed to believe, similar to 
opinions expressed by SASO that these failures were due to the unwillingness of the ANC-
SA and the PAC to unite.587  Still, the ANC-SA and PAC rejected efforts by the ALC to 
                                                          
584 ANC Archives LUM/053/0007/09, ‘Report on the A.N.C. Youth and Students Summer School held from 
1st – 14th August 1971 in the District of Erfurt G.D.R’, pp.1-4. 
585 ANC Archives LUM/053/0007/09, ‘Report on the A.N.C. Youth and Students Summer School’, p.2. 
586 ANC Archives LUM/053/0007/11, ‘Resolutions of the enlarged National Executive Committee Meeting’, 
August 27th – 31st, 1971, p.3 possibly a draft. 
587 ANC Archives LUM/005/0034/22, ‘For immediate action’, February 8th, 1972, pp. 1-2. 
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force them to unite, both for different reasons, showing how deeply the splits ran between 
the two organisations.588   
While the older liberation movements rejected efforts to unite them, in the wake of 
the May-June 1972 Tiro affair Black Consciousness became solidified as a movement for 
positive change in South Africa.  This encouraged the ANC-SA to openly praise SASO’s 
activism although many still had reservations about its politics and potential.  In short order 
the pages of Sechaba became the site of rich debates on BC among ANC-SA cadres.  A 
close reading of them reveals substantive disagreements within ANC-SA on questions of 
race versus class, armed struggle, and the importance of psychological liberation.  Despite 
these differences, it was clear to the ANC-SA that BC was the radical movement inside 
South Africa and it was on them to find ways of building a mutually beneficial relationship 
with it if they were going to become relevant again.589  This forced the ANC-SA’s NEC to 
take another hard look at itself as it pertained to their own commitment to the struggle 
given how quickly events were moving inside the country.  At an NEC meeting in October 
1972 it was noted with disappointment that as a body they had not met for almost twelve 
months which had ‘adversely affected our work.  This is particularly so in light of the 
situation at home’ where emerging Black organisations were successfully mobilizing the 
oppressed against apartheid in ways they as the ANC-SA were incapable of doing.590   
                                                          
588 ANC Archives LUM/001/0001, ‘Algerian Unit’, February 22nd, 1972, pp.1-2. 
589 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, D. Crowe, ‘On Black Consciousness’, in Sechaba, Vol. 6, No. 9, 
September 1972, p.11 and ‘A reply to Dan Crow on… Black Consciousness’, in Sechaba, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
February 1973, NAHECS Collection and O. Setlhapelo, ‘Letters to the Editor: On Black Consciousness’, in 
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590 ANC Archives LUM/053/0008/03, ‘Report of the Secretary to the Meeting of the Revolutionary Council, 
Lusaka, 9th October, 1972’, 11.10.72, p. 1. 
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What's more, BCM’s outspoken stance against Bantustans, white liberalism, and 
their unequivocal self-identification of Black called into question the ANC-SA’s policy of 
forming broad coalitions (which included working with Bantustans and whites), legal vs 
illegal organizing, and the wider Congress Alliance framework.  It also exposed the reality 
of the ANC-SA’s internal reconstruction efforts as highly ‘inadequate in relation to the 
tasks we have to carry out’.591  Tied to this, as it pertained to the question of mass 
mobilization and the Black Consciousness organisations, ‘contact between these 
organisations from below and above, is necessary.  If we view these organisations as 
component parts of the forces of national liberation, then no conflict between us and them 
need arise’.592  They also engaged in a thoughtful self-critique of their own inability to 
recruit from inside the country and/or to build effective underground cells.593 
This reality forced the SACP to also openly embrace the activism of Black 
Consciousness organisations in the wake of the Tiro affair, although, theirs was a more 
critical embrace.  In an article in the African Communist December 1972 issue by 
Alexander Sibeko (Ronnie Kasrils’ SACP/MK name) SASO was praised for its role in 
cultivating this new militant attitude in Black students in such a short span of time.594  
Sibeko also emphasised how the positive construction of being Black outweighed its 
negative repulsion of whites that while necessary and understandable, at some point needed 
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to be overcome.  Notably, Barney Pityana was referenced explicitly as being one of the BC 
leaders moving in this direction and throughout Sechaba and the African Communist 
publications he, more than Nengwekhulu or Biko, was cited as one of BC’s more radical 
leaders.595  Indeed, Biko was isolated as one of the leaders to be critiqued for a lack of 
historical perspective which had the potential to lead BC on an “erroneous path”.596  Sibeko 
then went on to charge that SASO needed to ‘clarify its views about the nature of 
revolutionary change in South Africa, and its concept of the future… [and] develop its 
ideological concepts along the lines of the national emancipation, and the Freedom Charter 
as the policy programme for a free South Africa’.597  However, he admitted SASO’s ability 
to do this depended upon how effective the ANC-SA/MK could be in their internal actions 
which even Sibeko admitted had been minimal over the past few years.   
Nevertheless, in a later issue the SACP Central Committee was clear that,  
Although it still lacks clear and consistent expression the concept of Black Consciousness 
and the psychological liberation of the African people has its roots in, and is part of the 
battle for the unity of the oppressed masses and their leadership of the whole national 
democratic alliance.  We therefore see the current, public spread of the ideas of Black 
Consciousness as reflecting basically a positive aspect of one of the realities of our 
struggle.598 
 At the same the SACP through its publication was adamant that Black 
Consciousness needed to embrace Marxism-Leninism in order for it evolve into a 
revolutionary organisation.599  This would become a regular refrain throughout the pages 
of its major publication, SACP internal reports, and ANC-SA publications/statements.  In 
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many ways it demonstrates the pressure that was on the ANC-SA/SACP to show South 
Africans, Africa, and the world that they were still relevant to the political struggles taking 
place inside South Africa.  In the context of Marxist-Leninist struggles dominating the 
headlines at the time, pointing out BC’s lack of an open engagement with Marxist-Leninist 
theory differentiated the ANC-SA from BC.  Nevertheless, the ANC-SA still had to praise 
SASO as ‘one of the most relevant organisations in this search for the black man’s real 
identity and of his liberation’.600  Still, much of their discussions on the movement was 
paternalistic as on the one hand they did not always agree with its political ideology but on 
the other they had to show the world that while this new movement was powerful, they 
were not central to the overthrow of apartheid, the ANC-SA was.   
This latter point becomes clearer in a letter from the ANC-SA Secretary General 
(SG) Alfred Nzo to the SG of the OAU in early February 1973.601  In this letter, which was 
also sent to the SG of the UN, Nzo discusses how the recent militant activity of Black 
workers (focusing explicitly on the Durban Strikes of 1973), students, church groups and 
others has led to brutal responses of the South African government.  This brutality needed 
to be condemned by the progressive forces of the world and assistance was needed ‘in all 
possible ways, [for] the leading political force, the African National Congress, to 
consolidate and develop further the political upsurge which must lead employing all 
possible methods including armed struggle to the eventual overthrow of the hated fascist 
regime’.602  Obviously, the ANC-SA was using BC’s activism at home to advance its own 
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cause in the international community while at the same time, as we have seen above, quietly 
trying to seek ways to contact the leadership of SASO and BPC.   
By the end of 1973 the pages of Sechaba continued its mostly strong defences of 
BCM.  One of the strongest defences was given by a long-time ANC-SA member Ontisitse 
K. Setlhapelo, in a letter to the Editor.603  Setlhapelo began by critiquing those in the 
organisation who doubted BC had done anything to be considered a radical movement in 
South Africa.  Black Consciousness, to him, was the most important political development 
since the banning of organisations in 1960 and so the ANC-SA was ‘faced with the 
historical task of rising to the challenge posed by the forces of Black Consciousness in 
South Africa.  Instead of us decrying these forces and thereby aiding our tormentors, it is 
necessary that the ANC gears itself to lead and to provide armed protection for these 
forces’.604  While Setlhapelo was clearly ANC-SA and embraced the Freedom Charter, he 
uplifted Black Consciousness as a movement that was ‘anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly 
capitalist and have nothing to do with racial exclusiveness’.605    
 
Keith Mokoape, the APLF, and the ANC-SA/MK, September 1972 – December 1976 
This was the context of debates within the ANC-SA in the early 1970s.  It was also 
around this time when some of the first cadres of Black Consciousness left South Africa, 
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unaligned to any organisation except SASO, determined to find the armed struggle.  The 
Tiro Affair, as we saw in previous chapters, was central in convincing activists to leave 
student and local politics in order to find the armed struggle.  Keith Mokoape, the younger 
brother of stalwart Black Consciousness activist Aubrey Mokoape, would lead this group 
into exile.  Born in 1947, he completed his matric at Hofmeyr HS in Atterdigeville in 1967 
and then went to Turfloop University and earned a BSc with a focus on Zoology and Botany 
from 1968-1970.  These were the key years when BC was forming as a movement and 
Keith, with his older brother Aubrey, was very active in the growth and development of 
SASO at the University of the North.  In 1971, after completing his BSc, he applied to and 
was accepted into the University of Natal Non-European Section for medical studies.606  In 
his first year of studies Mokoape recalled that ‘during the elections of the SRC [September 
1971], Students Representative Council, I became President’.607  As Presidents were 
automatically on the SASO Executive Board, he now took on a leading role in the national 
politics of SASO.608   
 Musa Mdlalose, who we know from previous chapters as one who would become 
one of the key members of the Bokwe Group and the Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort 
(IRE), remembers his former classmate as ‘a talkative fellow, he was always full of 
energy’.609  This energy often made him one of the more exuberant participants in the 
Formation Schools organised by leaders such as Steve Biko where Keith Mokoape 
remembers ‘we would… compare the different revolutionary movements and where they 
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were, where they failed’.  They also engaged with the politics of Black Power in the United 
States as well as the writings of Amilcar Cabral to help think through their own unique 
position in apartheid South Africa.  At one particular workshop, demonstrating the non-
alignment of BC to any one liberation movement, Mokoape remembers being put into a 
group ‘that was studying the positives and negatives of the ANC and another group was 
studying the PAC and another group was studying the Unity Movement another group was 
studying the Communist Party and then we would come back together to plenary and say 
all of them ultimately failed and we must do something better’.610   
 In the aftermath of the 3rd SASO GSC of July 1972, in which Keith Mokoape 
openly declared he would not be returning to school because he was ready for armed 
struggle, the question he and his group faced was how they were going to get abroad.611  
The reality of the ANC-SA and PAC not having an effective underground fuelled much of 
the drive of these SASO activists to go into exile to see why nothing was being done.  After 
finding a route to Gaborone through Sikwane the group crossed into Botswana sometime 
in late September 1972 determined to either join the older liberation movements or form 
their own unit.612   
When they arrived in Gaborone, Mokoape and Mtulu reached out to students at the 
University of Botswana, some of whom were directly affiliated with the Southern African 
Students Movement (SnASM), to ask how to contact the liberation movements.   Much to 
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their surprise, they were told to go to Francistown, a little over four-hundred kilometres 
away, and ask local taxis there where the ANC-SA representative was because they had no 
presence in Gaborone.  This information was confirmed by Malebo and Tshabalala who 
had gone to the Nigerian and Zambian High Commissions to ask about the whereabouts of 
the liberation movements.  A few days later they caught a bus to Francistown and when 
they arrived a local taxi took them to the home of the ANC-SA Representative Jerry Mbuli 
who, much to their shock, was staying in a place on the outskirts of the small town with 
‘some goats running around in his yard and we say Jesus, these are the freedom fighters… 
That’s how we joined the ANC, by chance’.613   
 Their frustrations would continue when they told Mbuli that they wanted to receive 
training for armed struggle, they were informed, much to their shock, that the ANC-SA 
had closed all of its camps and MK currently was not accepting new recruits.614  This is 
important because as we saw previously in the propaganda of Sechaba and the African 
Communist, the unwillingness of BCM to openly declare for armed struggle was one of the 
main criteria used to discredit the movement as a rival to the ANC-SA.  Later writings on 
the ANC-SA during this time like those of Houston and Magubane do not delve into this 
reality yet they continue to use the rationale that the ANC-SA was a superior movement 
because of their commitment to armed struggle.615  Hugh Macmillan troubles this analysis 
as he has written, from his perspective as an ANC-SA activist in Zambia during the 1970s, 
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that in the early 1970s MK was ‘effectively disarmed’.616  As we see from the case of 
Mokoape and his group, Macmillan’s words are a better match of MK’s reality at the time. 
Jerry Mbuli informed them that ‘unless you go to school to continue our medicine 
[studies] there is no way in which they can help us’.  This was the same message for the 
next few months as they came to Mbuli’s house regularly to inquire about the status of 
them leaving for military training.  But, the message remained the same with top ANC-SA 
leaders like Thomas Nkobi and Gertrude Shope being called by Mbuli to explain to the 
young Black Consciousness cadres why they could not go for training.  Instead, they 
wanted the young men to accept scholarships to continue their medical studies abroad.  
This Mokoape and his colleagues refused as ‘That is not what we came here for, we came 
here for the armed struggle.  It was a big fight’.617 
The PAC, it seems, was not a serious presence in Francistown at this time so 
Mokoape and his comrades formed their own little BC unit of operatives and tried to teach 
themselves how to conduct sabotage missions.  After some time they began living at White 
House, the collection point for various southern Africans from the various liberation 
movements in Francistown.618  As the months rolled by this unit tried, but failed, to 
sabotage a number of installations supporting the apartheid regime.  Additionally, they 
began reading books, articles, and newspapers from across the radical world to enhance 
their world-view as most of these texts were banned or not easily available to them inside 
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the country.  At this point, they were not officially members of the ANC-SA or MK but 
were their own independent unit trying to support efforts by the Zimbabwean African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) in Rhodesia 
against the white settler regime.619    
After a few months of living at White House a number of Zimbabwean refugees 
were deported back to Rhodesia by the Botswana authorities around May 1973.620  Some 
were captured by the Rhodesian army at the border and imprisoned as terrorists while some 
escaped and secretly returned to Francistown on foot.  When they arrived Keith Mokoape 
and his comrades took it upon themselves to hide them from the Batswana authorities in 
the outskirts of Francistown.  They would secretly bring them food and other materials 
while trying to figure out ways to get them legal refugee status in Botswana.  After some 
weeks of this Dumiso Dabengwa, a rising commander of ZAPU/ZIPRA, arrived in 
Gaborone and inquired about the status of some of the local Zimbabwean refugees.621  
When he arrived in Francistown the Black Consciousness activists informed him about the 
situation facing these undocumented refugees.  In thanks for their work helping these 
Zimbabweans who were potential ZAPU/ZIPRA recruits, Dabengwa agreed to let them 
slip onto flights to Zambia with them so they could go to the ANC-SA HQ in Lusaka.622 
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Upon arriving in Lusaka the group was allowed to stay at ZAPU houses until 
contact was made with the ANC-SA.  Once this was done, Mokoape and his unit were 
reassigned to ANC-SA houses across the capital.  During this time Mokoape recalls, 
Now the ANC meets us constantly, that was April 1973.623  And the ANC says go to school 
and we say no way… And ultimately they decided to say yes, we shall train in a game 
reserve, Luangwa game reserve.  So we trained in the Luangwa game reserve by instructors 
of the Luthuli Detachment.  And we discovered that these guys actually knew their stuff.  
It further convinced us, after having read a lot about the ANC in Botswana, and appreciated 
the fact that we were right in joining the ANC by chance… we got trained in basically 
home-made guerrilla tactics.  Home-made, guerrilla tactics and indeed Chris Hani felt out 
of these young men I am not going to sit here any longer [I’m going to] Lesotho… and I’m 
taking three of them.624 
Chris Hani took Makwezi, Gwaza, and Malebo with him on his journey to 
Botswana and this could in part explain how he was able to survive for months around the 
Johannesburg area without being caught.  Timothy Gibbs, who has written in some detail 
about Hani and his work in Lesotho, does not speak of these cadres who infiltrated South 
Africa with him, instead, Hani is constructed as having found a way alone to survive 
underground for months.625  Makwezi, Gwaza, and Malebo had deep connections with 
local Black Consciousness groups and more than likely tapped into these networks to help 
Hani survive underground.  After some months living underground Hani and his small unit 
moved to Lesotho to formally establish an ANC-SA underground.  In Lesotho much of the 
focus of his recruiting efforts was engaging with the Black Consciousness organisations of 
                                                          
623 This date is more than likely inaccurate as the Zimbabwean refugees Keith speaks about were deported 
in May 1973.  This is probably either late May or June 1973.   
624 Keith Mokoape Interview, p. 10.  This account differs from S. Ellis and T. Sechaba who argued in their 
earlier work in 1992 that Mokoape and his cadres had been trained in Egypt and the USSR before being 
infiltrated back into the country to rebuild underground networks which helped Chris Hani.  Mokoape was 
never infiltrated as an underground operative inside South Africa.  While eventually Mokoape would go to 
these places for training, this happened in the 1980s not the mid-1970s, see S. Ellis and T. Sechaba, Comrades 
against Apartheid, p. 72. 
625 T. Gibbs, ‘Chris Hani’s “Country Bumpkins”: Regional Networks in the African National Congress 
Underground, 1974-1994’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 37, 4 (2011), pp. 679-680. 
 225 
 
the Eastern Cape particularly those located in King Williamstown Town where Biko was 
banned.626 
This narrative complicates how top ranking members of the ANC-SA NEC often 
spoke about this first wave of recruits who decided to join them after the student strikes of 
1972.  According to Alfred Nzo these BC cadres ‘came to the ANC on their own, convinced 
that since they sought to continue the struggle as underground operatives and as armed 
combatants, the ANC provided the logical base for them to fulfil their objectives’.627  The 
first part is clearly not true, they joined the ANC-SA, as Mokoape recalls, by accident and 
it was only through their commendable resourcefulness that they received training as 
guerrillas.  What is true, according to Mokoape, is the ANC-SA was accepting of them as 
fighters in the struggle even though they did not agree with their Black Consciousness 
politics.628  This can in part be explained by the reality that the ANC-SA/MK needed these 
cadres as recruits and could not afford to turn them away once they began their work.    
The arrival of these five new Black Consciousness recruits seems to have ignited a 
fire in the bellies of MK commanders who, like Hani, divided these recruits among 
themselves and began moving decisively into the Forward Areas (Botswana, Swaziland, 
Lesotho and post-April 1974 Mozambique) to build underground MK cells.  Keith 
Mokoape was assigned to work in Botswana under MK Commander Isaac Makopo, their 
military instructor in Zambia, while Archie Tshabalala, who had a gift for languages, was 
                                                          
626 Interview with Comrade Chris Hani (SACP Offices, Rissik Street, Johannesburg; 23rd and 31st March 
1993; Interviewer Luli Callinicos, transcribed by Sheila Weinberg), pp. 23-32, accessed online at the 
following https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/communist-university/BrxSqVx1ICM ; T. Gibbs, ‘Chris 
Hani’s “Country Bumpkins”’, pp. 677-691; G. Houston and J. Ngculu, eds., Chris Hani: Voices of Liberation 
(Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2014), p. 24. 
627 ANC Archives LUM/088/0043/01, A. Nzo, ‘Statement of the National Executive Committee of the ANC 
on some questions of the unity of the Patriotic Forces of South Africa’, 4/7/79, p. 8. 
628 Keith Mokoape interview, p. 11. 
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assigned to work in Mozambique.629  Unfortunately, Mokoape was arrested at the border 
of Botswana and Zambia and was not allowed to enter the country.  Forced to return to 
Lusaka he had was reassigned to Swaziland as it was rapidly becoming an important transit 
country for potential ANC-SA/MK recruits who were beginning to leave South Africa in 
larger numbers.   
Apparently Oliver Tambo himself wanted Mokoape in Swaziland as he reasoned 
‘there will be BC ones [recruits], there will be young ones, the revolution is on, especially 
after the 1974 FRELIMO rallies’.  The ANC-SA/MK leadership knew he had been a key 
figure in SASO and was better equipped to recruit these cadres to their organisation who, 
like he had been, were highly sceptical of joining the ANC-SA and MK given their lack of 
a presence in the country to that point.630  This is confirmed by a recent interview I 
conducted with Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, a SASO activist who joined the ANC-SA in 
Swaziland, who remembers Keith Mokoape and Thabo Mbeki speaking to a group of them 
about the movement and the need to rebuild underground structures inside the country.  
Much of what convinced her to join the ANC-SA was Mokoape’s history as a leader in 
BCM and his ability, because of that history, to understand her politically.631   
While the ANC-SA/MK underground was slowly building itself up, thanks in no 
small part to the new BC recruits, others in the international community were beginning to 
notice the lack of an organised, effective, and clearly ANC-SA inspired presence inside the 
                                                          
629 G. Houston, ed., S. Ndlovu interview, ‘Makopo, Isaac’, in A. Temu and J. Tembe, eds., Southern African 
Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 19601-1994/Liberation War Countries (continued), 
Vol. 4 (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki Na Nyota, 2014), pp. 207-238. 
630 Keith Mokoape Interview, pp. 10-11. 
631 High Commissioner of South Africa to Namibia Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini Interview by Toivo 
Asheeke, Windhoek, August 16th, 2017, pp. 6-12. 
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country as the SASO/BPC Trial seized local and national headlines.632  This began to worry 
many in the ANC-SA’s political leadership as it was becoming increasingly self-evident 
that the rising legitimacy of BCM was a threat to their claim to be the vanguard of the 
South African anti-apartheid forces inside the country.   
At a conference in Geneva that took place from September 2nd – 5th, 1974 an ANC-
SA delegation of Alfred Nzo, Duma Nokwe, Ruth First, and Essop Pahad expressed strong 
displeasure at the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) and World University 
Service (WUS) for funding groups in South Africa like SASO without ANC-SA 
approval.633  The Political Commission of this conference wanted to make this support 
official but the ANC-SA delegation successfully fought it on the basis that ‘all assistance 
should be channelled to our organisation which has the necessary experience and 
knowledge of the complicated situation inside South Africa’.634  The ANC-SA 
representatives argued, with little evidence, that the recent events inside South Africa 
(FRELIMO Rallies) demonstrated how ‘the Black super-exploited workers and the militant 
youth, are turning to the road of revolutionary struggle chartered by the African National 
Congress’.635  This claim had no basis in fact but needs to be understood in the wider 
                                                          
632 WHP A2675/III/757, ‘The Trial of SASO/BPC Detainees’, author unclear, 1975, pp. 1-15; ANC Archives 
NAHECS Collection, ‘Interview: Sechaba talks to Shun Chetty’ in Sechaba, November Issue 1979, pp. 3-4; 
On the SASO/BPC Trial see L. Wilson, ‘Bantu Steve Biko: A Life’, in B. Pityana, M. Ramphele, M. 
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633 ANC Archives, OTP/029/0248/18, A. Nzo, ‘Report on the International non-Governmental Conference 
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634 ANC Archives, OTP/029/0248/18, A. Nzo, ‘Report on the International non-Governmental Conference 
against Apartheid and Colonialism in Africa’, p.4. 
635 ANC Archives OTP/058/0549/04, ‘Paper submitted by the African National Congress of South Africa to 
the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations against Apartheid Colonialism in Africa, 
held in Geneva, 2-5th September, 1974’, p. 3. 
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context of the ANC-SA delegates to this conference being alarmed at how popular BCM 
had become.     
Back inside South Africa, restlessness among some BCM activists was growing as 
the ANC-SA and PAC seemed unable to mount an effective armed insurrection against the 
apartheid regime.  Always cognizant to the eventuality of the necessity to take up arms, a 
few BCM activists became convinced they needed to look to themselves to revitalize the 
armed struggle.636  Inspired by Keith Mokoape’s outspokenness, one year after his 
departure another BC group led by Bokwe Mafuna left for Botswana with hopes of forming 
a broad South African/Azanian Liberation Front with the ANC-SA and PAC.637  When this 
failed, as chapter three has pointed out, Mafuna’s group formed the Azanian People’s 
Liberation Front (APLF) to complement BCM’s growing protest actions inside the 
country.638  In time, and driven by some ideological affinity and practical expediency, the 
APLF aligned itself with the PAC.  Through their alliance with the PAC, the APLF was 
able to send some of its cadres for military training to camps in Libya and Syria in 
                                                          
636 Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa, pp. 171-172, 180. 
637 K. Mokoape, T. Mtintso, and W. Nhlapo, ‘Towards the Armed Struggle’ in B. Pityana, M. Ramphele, M. 
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September 1975.639  It was around this time that ANC-SA/MK gave orders for their own 
fledgling underground to accept new recruits for military training.640 
Black Consciousness as a political philosophy was not only finding independent 
ways to form an armed wing, but was through Mokoape and his group also finding a 
comfortable home within the ANC-SA/MK.  Mokoape recalls that he and his companions 
were clear that ‘when we join the ANC that not one bit of Black Consciousness are we 
going to abandon… Black Consciousness and African Consciousness and African 
Nationalism, are the same’.641  This seemed to have had a noticeable impact on how the 
ANC-SA and SACP were engaging with the movement and its ideology.  Dr. Dadoo, an 
influential member of the SACP Central Committee, saw no fundamental contradiction 
between their non-racial Marxist-Leninist ideology and Black Consciousness.  For Dadoo 
BC was ‘a fully justified and healthy response to the insulting arrogance of the white 
supremacists’.642  While they did not agree with some of what the movement did there 
seemed to be a shift in opinion in the SACP.  It was a shift it seemed towards a BC position 
as it pertained to the armed struggle as Dr. Dadoo wrote that what the struggle needed was 
‘the simultaneous intensification of mass struggles in the cause of which the people will 
                                                          
639 ANC Archives OTP/035/0304/01, D. Gadibone and B. Nguna, ‘The Joint Statement’, 9/7/1977, p. 1; ANC 
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1974’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 38, 1 (2012), pp. 55-71.   
641 Keith Mokoape interview, p. 11. 
642 ANC Archives NAHECS, Dr. Y. Dadoo, ‘South Africa – A Time of Challenge’, in African Communist, 
No. 56, 1st Quarter 1974, March 1st, 1974, p. 41. 
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feel their strength and gain more and more confidence in their capacity to meet and 
challenge the enemy on the ground’.643  Similar to what BC had meant when it stated a 
psychological revolution was needed before any serious planning and execution of armed 
struggle could take place, the SACP seemed to be moving towards that position, perhaps 
due to new recruits into their party like Keith Mokoape. 
This ideological clarity in the importance of the psychological elements of any 
revolution, helped Mokoape, as it did Gwaza in Lesotho with Chris Hani, build an 
impressive network in Swaziland as he was able to engage with the youths from BC on 
their concerns with the ANC-SA.  Mokoape’s posting to Swaziland came at a critical time 
for the ANC-SA, with Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau winning their political 
independence from Portugal and there still being no serious armed activity taking place 
inside the country.  Even Oliver Tambo was openly admitting that his organisation while 
politically still a force was ‘ill-managed, poorly directed and badly led’.644  Furthermore, 
it was becoming self-evident to key members of the ANC-SA underground in Swaziland 
like Stanley Mabizela that ‘SASO is strong and on a national level’ and consequently was 
highly influential on the political consciousness of recruits trickling in.645  Plans for the 
seizure of political power in South Africa through force of arms needed to get underway 
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with more seriousness than had been exhibited up to this point and Mokoape was one of 
the ANC-SA/MK’s most successful recruiters in the Swaziland underground.646   
Due to Mokoape’s successes in Swaziland, he was again reassigned to Botswana.647  
According to Mokoape, his main mission was to work among the Bokwe Group/APLF and 
his plea to them, many of whom he knew from his days as in SASO, was that they could,  
turn the ANC around into a fighting organisation… we are the ones more organised with 
our networks inside the country, we can swell their ranks, and actually make sure that we 
do not sit back and say because there are buffer countries from Botswana and Namibia… 
we said no we are going to fight.648 
Before arriving in Botswana, Mokoape was sent back to Dar es Salaam in early 
1976 to be debriefed by the political and military leadership.  It was while waiting for new 
orders at the University of Dar es Salaam that he received a call from Joe Modise that there 
were some BC cadres stuck in the airport and he and others should go there to see what 
they could do for them.  Upon arriving in the airport he saw many of his old friends like 
Welile Nhlapo and Tebogo Mafole.  After speaking with them about their situation as 
APLF cadres betrayed by the PAC and discussing some of their concerns with the ANC-
SA’s policies, he helped them get back to Botswana.  During these discussions it seems he 
had successfully convinced at least Nhlapo and Mafole to leave the Bokwe Group/APLF 
and join the ANC-SA/MK.649   
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Not all who were BC in this group stuck at the airport were able to get tickets back 
to Botswana.  After Nhlapo and his group left, some like January Masilela (MK name Che 
Ogara) remained.  These cadres were BC but had been recruited by the PAC in Middleburg 
and then routed by them to Swaziland, from there they were sent to the camps in Libya.  
They could not go to Botswana as they had agreed to join the PAC in Swaziland, but, they 
too had become disenchanted with the PAC and its in-fighting they had experienced first-
hand in the Libyan camps.  A day after Nhlapo’s group flew out they sent a message to 
Mokoape asking to join the ANC-SA.  Mokoape came to them and after a thorough 
assessment of their desires made it clear to them that they ‘first had to go to… the PM 
[Prime Minister’s] office… [as] the PAC must know they are leaving it and joining the 
ANC’.650   
Shortly after this he flew to Botswana where, unlike the last time, he was able to 
make it through immigration controls and into the country.  Inside Botswana he worked 
closely with Snuki Zikalala, who the Botswana authorities recorded had come across the 
border on August 13th, 1974, and Makopo who was the ANC-SA Chief Representative and 
top commander of MK in Botswana.651  Charles Mthombeni, who we know from previous 
chapters as a member of APLF and IRE, recalls Mokoape in Botswana ‘was one of the 
people who was trying to recruit us into the ANC… he would tell us that you guys are 
                                                          
650 Keith Mokoape Interview, p. 14. 
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wasting your time here [with APLF and IRE]’ and had noticeably, in Mthombeni’s mind, 
abandoned Black Consciousness.652   
Eventually Nhlapo, Mafole, and Williams came to this ANC-SA/MK unit to say 
they were willing to join their organisation.  Once Nhlapo and others joined more cadres 
from the various BC organisations joined.653  Despite disbanding, BCM’s attempt to turn 
to armed struggle had signalled its intention to be considered a liberation movement on par 
with the ANC-SA.654  By mid-1976 Tambo was pressuring the Swedish government, who 
was a consistent funder of BCM organisations, to stop financing BCM as this was, in his 
opinion, creating tensions between BCM and ANC-SA.  Instead, Tambo argued, money 
for the liberation of South Africa should be flooded through the ANC-SA.655  From this 
point onwards the ANC-SA in exile abandoned its supportive, albeit paternal attitude 
towards BCM and began to more openly construct them as opponents.656  
 
Controlling the Narrative around Soweto, January 1977 – July 1979 
Following the fall of the APLF, the next important moment in the engagement of 
the ANC-SA and BCM came with the Soweto Uprising.  The shooting by white police of 
unarmed Black children protesting not only the implementation of Afrikaans in the schools, 
but a host of other social ills, triggered a lengthy and bloody rebellion that transformed the 
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landscape of the anti-apartheid struggle.  None of the liberation movements in exile were 
ready for this uprising nor the thousands of refugees who streamed into exile looking for 
weapons and training to return and fight the Boers.  The ANC-SA and its allies in the 
international community were caught off-guard.657  In response, the ANC-SA needed to 
construct a narrative of the student rebellion which recognised BCM’s contributions, which 
were too clear to deny, but downplay its importance to the planning and execution of the 
uprisings.   
The South African Students Movement (SASM) and the Soweto Students 
Representative Council (SSRC), are universally recognised as key organisations in the 
planning of the march and the rebellion that followed.658  Recent scholarship has attempted 
to argue, with some truth, that a number of SASM members were actually ANC-SA 
underground activists.659  The implication being that while on the surface they spouted 
Black Consciousness ideas, deep down, they were and had since the early 1970s been loyal 
to the ANC-SA.  Although this claim can be subjected to some scrutiny, it does not follow 
that BCM organisations controlled the Uprising as many of them were also caught off-
guard.  As it pertains to the ANC-SA, controlling the narrative of Soweto took on an added 
level of urgency when some of the uprisings leaders, in particular Tsietsi Mashinini and 
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Khotso Seatlholo of the SSRC went into exile in August 1976 and January 1977 
respectively.660   
As the uprising intensified and gradually spread across the country Mashinini and 
Seatlholo became international icons of Black struggle in South Africa.661  When they fled 
into exile a host of anti-apartheid organisations, states, and other South African 
organisations – both those in support of and in opposition to South African freedom – 
bombarded them with offers of support and promises of alliances.  A number of media 
outlets with differing political agendas were keen to provide these young Black activists 
with a platform to articulate in their own words what needed to happen to end apartheid in 
South Africa.  The ANC-SA was equally desperate to ensure these activists endorsed them 
as the main liberation movement, or at the very least, diplomatically acknowledge their 
past contributions to the struggle and hopes for a future intensification of actions.662   
With the eyes of the world on these two activists in early 1977 they both bluntly 
denounced the ANC-SA as an ineffective liberation movement, rejected all attempts by 
them to claim credit for the Soweto Uprising, and declared in no uncertain terms that whites 
were their oppressors and all they wanted were guns and training to go back and fight them.  
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They also made it clear, counter to the ANC-SA’s diplomatic strategy in exile, that being 
against apartheid did not mean you were on the side of the Black masses.663  ANC-SA 
leaders were furious.  Mistakenly, they had expected Mashinini and Seatlholo to praise or 
at the very least be respectful towards the ANC-SA’s past contributions.  Mashinini and 
Seatlholo did none of this as from their perspective the ANC-SA or MK were not 
organisations they knew to be active inside the country against apartheid.664   
Moving swiftly to counter these statements the ANC-SA through Sechaba 
published pieces by two well-known BC leaders who had recently openly joined the ANC-
SA when they escaped into exile.  Nkosazana Dlamini and Tebello Motapanyane, former 
Vice-President (VP) of SASO and Secretary-General (SG) of SASM respectively, wrote 
articles arguing the ANC-SA underground was present in South Africa during and before 
the events of June 16th and they themselves had been members.665  Nkosazana Dlamini 
went so far as to denounce BCM cadres in Botswana, more than likely remnants of the 
APLF, as being mobilise d by enemies of South Africa as a “Third Force”.  Motapanyane 
was more measured in his comments but also discussed how he and a few others were 
influenced by the ANC-SA to form underground cells in the years prior to the Soweto 
Uprising.  While some of their statements mirrored Mashinini’s and Seatlholo’s as it 
pertained to constructing whites as the enemy as Black Consciousness defined it, both 
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endorsed the ANC-SA as the only organisation capable of bringing freedom to South 
Africa.666 
Another youth activist with knowledge of BCM who worked with the ANC-SA to 
counter Mashinini and Seatlholo was Sikose Mji, the sister of former SASO President 
Diliza Mji and daughter of a well-known member of the ANC-SA.  In a recent interview, 
she recalls never being impressed by BCM but when the Soweto Uprising broke out, she 
and an underground ANC-SA cell did what they could to support the students.  Eventually 
she drew the attention of police and was forced to leave the country, by October 1976 she 
arrived in Dar es Salaam determined to join MK.667  ANC-SA leaders like Tambo, products 
of the sexism and classism of their social reality, rejected her request to join MK apparently 
because they knew her relatively wealthy father would not have wanted her to go to the 
camps in Angola.   
Instead of joining MK, she was asked to accompany Tambo and Thabo Mbeki as 
part of a delegation to the United States.  Upon their arrival in New York City she was 
asked to write and present a speech to the UN Special Committee against Apartheid.  After 
it was approved by ANC-SA representative to the UN Johnny Makatini, it was read in front 
of the committee and received with much fanfare.668  Newspapers from all over covered 
her speech as many were desperate for information on the Soweto Uprising that was still 
                                                          
666 Recent research by MK historian Thula Simpson has argued that while the ANC-SA underground was 
present during the Soweto Uprising, it did not cause or instigate it.  See T. Simpson, ‘Main Machinery: The 
ANC’s Armed Underground in Johannesburg During the 1976 Soweto Uprising’, African Studies, 70, 3 
(2011), pp. 415-436. 
667 G. Houston, ed., N. Ramoupi interview, ‘Mji, Sikose’, in A. Temu and J. Tembe, eds., Southern African 
Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 19601-1994/Liberation War Countries (continued), 
Vol. 4 (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki Na Nyota, 2014), pp. 387-399. 
668 This speech took place on November 23rd, 1976. 
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taking place.  Shortly after her successful speech she was asked to go on an official ANC-
SA sponsored speaking tour of the United States.669 
 During this tour she was asked by ANC-SA representatives to go to Harlem because 
they heard Mashinini was about to give a speech.  As she had been a classmate of Mashinini 
she agreed recalling that she ‘needed to counter whatever false [things] he would say about 
the ANC in particular’.670  A few years later, again traveling with Tambo and Mbeki but 
this time to Nigeria, she met Mashinini and again challenged his narrative of the Uprising 
and conditions in South Africa.  Back in the US after months of being on a speaking tour, 
she, with the help of the ANC-SA, moved to France to study and again chose to combat 
some BC cadres who she claims were there causing trouble for the ANC-SA.671 
Controlling the narrative of the Soweto Uprising in the context of this back and 
forth between the ANC-SA and leaders of the SSRC formed an important backdrop to an 
NEC meeting which took place in July 1977.  At this meeting Alfred Nzo stated that one 
of the key tasks of the movement was to project itself as the ‘authentic leader of the 
revolutionary struggle of our people’.672  While the SACP would admit primary leadership 
and political inspiration of Soweto came from the SASM, as well as acknowledging the 
unpreparedness of the ANC-SA/MK to protect the protesting youths, BCM was now 
                                                          
669 G. Houston, ed., N. Ramoupi interview, ‘Mji, Sikose’, in A. Temu and J. Tembe, eds., Southern African 
Liberation Struggles, pp. 400-404. 
670 G. Houston, ed., N. Ramoupi interview, ‘Mji, Sikose’, p. 404. 
671 G. Houston, ed., N. Ramoupi interview, ‘Mji, Sikose’, pp. 406-407. 
672 Karis and G. Gerhart, eds., ‘Document 108. Report on meeting of the ANC National Executive Committee, 
Morogoro?, July 15th – 24th, 1977 (abridged)’, in From Protest to Challenge, p. 700. 
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openly discredited as a vehicle to provide a sustained political and armed challenge to the 
apartheid state.673   
Oliver Tambo would continue this assault on BCM with a focus on its ideology, in 
a fascinating reversal from his earlier position he now argued the conflict was no longer 
about Black vs white as the movement and the world ‘has passed that stage’.674  Nzo would 
give a harsher reading by claiming that after the apartheid regime and its imperialist allies 
‘failed to project the Bantustan traitors as the only acceptable and true leaders of the 
oppressed African majority [ignoring the fact that the ANC-SA was working with some of 
them like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi], attention is now focused on sections of the Black 
Consciousness Movement to provide new allies for imperialism’.675   
However, the death of Steve Biko in prison on September 12th, 1977 combined with 
the banning of all Black Consciousness organisations by the apartheid regime one month 
later forced the ANC-SA leadership to walk back some of these statements.  Even Jack 
Simons, a prominent white Communist in the ANC-SA later assigned to run political 
education courses in MK’s Angolan camps, noticed the intense reaction by MK recruits in 
Novo Catengue when news arrived of the bannings.676  As knowledge of Biko’s horrendous 
torture was revealed to the world and to new recruits inspired by BC arriving in MK’s 
camps, opinions among many rank-and-file ANC-SA/MK activists and international allies 
                                                          
673 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, ‘The Way Forward from Soweto’ (Political Report Adopted by 
Central Committee of SACP April 1977” in African Communist, Issue 70, Third Quarter 1977 (September 
1st, 1977), pp. 21-50. 
674 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, O. Tambo, ‘ANC President explains the Struggle: Oliver Tambo 
interviewed after the important summit meeting in Luanda’ in Sechaba, Vol. 11, 4th Quarter 1977 (October 
1977), p. 11. 
675 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, A. Nzo, ‘Impact of the Underground ANC’ in Sechaba, Vol. 11, 4th 
Quarter 1977 (October 1977, extracts from SG statement), p. 16. 
676 University of Cape Town Special Collections: BC 1081 Jack Simons Collection, ANC – Umkhonto We 
Sizwe Diarised Notes; Folder P.29.10.4. 
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turned pro-Biko and by extension, for a time, pro-BCM.  Due to this surprising turns of 
events the ANC-SA was forced to move with this wave of pro-Biko sympathies or risk 
alienation from many in the international community, its own recruits, and the people of 
South Africa.677   
Alfred Nzo now deftly praised the movement by saying,  
no one can doubt the positive role played by the Black Consciousness Movement in 
arousing and asserting the national identity, pride and confidence of the blacks… Above 
all, it has contributed in the unparalleled mobilisation of the black masses and drawn them 
close to the main stream of revolutionary struggle.  Admittedly, there [they] were 
independent organisations and not ANC fronts… they served as a vital constituent in the 
liberation struggle.678 
Two things stand out about this statement.  To begin with, praise was now being 
heaped on BC for being more than an elitist, student-based intellectual movement.  Nzo 
also walked back earlier statements the ANC-SA made claiming BCM was a front for the 
ANC-SA or largely under the leadership of underground ANC-SA cadres.  Nevertheless, 
as the year drew to a close the ANC-SA dubbed 1978 as the year where they would push 
harder for ‘the recognition of the ANC as the legitimate and sole representative of the 
people of South Africa’.679 
In response to this call from the leadership, the fall of the APLF, the growth of the 
ANC-SA’s underground, the formation of more BCM organisations in exile, and the 
swelling of MK’s ranks with the Soweto generation, attempts to discredit and marginalize 
                                                          
677 ANC Archives OTP/069/0717/02, P. Laurence, ‘Man of deep conviction’ in Daily Dispatch, 15/9/77, 
Patrick Laurence; ‘U.S. Urges caution in future dealings with South Africa’ (SR/65/11/21/77), pp. 1-3.  
678 ANC Archives LUM/053/0008/25, A. Nzo, ‘Statement on recent Kruger Bannings broadcast over Radio 
Freedom Luanda’, October 25th, 1977, p. 3. 
679 ANC Archives LUM/054/0089/02, ‘African National Congress (S.A.) Programme of Action for 1978’ 
(date and author unclear, presumably it is the end of 1977), p. 3. 
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BCM increased.680  In one example an ANC-SA comrade referred to as ‘Dilinga’ wrote a 
letter to Tambo in April 1978 informing him that SSRC students in Nigeria had recently 
approached the Nigerian government for permission to obtain visas.  The SSRC members 
intended to fly to Mozambique for a conference or congress where they would form an 
organisation called the ‘Revolutionary Youth Council’ (probably SAYRCO).  According 
to this little cited document located in the ANC-SA’s Fort Hare Archives, Dilinga 
suggested that the best way to co-opt this space, given the global popularity of the SSRC 
at the time, was to work with their allies in Mozambique to allow the conference to happen 
and then flood it with their own people to get them on the ANC-SA side.681   
In another example Chris Hani, who had now risen to become the top commander 
of MK’s underground in Lesotho, in no small part thanks to the BCM cadres who he was 
working with, met with top level Lesotho government officials in June 1978 to address 
rumours of BC cadres being invited to the Human Rights Symposium being hosted there 
in July.  In this meeting he curiously denounced the Black People’s Convention (BPC) as 
an organisation being projected by some ‘as an alternative Movement to undermine the 
struggle being waged by the ANC’.  Despite the BPC and SASO being banned by the 
apartheid regime the year before he demanded SASO/BPC not be invited.682 
With these plans in motion by the end of 1978 the ANC-SA was back to claiming 
in international circles, particularly non-African spaces, that they were central to the events 
                                                          
680 On some of the newer BCM formations in exile after APLF see, Maaba and Mzamane, ‘The Black 
Consciousness Movement of Azanian, 1979-1990’, pp. 1361-1398; Mangena, Triumphs and Heartaches; 
also see chapter three.   
681 ANC Archives OTP/028/0229/01, Dilinga, ‘Letter to the President-General: Urgent and Confidential’, 
April 29th, 1978, pp. 1-2.    
682 ANC Archives LUM/008/0050/01, ‘Top Secret: Summary of Top Level Consultations between Lesotho 
and ANC (SA) held in Maputo on 5th and 6th June 1978’, p. 5. 
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of the Soweto Uprisings.  At a December 1978 IUEF meeting ANC-SA representatives 
claimed that their ‘militants participated in the youth uprising triggere[f]g by the Soweto 
massacre in 1976.  Since then, there has been continuous action throughout the country by 
units of Umkhonto We Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC’.683  Given these “facts”, they 
argued any support that was not  given to ANC-SA/MK directly needed to cease.  This was 
most assuredly not the case as even top MK commanders like Ronnie Kasrils and Joe 
Slovo, as well as other scholars of the Soweto Uprising, were clear that the ANC-SA had 
at most a minimal presence before and shortly after the uprising.684      
By January 8th, 1979 Tambo’s annual message to the ANC-SA and its allies was 
emphasizing the differences between the ideologies of BC and the ANC-SA.  Now 
constructing BC as anti-white and borderline reverse racist, Tambo extoled the world on 
how the ANC-SA through its timeless Freedom Charter was fighting for a South Africa 
that would belong to all who lived in it.685  A few months later in a statement read by Nzo 
on the NEC’s perspective on the unification of the liberatory forces of South Africa, it was 
argued that if BCM refused to be absorbed, they would be seen as competitors.686   
This statement by the ANC-SA’s SG is worthy of some attention.  It opened by 
citing in detail the ANC-SA’s earlier public support of Black Consciousness.  Nzo then 
went on to argue that after finally establishing contact with this internal movement their 
                                                          
683 ANC Archives LUM/054/0009/08, ‘A Statement by the African National Congress of South Africa at the 
Board and Assembly meeting of the IUEF held in Geneva on 1st-5th December, 1978’, p. 2.    
684 WHP A2675/I/35, Victoria Butler interview with Joe Slovo, February 1988, pp. 1-4; WHP A2675/I/14, 
Howard Barrell first interview with Ronnie Kasrils, August 19th, 1989, pp. 241-242; WHP A2675/I/35, T. 
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685 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, ‘O.R. Tambo: January 8th Message’ in Sechaba, April Issue 1979, 
pp. 2-5. 
686 ANC Archives LUM/088/0043/01, A. Nzo, ‘Statement of the National Executive Committee of the ANC 
on some questions of the unity of the Patriotic Forces of South Africa’, 4/7/79, pp. 1-10. 
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relationship soured because the external wing of BC, referring more than likely to the 
APLF, fed negative reports to the internal branch about the ANC-SA.  Despite this 
challenge, Nzo correctly stated the ANC-SA had been able to convince a number of BC 
cadres to join them.  However, Nzo also claimed, with dubious correctness, that many of 
these newly recruited members were asked to stay in BCM organisations and ‘work to 
expand and strengthen them as independent entities drawing in all forces that sought to 
struggle for a democratic South Africa’.687    
  
Conclusion: Absorption or Radicalization? 
In closing, this chapter has argued that the relationship between the ANC-SA and 
BCM in exile was dictated by the need for the ANC-SA to stay relevant in the struggle 
against apartheid.  As long as BCM was willing to restrict itself to non-violent direct action 
inside the country against apartheid the ANC-SA found little cause to construct it as an 
enemy.  At most, they became friendly rivals to the much older organisation.  While ANC-
SA would have preferred to absorb them into their structures, as they had with Keith 
Mokoape and others, it was not seen as necessary nor was the ANC-SA capable of doing 
so in the early 1970s.  However, when certain elements of BCM refused to join the ANC-
SA/MK and formed an independent armed wing and attempted to discount ANC-SA 
influence on the Soweto Uprising, they became constructed as an enemy. 
                                                          
687 ANC Archives LUM/088/0043/01, A. Nzo, ‘Statement of the National Executive Committee of the ANC 
on some questions of the unity of the Patriotic Forces of South Africa’, p.6.  We use the word dubious here 
because Nzo, as we have shown, clearly bent the truth to his, or his organisation’s, benefit on numerous 
accusations as it pertained to discrediting BCM to uplift the ANC-SA.  He offered no evidence, and later 




Whether on purpose or accidental, BCM emerged at a time when the ANC-SA/MK 
was weak and unable to effectively lead the mass struggle against apartheid at home.688  
Consequently, they were seen by many inside South Africa and in exile as the dominant 
ideology and political organisation which threatened the financial security, material 
support, and international recognition the ANC-SA enjoyed in exile.689  Thinking back to 
1975, top ranking SACP member and MK commander Joe Slovo remembers that within 
ANC-SA/MK and their international allies ‘there was a feeling that we were being upstaged 
by the emerging Black Consciousness’.690  Hence, if members of BCM in exile chose not 
to join the ANC-SA, they would have to be delegitimised as a movement in the eyes of the 
world.  Central to this was the scramble for Soweto where it is widely acknowledged by 
scholars and activists such as Tom Lodge and others that while the ANC-SA did the least 
for the Soweto Uprising, they benefitted the most.691  What is not mentioned, and what this 
chapter tries to demonstrate, is they benefitted at the expense of BCM. 
This also leads us to interrogate what Keith Mokoape and a number of others who 
joined ANC-SA and/or MK means.  On the one hand it is clear this organisation offered to 
some a clearer route to organize and mobilise the South African people against the 
apartheid regime.  This was something they could not find in BCM as its progress in exile 
was very slow, as we saw in chapters three and four, and life in the ANC-SA was materially 
                                                          
688 Even top ranking ANC-SA members in the Forward Areas like Stanley Mabizela recognised this reality 
during the 1970s, see WHP A2675/I/16, ‘Interview with Stanley Mabizela by Dan Swansen’, more than 
likely early 1980, pp. 25-26.  
689 Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation, pp. 63-72; Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern 
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691 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, p. 339; R. Suttner, The ANC Underground in South 
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better.  Strike Thokoane was clear in a recent interview that people like Mokoape joined 
the ANC-SA because the latter ‘had the resources’.692  Bokwe Mafuna when asked this 
question argued the same.693  In sum, the ANC-SA was able to mobilise more resources to 
take material care of their members, provide them with jobs/education, and had a better 
funded military training experience and infiltration potential.   
On the other hand, Keith Mokoape did believe BCM should and could radicalize 
the ANC-SA/MK.  This chapter has clearly shown that most of the recruits to the party of 
Oliver Tambo did not come because of ideological reasons.  They brought their Black 
Consciousness politics and organizing experiences with them and this, at least at the lower 
and mid-levels, influenced the ANC-SA/MK.  From the publications of Sechaba and the 
African Communist we see a level of embrace by the ANC-SA and SACP towards BCM 
which is not to be discounted.  At the same time, we also see on the broader global level 
how the ANC-SA pushed back against this influence when it became clear how potentially 
powerful the movement was.  Therefore, this chapter has from the perspective of the ANC-
SA demonstrated that its influence and rise to dominance was not a smooth road guided by 
the Freedom Charter and non-racialism, but a road to power deeply indebted to the Black 
Consciousness generation.             
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Chapter Six  
‘A Tale of Two Armies’: Black Consciousness and/in Umkhonto We 
Sizwe (MK), June 1976 – November 1985 
 
Introduction: The Ideological Armour of Black Consciousness  
The previous chapter showed how Black Consciousness (BC) recruits of 1972 
helped rebuild African National Congress of South Africa’s (ANC-SA) forward areas and 
underground structures in the mid-1970s.  It also sketched how the ANC-SA in exile sought 
to either absorb elements of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) or outmanoeuvre 
them diplomatically in order to project itself as the sole authentic liberation movement.  
This chapter builds on this foundation by critically excavating the contributions of 
components of the Soweto Generation, many of whom were politicised by BCM, to the 
transformation of MK from 1976 – 1985.  This time period is critical in the history of the 
ANC-SA as it saw MK operatives in larger numbers than ever before infiltrate and execute 
missions inside South Africa.  ANC-SA scholars and activists have isolated this period as 
one which, through the increased profile of MK as a symbol of resistance to the regime, 
the organisation was able to reassert itself as the leading South African liberation 
movement.  While the importance of the Soweto generation on this resurgence is widely 
acknowledged, the central role played by BC within this moment has been mostly 
overlooked.694   
                                                          
694 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection (loose pamphlet), O. Tambo, ‘Umkhonto We Sizwe, Born of the 
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Azanian People’s Liberation Front (APLF) cadres, already trained as guerrillas, 
joined MK towards the end of 1976 and were rapidly promoted as commissars and mid-
level commanders.  Despite being able to relate better with the new recruits to the 
movement, these guerrillas were initially met with suspicion from older cadres from the 
1950s and 1960s generation.  These older cadres, called mgwenyas, were also deeply 
suspicious of Soweto generation recruits who exhibited BC thinking or were friendly with 
its praxis.  Moreover, many of the women heralded as ushering in a change in how MK 
dealt with the gender question had rich histories in BCM that played a decisive role in how 
they challenged the patriarchy of the ANC-SA armed struggle.  These histories in BCM 
have been mostly minimised which has had the effect of silencing the experiences they 
brought with them into the movement.  Grappling with this influence is important because 
as the 1980s progressed two armies began to emerge within the ranks of MK.   
One was composed primarily of Soweto generation recruits who made up the 
majority of the rank-and-file and mid-level level commanders whose youth and energy 
revitalised the ANC-SA and its armed wing.  Many had a deep grounding in BC which was 
part and parcel of their radicalizing presence in MK.  This army looked to commanders 
like Chris Hani, Joe Slovo, and Jacob Zuma for inspiration as they were perceived as being 
similarly radical and determined to infiltrate South Africa.695  The second army was 
composed mostly of mgwenya commanders/commissars, the Security Department 
(nicknamed Mbokondo meaning grinding stone), and some MK leaders like Joe Modise 
                                                          
Consultative Conference of the African National Congress’, June 1985, pp. 51-55; J. Ngculu, The Honour to 
Serve: Recollections of an Umkhonto Soldier (Cape Town, David Phillip Publishers, 2009), p. 176. 
695 Tom Lodge described Hani and Zuma as part of a 3rd dominant strand of ANC-SA leaders who came to 
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more militant.  See T. Lodge, ‘State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-1986’, 
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and Mzwai Piliso.  These cadres came from a different activist tradition and did not 
understand the BC politics or township culture of these new recruits.  While on the surface 
the tensions between these two armies was perceived as primarily a difference in age, it 
masked deeper contradictions that events like the 1981 Spy Ring, 1984 MK Mutinies, and 
the Kabwe Conference brought into stark relief.           
 
Literature Review 
Up till now an exploration of the reverberations of BC within MK in the late 1970s 
and 1980s has not been attempted in the rich canon on MK.  In Vladimir Shubin’s work on 
the southern African liberation struggle from the perspective of the USSR, little attention 
is paid to the impact of the Soweto generation, let alone Black Consciousness, to the 
regeneration of MK in the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s.696  Martin Legassick’s work 
while rightly critical of petty bourgeois liberal tendencies within the ANC-SA/MK, is also 
silent on BC and its impact, or lack thereof, on MK during the mid-late 1970s and 1980s.697  
More recent scholars like Thula Simpson, despite delivering masterful histories on the 
evolution of MK and the impact of USSR training on its organisation, have done little to 
explore the ideological impacts of BC within the ANC-SA’s armed wing.698  In other 
works, particularly The Road to Democracy in South Africa volumes, while the BC roots 
of many of MK’s new recruits of the 1970s is acknowledged, various contributors 
                                                          
696 V. Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow (Johannesburg, Jacana Media, 2009 2nd edition, org. 1999); V. 
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downplay its influence by arguing, with little evidence, that these cadres “left” BC or 
“graduated” to a higher form of consciousness when they joined the ANC-SA/MK.699  
Former Soweto Generation MK recruit and later commissar James Ngculu furthers this 
argument when describing how his generation ‘arrived… as raw material whose only 
interest was the AK47 and bazooka… [yet] left as seasoned cadres of MK, fully informed 
about the politics of the ANC’.700  Chris Hani who worked closely with BCM adherents 
while posted to Lesotho (1974-1982) argued in an interview in 1993 that the ANC-SA and 
SACP helped change Black Consciousness ‘from a narrow, rather conservative nationalist 
movement’ to one willing to embrace non-racialism and socialism.701       
While the perspective of these participants and scholars of MK is to be respected, 
it does not tell the entire truth of the transformations that took place within the ANC-SA’s 
armed wing at the critical conjuncture.  According to Keith Mokoape, Thenjiwe Mtintso, 
and Welile Nhlapo, BCM cadres like them who joined the ANC-SA/MK in the 1970s 
‘injected a qualitatively new approach into the conduct of the armed struggle’.702  Over a 
decade later Raymond Suttner picked up this line of thinking by acknowledging that ‘BC 
people who joined the ANC left a mark on the latter, changing aspects of its thinking and 
strengthening certain currents within it’.  Moreover, Suttner critiqued the tendency within 
the ANC-SA, particularly among cadres like Ngculu, and in scholarship ‘to see BC as an 
                                                          
699 G. Houston and B. Magubane, ‘The ANC Political Underground in the 1970s’ in The Road to Democracy 
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immature political maturation, which people left behind them in a process of political 
maturation to join the ANC’.703  Hugh Macmillan in his recent work on the ANC-SA in 
Zambia has similarly argued that BCM revitalised the ANC-SA at all levels.704   
But what did this impact look like?  How did BCM “revitalise” the ANC-SA/MK?  
And furthermore, what accounts for the negative perceptions on BCM by cadres such as 
Ngculu and other scholars of MK?  Building on Stephen Davis’s conception of Novo 
Catengue and other camps in Angola as spaces of both repression and the positive 
foundation of the newly re-forged MK, this chapter will attempt to answer these queries by 
interrogating the role BC played within those divergent constructions.705  Additionally, 
while some have argued armed struggle is itself a masculinist project, Black Power scholars 
like Joy James and Robyn Spencer have hinted that this perception and reality has more to 
do with the patriarchy of the men within armed wings than armed struggle itself as a tool 
of resistance.706  This chapter builds on their analysis by showing how women who joined 
MK in the 1980s, many from BCM, subverted, challenged, and contested the patriarchy 
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within the movement to attempt to reshape it into a space where women could more easily 
cultivate an independent presence and power.       
In addition to tracking the challenges women of BCM made in MK, another useful 
method to capture the impact of BCM on MK is by exploring the organising strategies used 
by university activists at the University of Fort Hare during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
As generations of ANC-SA, South African Communist Party (SACP), and MK leadership 
either trained there or were influenced by its graduates, Fort Hare serves as an important 
location to broadly understand the difference between the two organizing traditions.  We 
have hinted at some of these differences in organising and mobilising strategies in previous 
chapters, Daniel Massey’s work on this history at Fort Hare is instructive as it helps better 
illustrate this point.707   
According to Massey, when Black Consciousness led activism began to form at 
Fort Hare in the late 1960s many, like Barney Pityana, were initially sceptical about its 
horizontal leadership structure and brazenly confrontational protest style.  Much of this 
hesitancy emanated from petty bourgeois students (many of them children or relatives of 
Chiefs) from the rural Transkei and Natal who distrusted the bold Black Nationalist politics 
of groups like SASO whose adherents were drawn primarily from the townships in 
Johannesburg and Durban.  Unlike the more affluent students who made up Fort Hare’s 
early population, these new students came from much humbler backgrounds and often had 
to work and/or earn scholarships to pay for their school fees.  These new cadres, ‘Out of 
the dusty streets of Azanian townships’ were called abaKaringas (rebels) and were 
                                                          
707 D. Massey, Under Protest: The rise of Student Resistance at the University of Fort Hare (Pretoria, 
UNISA Press, 2010). 
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qualitatively ‘a different type of youth and fighter’ from the previous organising tradition 
at Fort Hare.708  Adding to the rich protest tradition at Fort Hare the abaKaringas pioneered 
the tactic of making collective decisions on how to mobilise against the authorities instead 
of having a small group of leaders decide what the masses were to do.  Furthermore, they 
replaced the ANC-SA Youth League (ANCYL) tradition of forming special committees to 
negotiate secretly with the administration with the demand that the white administrators 
come and address the students directly.709  Moreover, leadership of the movement was 
constantly challenged, questioned, and forced to give a full account of itself to members 
and supporters regardless of age, experience, or national affiliation.       
Consequently, when these abaKaringas went into exile in the mid-late 1970s they 
had not come from the liberal/hierarchical tradition of the previous generation of Oliver 
Tambo, Alfred Nzo, and Joe Modise.710  The ANC-SA, powerfully influenced by the liberal 
tradition out of Fort Hare, has been described by Macmillan as being closer to the Christian 
Socialism of the United Nationalist Independence Party (UNIP) despite the powerful 
influence of the SACP and USSR.711  When the abaKaringas arrived in the camps, although 
younger and not as highly ranked as the mgwenyas, they, according to MK historian 
Stephen Davis ‘appeared to be no less politically motivated then their elders’ and seemed 
‘to exude a greater sense of confidence and independence derived… from the 
psychological reinforcement provided by BCM’.712  This confidence and independence 
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would clash with the cadres they met in the campus while at the same time pushing the 
movement to better execute its armed struggle.       
The work of South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) historian 
Christian Williams has, with the analysis of Steve Davis and Massey, also been influential 
to this chapter.  Williams’s work on Kongwa, a Tanzanian based guerrilla camp that from 
the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s hosted a number of different southern African liberation 
movements simultaneously, pioneered a detailed critical exploration of how people lived 
and interacted in the camps and how this prefaced the post-colonial repressiveness of the 
soon to be parties in political power.713  Focusing on SWAPO, Williams demonstrated how 
some commanders utilised their positions of power and authority to control new recruits 
and discipline those who challenged their authority or diverged from the party’s political 
outlook.  While Kongwa and other camps were critical spaces for the cultivation of Pan-
Africanism and training for the war against the apartheid regime, how they operated 
simultaneously reinforced and created new hierarchies.  While I take exception to 
Williams’s implied conclusions, that the liberation struggle was a waste because it merely 
replaced the political system of apartheid with Africans, the level of detail he provided as 
to how people lived in the camps and how systems of oppression were cultivated is useful 
for the purposes of this chapter.      
With this in mind the next section will provide a brief overview of the regional 
context in southern Africa in the mid-1970s with a focus on Angola and the challenges the 
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Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) faced to gain and hold political 
power.  We will then move to a broad overview of some of MK’s camps throughout Angola 
and track the BC praxis of many of the new recruits and how it interacted with the 
mgwenyas in the camps.  The next section tracks efforts by the ANC-SA/MK/SACP 
leadership to challenge the political groundings of these new recruits.  The following 
section explores the anti-sexist work new recruits initiated to attempt to recreate MK while 
the following section will survey of the biographies of some key BCM personalities who 
joined ANC-SA/MK and were able to flourish.714  We will then excavate how simmering 
anger against BCM cadres transformed into open hostility and closer incorporation during 
the 1981 Spy Ring, 1984 MK Mutinies, and 1985 Kabwe Conference.  The conclusion will 
recap key arguments and present a more complex picture of the impact of this new 
generation and suggest an alternative explanation as to why so many of them were not 
infiltrated into South Africa.   
    
Transformations across the southern African political/military landscape: April 1974 
– February 1977   
Angola’s independence in November 1975 in the wake of the Carnation Revolution 
in Portugal in April 1974 reshaped the struggle against white minority rule in southern 
Africa.715  Almost overnight the soldiers of the Portuguese army who had lead the coup 
against the regime ended the wars in the African colonies.  Unlike other colonies like 
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Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau where the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(FRELIMO) and the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) 
were dominant, Angola was locked in a three way rivalry between the MPLA, the Frente 
Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and the União Nacional para a Independência 
Total de Angola (UNITA).716   
The MPLA was able to win a hastily organised election whose results were disputed 
by the FNLA and UNITA with the tacit approval of their imperialist allies.717  This dispute 
lead to a vicious civil war – which never truly ended until 2003 (when Jonas Savimbi of 
UNITA was finally killed) – as a departing Portuguese colonial administration and army 
did little to ensure a peaceful transition of power.  As a result, Angola became a central 
battlefield of what Shubin accurately describes as the “Hot” Cold War as the United States 
and its allies backed the FNLA and UNITA while the USSR and Cuba supported the 
Marxist-Leninist oriented MPLA.718  Agostino Neto of the MPLA became President in 
November 1975 and was able – with the help of the USSR, Cuba, and to a lesser extent the 
                                                          
716 J. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976) (Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 1978), pp. 130-282. 
717 It must also be noted that many cultural Black Nationalists in the United States like Amiri Baraka were 
supportive of UNITA and for a time silently applauded efforts to overthrow the Moscow-backed MPLA.  
Other Black Power radicals like Walter Rodney challenged this perspective from within the Black Radical 
Tradition to propose MPLA was the organisation capable of creating a better life for the people of Angola 
and fighting imperialism.  See Special Collections Research Centre George Washington University Gibson 
Papers (hereafter SCRC-GWUGP), Series 1, MS2302 Box 3 Folder 1: Correspondence September – 
December 1975 ‘Letter to Ms. Florence Tate from Richard Gibson’, October 15 th, 1975; ‘Letter to David 
Sibeko from Richard Gibson’, November 11th, 1975; ‘Letter to Ms. Florence Tate from Richard Gibson’ 
December 9th, 1975; ‘Letter to Chairman Amiri Baraka from Richard Gibson’ February 10th, 1976; W. 
Rodney, ‘Marxism and African Liberation’, 1975, available at 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/rodney-walter/works/marxismandafrica.htm , retrieved February 
14th, 2018. 
718 P. Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 
1976-1991 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2016, org. 2013). 
 256 
 
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN, SWAPO’s armed wing) and MK – to push 
back a joint attack from the FNLA, UNITA and Zairean forces.   
By 1976 MPLA had secured most of the major cities, chiefly Luanda, and was in 
the process of securing the northern and eastern parts of the country.  The FNLA, who had 
struck from the north, was mostly defeated forcing its CIA-backed leader Holden Roberto 
into exile.  As the MPLA and its allies pushed south to defeat UNITA their advance was 
halted as the South African Defence Force (SADF), given the go-ahead by the United 
States, intervened to prevent the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola 
(FAPLA), the armed wing of MPLA, from conquering up to the border with Namibia.  
Their intervention was successful and they established a buffer zone between the radical 
new government and Namibia’s northern border.  With the FNLA mostly defeated in the 
north and UNITA and SADF contained to the south-east/far eastern areas of Angola, MK, 
PLAN and the Zimbabwean People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) were able with the 
assistance of MPLA, the USSR, and Cuba to build guerrilla bases across areas secured by 
the FAPLA.  The Cubans and Russians agreed to help with their training and a number of 
bases were jointly operated.719   
Engineering was one of the first camps opened in Angola towards the end of 1976 
and was used primarily as a holding camp for new recruits, mostly from MK, but some 
PLAN and ZIPRA guerrillas were also present.  Funda opened later in 1976 and was used 
as a finishing camp for those about to be sent to the front, yet, malaria was rife in this camp 
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forcing it to close in 1979 with its facilities moved to a new camp named Caxito.  Novo 
Catengue (often spelled Katengue) was opened in early 1977 and would differ from Funda 
in that it was designed to not only train cadres in the art of guerrilla warfare, as conceived 
by MK, but to train a politically conscious cadre capable of carrying the ideas of the ANC-
SA to the people inside South Africa.  Quibaxe was opened later in 1977 and Fazenda was 
opened in 1978.  When independence came to Zimbabwe in 1980 the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) gave its camps to the ANC-SA.  In 1979 Camp 13, the infamous 
Quatro, was opened and was used to imprison those suspected of being enemy agents and 
traitors to the cause. 720    
Novo Catengue (NC) was where the first significant influx of Soweto generation 
recruits were trained.721  Here, ideological training towards the ANC-SA/SACP’s socialist 
non-racialist vision, the Freedom Charter, and the National Democratic Revolution would 
grow to be emphasised on equal terms with that of armed struggle.  This emphasis would 
increase when it became clear that Black Consciousness philosophy was a foundational 
piece of the political consciousness of the new recruits. 
 
“A Different Type of Youth and Fighter”: Roots of Black Consciousness in the 
University of the South                       
                                                          
720 Although the different camps had unique structures depending on the time they were built and/or their 
intended purpose, the general hierarchy of the camp was as follows: Camp Commander, Camp Commissar, 
Chief of Staff, Chief of Logistics, and a Recording (Security) Officer.  Each Company (CY) would have a 
Company Commander, Commissar, and Training Team as well as a News Team, see J. Ngculu, The Honour 
to Serve (2009), pp. 44-45; S. Manong, An Autobiography of a former Commander of uMkhonto we Sizwe 
(South Africa, Nkululeko Publishers, 2015), p. 58.   
721 Ronnie Kasrils gave it this nickname seemingly as a parody to the University of the North (Turfloop) 
known to be the unofficial HQ of SASO and where many of their new recruits were educated, see R. Kasrils, 




According to James Ngculu this new camp was nicknamed ‘the University of the 
South’ because ‘it was the cradle of a new cadre of the African National Congress.  It was 
here that cadres were educated not only in the art of war but in politics and philosophy’.722  
Former MK commander and SACP member Ronnie Kasrils is credited with providing this 
nickname as it offered a high level of political training.723  In the beginning living 
conditions at NC were poor as there were constant shortages of war materials, food, 
medicine, clothes, cigarettes, and other supplies.724  Jack Simons, the white Communist 
member assigned to NC to run the political education classes, noted when he first arrived 
a few months after its opening that there were ‘blocked toilets, no pit latrines… excreta all 
around, few hundred yards from quarters.  Food remains dumped near Kitchen – 
fermenting’.725 
The semi-tropical climate in Novo Catengue was one many South Africans found 
difficult to manage as they were unprepared for the humidity, malaria, and a host of other 
minor and major diseases that plagued the area.  The Cuban soldiers at the camp who jointly 
ran the training courses lived much better than MK as they seemed to be used to the semi-
tropical climate and had effective strategies for keeping themselves as safe as possible from 
some of the diseases in the area.  According to Simons the Cubans ate ‘apart, prepare own 
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food (of higher quality), drink boiled water’ and had a doctor constantly on call who only 
treated MK guerrillas in serious cases.726   
Julius Mokoena of the Luthuli Detachment was the camp commander and Francis 
Meli was Camp Commissar, however, Meli was later replaced by Mark Shope the General 
Secretary of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).727  The lower and 
mid-level platoon/company commanders and commissars were heavily staffed by former 
APLF members such as Nhlapo (MK name Arthur Sidweshu) and Mafole (MK name Dan 
Cindi) as well as former BCM activists from inside the country like Joel Netshitenzhe.728  
James Ngculu remembers ‘The instructors in Novo Catengue camp were mainly Cubans, 
but they were assisted by members of the mgwenya group and the mid-70s group – those 
who left South Africa before the Soweto Uprisings and had been trained before us’.729  
These three groups of trainers: the mgwenya’s, mid-70s group (APLF disproportionately), 
and Cubans would exert a considerable amount of ideological influence on the new recruits 
in Novo Catengue.   
The ANC-SA and those allied to it, both white and Black, were well aware of the 
extent to which new recruits coming into their movement in the wake of the Soweto 
Uprising were baptised in BC.  In an interview with Howard Barrell in the late 1980s, 
Ronnie Kasrils described this generation who joined MK as ‘more imbued with the ideas 
of black consciousness’.730  Omry Makgoale, a former South African Students Movement 
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(SASM) activist and participant in the June 16th Uprising who eventually joined the ANC-
SA/MK recalls many new recruits ‘would come with Black Consciousness because in 
South Africa mostly it was Black Consciousness’.731  What did this BC politics/orientation 
mean in relationship to the ANC-SA/MK?  Even though ideologically it meant a more 
Black centred approach to thinking through the struggle, it was the political independence 
of BCM influenced recruits that stands out.   
This political independence clashed at times with a more stringent and hierarchical 
ANC-SA/MK in exile.  When the Soweto generation arrived the power structures within 
MK hardened and certain leaders became adept at producing cadres loyal to them, those 
who challenged leadership were branded as anti-leader and often were accused of being 
spies.  According to SACP stalwart and Soweto generation guerrilla Jabulani Nxumalo, 
SACP/MK name Mzala, this had the negative effect of stifling ‘critical or objective 
thinking, and it has never encouraged democratic proceedings’.732  An example Mzala 
recalled of this clashing political orientation came sometime in 1979 when Mongezi 
Stofile, ex-SASO President, challenged Oliver Tambo in a meeting with Youth Members 
on him continuing to hold talks with Gatsha Buthelezi.  While Tambo handled it well, 
others around Tambo like Nzo were furious at this open challenge.  Ngculu confirms this 
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 261 
 
loyalty of elders, particularly of the Luthuli Detachment, as whenever the new recruits 
‘would complain about something they would say we have nothing to complain about 
compared to what they had gone through.  They would encourage us to be disciplined and 
loyal to the movement in order to bring the day of our victory closer’.733   
Mzala believed this mentality developed among the older generation during the 
1960s among a group that coalesced around Oliver Tambo and the ANC-SA President’s 
own determination to ‘present a united face to the world’.  The downside to this, according 
to Mzala, was the ANC-SA ‘paid a heavy price for this in lack of democracy, and in the 
lack of creative and rigorous thinking, getting out in front of the situation instead of always 
just reacting’.734  Others like Stephen Ellis have laid blame for this on the SACP given its 
relationship with the USSR and the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (GDR)’s 
Staatssicherheitsdienst (SSD, Ministry for State Security), commonly known as the Stasi.  
While this has elements of truth, Mzala’s reasons hold slightly more weight as most of the 
initial commanders and commissars who had problems with this new generation were not 
in the SACP.735       
Nonetheless, far more important than their BC praxis, these new recruits came into 
exile burning with the desire to obtain training in guns, explosives, and tactics in order to 
return home to fight the apartheid regime.736  As Makgoale recalls, many ‘after the 
Uprisings [those] who were not affiliated with it [Black Consciousness, they] were just fed 
                                                          
733 J. Ngculu, The Honour to Serve (2009), p. 98. 
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up by the shootings… joined because now their relatives died, were shot and killed, and 
they felt that no, we need to go and take arms’.737  Yet, when they entered the MK camps, 
as Steve Davis has correctly pointed out, their ability to survive and thrive, or not, depended 
to a large extent on, ‘The degree to which students accepted the premise that Black 
Consciousness was incomplete without Marxist-Leninist theories of revolution [as this] 
determined the tenor of relations between students and the camp administration’.738 
 
 An ANC-SA/SACP Program and Plan for Political Education: ‘Enter Jack Simons’  
It can be argued that it was this BC orientation, or at least non-ANC-SA orientation, 
which convinced the leadership of the ANC-SA/MK to appoint special political instructors 
for the new cadres.  In a July 1977 NEC meeting where the progress of the MK camps in 
Angola was discussed, Alfred Nzo the Secretary-General (SG) of the ANC-SA took time 
to highlight the fact that a ‘group of suitably qualified and experienced comrades has been 
appointed to conduct political lectures to assist the political developments of the young 
comrades who have recently joined our movement since the beginning of the current 
political upsurge in our country’.739  Nzo argued this was important not only for the camps 
but for actions in the country as this new influx of recruits highlighted the need for them to 
more aggressively push the struggle on the ideological, political, and military level.  Eight 
tasks to accomplish this were given but two stand out as telling in the context of this 
increased emphasis on political instruction.  The first was to ‘raise the level of political 
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understanding throughout the movement and consolidate the political unity among all its 
members, inside and outside the country, inside and outside Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)’.  
The eighth point argued the ANC-SA must through its actions and activism ensure that it 
is seen as the sole ‘authentic leader of the revolutionary struggle of our people’.740  As it 
pertained to the last point, chapter five showed how this consolidation was happening 
internationally, we now see parallel efforts to impose this internally.     
One of the key members of this political instruction team was the venerable white 
communist Jack Simons.  Simons was born on February 1st, 1907 to an Anglo-Afrikaner 
mother and an English father.  He earned his PhD in 1937 and married Ray Alexander in 
1941.  After being forced to leave South Africa in 1965 given he and Ray’s outspoken 
stance against the apartheid regime, they moved to Zambia where they worked closely with 
the ANC-SA trying to re-organise itself in exile.741  Starting in June 1969 Comrade Jack, 
as he was affectionately called, began running political education classes in Lusaka for 
ANC-SA, MK, SACP, Women’s Section, and Youth Section cadres with 20-30 comrades, 
including Chris Hani, attending.  A number of topics were discussed but most focused on 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and events taking place in the United States centring 
on the Black Power Movement.  Jack Simons also began lecturing at the University of 
Zambia in Sociology from 1969-1975.  After Soweto, Mzwai Piliso of MK’s Department 
of Personnel and Commander Joe Modise asked Comrade Jack to go to the new Angolan 
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camps to join Mark Shope in teaching the new comrades the politics and policies of the 
ANC-SA and its non-racialist class first vision.742   
Simons landed in Luanda on September 19th, 1977, shortly after Steve Biko’s 
murder, and left for Novo Catengue a few days later with Mzwai Piliso.  Simons kept a 
meticulous diary of his experiences in the camp and much of the substance for this section 
is drawn from it.743  From the beginning, Simons noticed many of the new cadres at Novo 
Catengue ‘resisted political instruction’ as they were focused only on gaining military 
training.744  In many ways the criteria the ANC-SA/MK leadership used to recruit particular 
members lent itself to this orientation as they wanted recruits who were ‘young, fit, [and] 
adventurous.  Political consciousness secondary’.745  Many of these very same cadres, 
Simons further noted, were not highly educated as most of them were from working class 
and/or peasant backgrounds.  Ngculu believed many cadres struggled in classes or were 
uninterested because they were conducted in English, which was not fluently spoken 
among those who had not finished high school.746       
Despite these challenges, Simons was in many ways the perfect SACP member to 
send to NC.  According to James Ngculu he ‘would always emphasize that our study of 
Marxism-Leninism should not be Europeanised, but must always be placed in the context 
of the adverse conditions in South Africa.  He made a point that the course should be simple 
and understandable to everybody, irrespective of educational background’.747  In addition 
                                                          
742 Sparg, Schreiner, Ansell, eds., Comrade Jack, pp. 5-6. 
743 I am indebted to Stephen Davis for sharing the importance of these diaries to my work.  He used them 
closely in his own about Novo Catengue.   
744 UCT Special Collections, Simons Diary.  
745 UCT Special Collections, Simons Diary. 
746 J. Ngculu, The Honour to Serve (2009), p. 64. 
747 J. Ngculu, The Honour to Serve (2009), p. 66. 
 265 
 
to co-authoring a rich text entitled Class and colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 with Ray 
Alexander, in mid-1975, Jack wrote a report for the leadership of the ANC-SA/SACP on 
the FRELIMO trials in particular The state vs. Saths Ivan Cooper and Others.748   
In his syllabus and lectures Jack Simons dealt briefly with Black Consciousness, 
but placed it within a larger history of African Nationalism since 1800.749  A glance at the 
syllabus Simons used shows much of what was taught at Novo Catengue during his two 
stints of duty.  Sections to be covered ranged from Scientific Method, African 
Technologies, Industrial Revolution, Historical Materialism, Forces of Production, 
Relations of Production, The Communist Manifesto, African Civilizations, Political 
Revolutions, Bourgeois Revolutions, Objective and Subjective conditions, Permanent 
Revolution, and Socialist Internationalism to name just a few.750  Mark Shope focused 
much of his time taking the cadres through the history of British trade unions in the 19th 
century and what this meant for South Africa.  Both added to this work by teaching the 
history of the ANC-SA, which was unknown to many of the new recruits, and sketching 
its relationship to the SACP and MK.751     
A close reading of the syllabus offers some explanations into why there were 
clashes in the camps during the political education segments by cadres who felt what they 
were being taught was not relevant to the liberation of South Africa.  Indisputably, much 
                                                          
748 H. J. Simons and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (Penguin African Library, 
1969); University of Cape Town Special Collections: BC 1081 Jack Simons Collection, Organisations B 
(cont.), BPC, 1970-1977, J. Simons ‘The state vs. Saths Ivan Cooper and Others’, 7/12/75, pp. 1-8.  
749 Sparg, Schreiner, Ansell, eds., Comrade Jack, p. 23.   
750 Sparg, Schreiner, Ansell, eds., Comrade Jack, p. 116. 
751 However, Mark Shope did attack Anton Lembede in some of his lectures on the history of the ANC-SA’s 
engagements with African Nationalism as promoting too much of a Garveyite vision of change in South 
Africa.  See University of Cape Town Special Collections: BC 1081 Jack Simons Collection, ANC Articles, 
P. 31.7 Mark Williams Shope continued, 1977-1984, M. Shope, ‘Lecture 6: African National Congress, its 
approach to the question of African Nationalism’, n.d., pp. 1-13. 
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of this rejection, as was mentioned above, was because many were not literate, could have 
been spies, or were impatient to be re-infiltrated back home to carry on the fight.  But, it is 
clear that others were inspired by Black Consciousness and this is where most of the 
sustained challenges to Simons on the ideological plain came from.  According to the 
biographers of Simons as ‘the only white man in the camp’ he was constantly challenged 
in his lectures by a strong ‘generation of militantly black consciousness (BC) youth’.752   
 
“Dissident Groups”: The Presence of a Militantly Black Consciousness Youth 
Following Stanley Manong and Omry Makgoale’s experiences in 1977 after joining 
MK in Angola provides fascinating insights into how ubiquitous BC was in these camps in 
the post-Soweto 1970s.  Upon arriving in Angola, Manong and his cadres were deployed 
to Engineering where they joined about 300 new recruits, many of whom had been directly 
involved in the June 16th Uprising and subsequent events.  Julius Mokoena supervised their 
basic training in ‘Politics, Small Firearms, March and Drill and Military Combat Work 
(MCW)’.753  Manong remembers that his platoon commissar was Joel Netshitenzhe (MK 
name Peter Ramokoa or Mayibuye) who had a rich history of SASO activism at the 
University of Natal throughout 1975 and 1976.754   
At the end of Manong’s first week of training at Engineering about forty cadres 
were selected to travel to the GDR.  One of those selected was Omry Makgoale (MK name 
                                                          
752 Sparg, Schreiner, Ansell, eds., Comrade Jack, p. 29.  
753 S. Manong, If We Must Die (2015), p. 59. 
754 S. Manong, If We Must Die (2015), p. 58; J. Netshitenzhe, ‘Joel Netshitenzhe’ in S. Ndlovu and M. 
Strydom, eds., The Thabo Mbeki I Know (2016), p. 239. 
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Sidwell Moroka).755  Tebello Motapanyane who had been the SG of SASM and one of the 
key leaders of the June 16th March was in this group as well.756  Upon arriving in GDR 
Makgoale and his group were taken to Teterow where the SACP, led by Ronnie Kasrils 
and Pallo Jordan, and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), ran most of their 
political education as a compliment to their arms and explosives training.757  Makgoale 
remembers the key political subjects being ‘Marxist-Leninist philosophy… Marxist-
Leninist socialism [and]… Marxist-Leninist political economy’.758  During these classes 
the Freedom Charter was brought up and analysed predominantly in classes run by Kasrils.  
In these lectures they became increasingly exposed to the SACP critique of Black 
Consciousness, arguing for a class critique over a race critique, which convinced some, 
like Makgoale, to transition ‘from BC analysis of things toward what is called class analysis 
of things’.759   
However, not all agreed with the notion that to evolve in their thinking they had to 
move past BC and embrace a class analysis.  Makgoale recalls ‘some people did differ with 
the communist analysis, the class analysis, they wanted to stick to Black Consciousness… 
of course the instructors tried to convince the students… that Black Consciousness was a 
step in the ANC history’.  While those who were committed to a BC perspective held firm 
to many of its central tenents, explaining it as a “step in ANC-SA history”, essentially the 
two stage theory of the National Democratic Revolution, did convince some that the ANC-
                                                          
755 Omry Makgoale Interview, pp. 10-11.  To confirm ANC-SA/MK cadres going to GDR for training see V. 
Shubin, A View from Moscow (2009).  
756 S. Manong, If We Must Die (2015), p. 145. 
757 R. Kasrils, Armed and Dangerous (1993), p. 126; Omry Makgoale Interview, pp. 11-12. 
758 Omry Makgoale Interview, p. 11. 
759 Omry Makgoale Interview, p. 12. 
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SA/MK was the best organisation, regardless of its political ideology, to join in order to 
bring down apartheid.760   
Back in the sweltering heat of central Angola, Stanley Manong and the rest of the 
recruits finally got word of their eventual departure from Engineering for NC.761  They 
arrived in late April 1977 and were reorganised into four companies.  Manong was in 
Company (CY) II with January Masilela (MK Che Ogara) serving as his political 
commissar.  Che Ogara, if we recall from chapters three and five, was a member of a Black 
Consciousness group in South Africa called AFRO who joined Welile Nhlapo and Tebogo 
Mafole in Libya to receive military training with the PAC.762  In addition to him, Manong 
remembers that Tebogo Mafole was the Commander of Platoon One in CY III.763      
As we mentioned earlier Nhlapo and Mafole’s group of former APLF/Bokwe 
Group comrades were, with the older mgwenya’s and Cuban soldiers, the main instructors 
of the Soweto generation entering Novo Catengue from 1977-1979.  According to an 
interview conducted with Welile Nhlapo the training they received by the Cubans in 
Angola was comparable to what the APLF received when they went for advanced training 
in Syria.764  The combination of having already received military training and being 
seasoned activists in BCM placed the former APLF comrades in an important position 
                                                          
760 Omry Makgoale Interview, p. 1.3 
761 S. Manong, If We Must Die (2015), pp. 61-66.  It would be interesting to know if this was actually the 
case.  These cadres I suspect were former APLF comrades like Nhlapo and Mafole, it is very possible they 
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in A. Heffernan and N. Nieftagodien, eds., Students Must Rise, pp. 129-130; Nhlapo Interview, p. 10 
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764 Welile Nhlapo Interview, p. 19.  Nhlapo remembers Joe Modise asking him to assess the training the 
Cubans were giving in relation to what he had received in Libya and Syria.  Nhlapo believed the training was 
comparable to what he and others received. 
 269 
 
within MK.  Nhlapo, who eventually became the commissar of CY II remembers that 
comrades like himself and Mafole ‘understood BCM, we came from that, and then… as 
Commissars… [we] could deal with those questions.  We could deal with them’.765   
Importantly, Nhlapo’s BC politics did not prevent him from accepting an offer by 
Mark Shope while in Novo Catengue to join the SACP.766  Joining the SACP for Nhlapo 
did not mean renouncing, abandoning, or evolving from Black Consciousness for 
something greater.  In his own words, ‘When you talk about the liberation of the Africans 
and Black people in general, as a priority that defines a National Democratic Revolution, 
that resonated with our own [BC] thinking and understanding;.767  Many, as we saw with 
some of those in Makgoale’s class, shared these sentiments and as the months rolled along 
Jack Simons noted how the SACP influence in the camp was growing suggesting there was 
more in common between the two political ideologies than either side knew of.     
 Nevertheless, cadres like Nhlapo did clash with SACP thinking, especially when 
it came to the figure of Steve Biko.  When word reached them in Novo Catengue about the 
death of Biko there was a mixed reaction in the camp.  The rank-and-file, lower, and mid-
level commanders mourned his loss and praised his life’s work while some in the 
leadership like Francis Meli, who was the Political Commissar for NC at the time, 
dismissed him as a CIA agent.768  Nhlapo was one who took exception to accusations of 
                                                          
765 Welile Nhlapo Interview, p. 20. 
766 Welile Nhlapo Interview, p. 18. 
767 Welile Nhlapo Interview, p. 15. 
768 Omry Makgoale Interview, p. 15; Welile Nhlapo Interview, p. 19.  Others like Jack Simons seemed not 
to care too much about Biko’s death as no mention of it was made in his diaries of life in NC, however, he 
did talk about the banning of BCM organisations.   
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Biko being CIA or at best a Black liberal, as seemed to be the conclusion from some SACP 
and ANC-SA publications discussing the life of Biko.769  Nhlapo recalls, 
the day Steve Biko died I addressed the whole detachment because I used to coordinate 
with some of the people the news analysis thing… when Biko died we did a news analysis 
and then I had to talk about Biko as a person.   
Nhlapo remembered that a few questioned his loyalty to the ANC-SA/MK because 
of his strong defence of Biko but he was resolute and responded to some of these concerns 
by saying,  
There was no serious empirical evidence of why he had to come to that conclusion and 
when I challenged him [Meli] on the basis of my knowledge and understanding of who the 
person is and this was enough to make those who questioned Biko rethink their position.770   
Nhlapo was not the only one who challenged the thinking of the ANC-SA/SACP.  
Others like Absalom Mampe were accused by high-ranking mgwenya commanders and 
Simons as being part of a dissident group within the camp due to their critiques of Marxism 
in the latter’s classes.  According to a comrade Tilly Iansson771 – a former secretary of 
SASM – who Simons spoke with to gain a better understanding of who Mampe was, 
Mampe was known in the Fort Hare area for his work running an illiteracy school.  This 
                                                          
769 ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, F. Meli, ‘Book Review: I Write what I like’ in Sechaba, February 
Issue 1979, pp. 30-31; ANC Archives NAHECS Collection, Toussaint, ‘“Fallen Among Liberals” – An 
Ideology of Black Consciousness’ in African Communist, Issue 78, 3rd Quarter 1979 (September 1st, 1979), 
pp. 18-30.   
770 Welile Nhlapo Interview, pp. 19-20; It is also interesting to note that the ANC-SA regularly accused 
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often neglected his duties as commissar and seemed to want special treatment in the camps.  Nevertheless, 
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771 I have a strong suspicion that this is Tebello Motapanyane of SASM but I have not been able to find other 
documents or oral accounts to confirm this connection.    
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more than likely meant he was a member of BCM’s Literacy Programs meaning he was 
involved on some level with Black Consciousness before coming to NC.  It also seems he 
had risen quickly through the ranks in MK to become a section commissar, yet, given his 
outspoken critiques of Marxism, he was under suspicion as being one of the ‘opposition’ 
leaders in the camp.772   
In addition to Mampe, Simons was also deeply suspicious of Tilly Iansson, the same 
man who had given him some background information on Absalom Mampe.  Iansson was 
a Political Instructor in the 4th Platoon which was considered by some of the commanders 
to be the “bad egg” in the detachment.  Simons writes of them as a peculiar bunch because 
they obtained good grades in his classes and followed orders.  Yet, Simons describes them 
in his diary as a ‘group of malcontents [that] stirs up defiance on trivial issues’.  They 
apparently were quiet during company classes, vocal in platoon meetings, and overall very 
anti-authority but did not deliver ideological attacks in the open.  Simons was deeply 
concerned about this group as he believed they were growing in strength.773  It is safe to 
assume that with Tilly’s history in SASM and the overall strong orientation of the new 
recruits to Black Consciousness, this Platoon was known on some level to engage in BC 
thinking which aggravated and concerned Simons.    
Other indications of the strong presence of BC within MK camps in Angola and in 
particular Novo Catengue can be seen in the debates that ensued between mid-level 
commanders/commissars and rank-and-file recruits on the question of the Bantustans.  
Simons and others in the leadership of the ANC-SA/MK/SACP disagreed with their 
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rejection of working with the Bantustans as they believed they could be used.  Oliver 
Tambo himself defended Inkatha’s Chief Gatsha Buthelezi within the ANC-SA/SACP/MK 
and in public consistently up until 1980 until they fell apart.774  According to Platoon 
Commissar Netshitenzhe, he and other MK youths in the camps were deeply agitated and 
alarmed with the ANC-SA when they heard about this meeting and it caused much tension 
in the camps.775 
This tension with top leadership exacerbated divisions between rank-and-file and 
mid-level mgwenyas and Soweto generation recruits in ways that went beyond a 
generation/age gap.  According to Simons’s diary a comrade named Mwama, an mgwenya 
educator and head of security Simons was friendly with in NC, was untrusting of the 
political attitudes of some of the recruits as he believed they were not loyal to the ANC-
SA.  A comrade Baanda according to Simons’s diary saw these recruits as criminals, 
especially those in CY III where Mafole was commissar.  Others like a comrade Theodore 
were angry at the ANC-SA for not having greater care over who they selected as he 
believed most of the new recruits were not serious freedom fighters.776  Simons believed 
this reflected attitudes of general mistrust and a widespread fear of infiltration more so than 
an ideological/political divide.777  The answer was more than likely both as Omry 
                                                          
774 For notes on the ANC-SA and Inkatha meeting in 1979 see ANC Archives LUM/065/0004/07, 
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Makgoale recalls that ‘some of the leaders of the Communist Party did not trust Black 
Consciousness’.778 
This divide is further revealed when looking at how some young militants from 
Turfloop University interacted with mgwenyas around the question of the selection of 
leaders.779  These recruits according to Simons were not in support of how some political 
instructors were being appointed as it was taking place without the approval of the larger 
body.  Simons’s diary notes a conversation he had with a comrade Raymond, of the Luthuli 
Detachment, who felt because of these challenges these particular recruits were emerging 
as a dangerous ideological opposition to the ANC-SA/MK/SACP leadership in the camps.  
Simons considered this might be a ‘carry over of SASO and BPC attitudes’ and decided to 
keep a closer eye on this group in his lectures.780   
This independent thinking and questioning of everything they were being exposed 
to was a hallmark of Black Consciousness’s political culture in South Africa.  Omry 
Makgoale believes that due to the  
background of Black Consciousness… where we interrogate, we were more prone to ask 
questions in a democratic way, questioning things, we were not so much like subservient 
to the communist theory without questioning, everything that we were taught we 
questioned, we interrogated it… We brought in vibrancy of thinking and political thought 
and so on.781 
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Nonetheless, as time moved on the camp leadership began to react more sharply 
and publicly to the differing opinions concerning how the camp was being run.  Julius 
Mokoena towards the end of November 1977 delivered a lengthy lecture to the entire camp 
on discipline as recruits were refusing to participate in drills and, most importantly to him, 
challenging certain political ideas.  After the lecture Simons noted how Mokoena was 
highly concerned that ‘only some are loyal to ANC [,] we ought to see that every commissar 
is loyal, active’ and correctly pushes the party line.782   
One of the missions of Simons in NC was to run political education classes for 
those who were going to be future instructors.  In order to fit these classes into the packed 
schedules of the instructors/commissars, these classes were conducted at night.  These 
special classes were designed for a select group of comrades. Nhlapo and Mafole, after he 
was transferred to CY II, were some of those chosen to take part which got underway in 
earnest after Mokoena’s speech on discipline.783  Simons’s reaction to them in his class is 
noteworthy.   
While Simons does not mention them by name, Nhlapo confirmed in an interview 
with the author that he was in CY II and attended Simons’s night classes.  James Ngculu 
also remembers them taking part in these night classes and being from CY II.784  Simons’s 
suspicions in his diaries are focused on three cadres from CY II who joined his classes ‘but 
do not take part in discussion’.785  Upon learning they will be posted to administrative jobs 
in various centres he writes in a separate entry, again with concern, that many of the 
                                                          
782 UCT Special Collections, Simons Diary. 
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784 UCT Special Collections, Simons Diary. 
785 UCT Special Collections, Simons Diary. 
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previous first wave of recruits from Botswana, Nhlapo’s crew, were not in his opinion 
appropriately cross-examined about their political affiliations or beliefs before being 
allowed to join the ANC-SA/MK.786        
On a rainy afternoon a few days after Mokoena’s speech Oliver Tambo, Joe 
Modise, MPLA, and Cuban representatives arrived at Novo Catengue to officially 
congratulate the first detachment on completing training.  During Oliver Tambo’s speech 
he too pushed for an intensification of Marxist-Leninist teachings within MK.  At this same 
graduation ceremony Tambo named the trainees in this camp the June 16th Detachment and 
reassigned about two hundred cadres for infiltration missions, Frontline State work, 
political/diplomatic posts, or for other assignments at various camps around Angola.  As 
the days and weeks dragged on those who for one reason or another were left in the camps 
mixed with a new influx of recruits.  They also had many who were BC aligned and 
determined to go home, as time went on tensions in the camps rose again.  They eventually 
grew to a point where Political Education classes were turned into grievance spaces where 
cadres of the reformed CY I lead critiques about the ANC-SA/MK.  On December 21st, 
1977 Simons noted that the previous night fourteen ‘rebels’ from CY I were removed from 
the camp, despite the secrecy with which this was done Simons was in support of this 
action.787   
As the New Year got underway the new recruits and those who were still for various 
reasons stuck in NC continued to place the question of the Black Consciousness on the 
table.  Their engagements with the Soweto Uprising, SASM, and SASO, according to 
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Simons, took place mostly in the political lectures for commissars which he was now 
exclusively running.  In these night classes Simons noted that some agreed BC was 
influenced primarily by the Black Panthers and ‘other trends among USA Blacks’.  
Furthermore, they had ‘no ideology other than Black Culture (form of Negritude) and 
vague notion of self-reliance and private black enterprise.  No attempt to prepare for action 
after BCM had succeeded in the indoctrination’.  Moreover, Simons argued in these classes 
that the Black Community Programmes (BCPs) were not to be taken seriously as they were 
petty bourgeois, reformist, and anti-Marxist.788  While these points were not greeted with 
too much open dissent, Simons recalled being strongly challenged when he tried to argue 
that by March 1976 SASM was no longer BC as they had contacts with the ANC-SA 
underground.789 
Another memorable episode Simons recorded in his diaries was a concern 
expressed by a Soweto generation recruit (unnamed) who ‘suggested that SASO, unable to 
receive military training by direct means, joined MK – but intend to return to SASO after 
training’.  This matched what many who were affiliated with BCM outside the camps, like 
Drake Koka, also believed.  In an interview with Tom Karis he argued that many ‘students 
have joined the ANC but only because it could provide them with things.  But some of 
them told Koka they were really still BPC and in fact were moving ANC in a BPC 
direction’.790  This probably fuelled suspicions by cadres, particularly of the older 
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generation, that these new recruits were not loyal to the ANC-SA/MK and would set the 
stage for later suspicions that would wrack the MK camps throughout the 1980s.     
 
‘Reflecting the Society that Produced us’: Black Consciousness and Challenging 
Gender Norms/Patriarchy within MK  
In addition to challenging the dogma of the SACP and the hierarchical structures 
of MK, the question of the objectification/ownership of women’s bodies, patriarchy, male 
chauvinism, and the toxic masculinity within the ANC-SA/MK was another arena of 
struggle women politicised by BCM engaged in while in MK.791  Shireen Hassim has 
argued in her work on women in the ANC-SA that until the late 1980s, the dominant 
position within the ANC-SA ‘was that the emancipation of women was secondary to and 
contingent upon national liberation.  The task of women activists was to mobilise women 
for the broader struggle’.792  Rachel Sandwell discussed how tensions formed between the 
older women in the ANC-SA and newer recruits around questions of patriarchy and the 
role of women in an armed movement.793  Violet Moloi, an MK cadre, remembered that 
although women were able to fight to receive the same training as men, sexism was rife 
within the ANC-SA’s armed wing.  Moloi recalled that, ‘Though we all had the same 
training, women were faced with the task of having to prove themselves more than men.  
Our military centres reflected the society that produced us’.794   
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Overall, Ngculu writes that ‘the impact of the women’s movement was weak, and 
feminist issues tended to be scorned as foreign… This position changed in the 1980s.  A 
new type of woman joined the ranks of MK, helping to revolutionize the ANC and put the 
issue of gender on the agenda’.  The women credited with leading this transformation were 
drawn from BCM and in later years the United Democratic Front (UDF), a reality that has 
not been deeply explored by scholars on women in MK.  Women like Mtintso, Zou Kota, 
and Nosiviwe Mapisa ‘were accustomed to being vocal and assertive’ in large measure due 
to their history of activism prior to joining MK.795   
Additionally, according to Moloi, the structural injustices within MK as it pertained 
to women extended into recruitment of women back home.  Moloi believed ‘90 percent of 
women found in the ranks of MK were not necessarily a result of a conscious recruitment 
campaign on the part of the ANC and MK’.796  Guerrillas like Thenjiwe Mtintso, who 
joined the ANC-SA from BCM sometime in 1979/1980, remembered some of her male 
comrades trying in daily interactions, political education classes, and military training to 
address gender injustice.  Despite their best efforts, it was not enough to reverse the deeply 
rooted patriarchal norms that saturated the movement.797  In response, a number of women 
took matters in their own hands and in camps like Novo Catengue began approaching 
political instructors to demand they receive separate political education classes.  In these 
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early years the Women’s Section of the ANC-SA did not have a notable presence in the 
camps so these independently forming groups were critical for women.798    
Furthermore, in the early years women ‘were generally deployed in the rear as 
typists and general office workers, or in the Amandla Cultural Ensemble’.799  This had 
ramifications for their prospects of rising within MK as one earned promotions based in 
large part on completing infiltration missions into South Africa and/or how effective one 
operated in the Frontline Areas.  Moloi accurately captured this dynamic of deployment to 
the front as it ‘reflected to a large extent the attitudes towards women.  The majority of 
women were deployed in combat-related duties like communication and medical and 
secretarial tasks both in the camps and the home front.  Very few were deployed in 
combat’.800  Additionally, as many MK commanders [and some in the APLF like Bokwe 
Mafuna] incorrectly believed women were by nature not good fighters, countless women 
were never given the chance to prove themselves which restricted their ability to contribute 
to the struggle against apartheid.801  As Thenjiwe Mtintso would later point out these biases 
fuelled a structurally unequal system which defacto locked women out of the higher 
leadership positions.802   
These structural inequalities extended to the unequal of treatment between men and 
women as it pertained to pregnancies, which also affected deployment to the Frontline 
States and infiltration missions into South Africa as scholars such as Lissoni, Sandwell, 
                                                          
798 UCT Special Collections, Simons Diary. 
799 J. Ngculu, The Honour to Serve (2009), p. 149. 
800 ANC Archives NACHES Collection, V. Moloi, ‘A woman’s place… is in MK’, p. 6. 
801 ANC Archives NACHES Collection, V. Moloi, ‘A woman’s place… is in MK’, p. 6. 
802 ANC Archives NACHES Collection, T. Mtintso, ‘Interview’, pp. 6-7. 
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and Suriano have shown us.803  Women were often forced/tasked with the responsibilities 
of wearing intrauterine devices (IUDs) to prevent pregnancy but men were not put under 
equal pressure to consistently wear condoms.  According to MK law if a woman was 
pregnant both she and the man were to be sent out of the camps to Tanzania where the 
ANC-SA had built a children’s crèche where new-borns were to be raised.804  In practice 
men rarely came forward to claim equal responsibility for the pregnancy and women were 
often put under pressure to not reveal who the father was as being reassigned to the crèche 
was seen as a punishment.  Moreover, led by conservatives in the ANC-SA Women’s 
Section, abortions were discouraged although they were made available.805   
Furthermore, while the ANC-SA Women’s Section was tasked ‘with providing an 
adequate supply of hygienic underwear, clothes and other sanitary requirements as well as 
advice about health issues’ the predominately male leadership running the camps ‘lacked 
knowledge of women’s issues – politically, emotionally and physiologically’.806  Thenjiwe 
Mtintso, one of the founding thinkers and builders of BCM, stands out as an example of 
the impact Black Consciousness had on reshaping the ANC-SA/MK along gender lines.  
Ngculu recalls that when she first came to the camps she was given special training and 
treatment but immediately rejected this as patronizing and sexist and demanded to train 
with the male comrades.807   
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Looking back at her experiences in MK, Mtintso acknowledged many women were 
trapped in society’s stereotypes of what their own capacities were as it pertained to guerrilla 
training.  While she and others tried to fight these internalised beliefs, it was not enough to 
combat the sorely lacking praxis of the men in the camps, as a result, Mtintso believed 
conditions were never optimal to create an environment where the most amount of women 
could succeed.  As it pertains directly to the July 16th Detachment, it was one of the first 
detachments of MK that had a ‘sizeable number of women… but most have now fizzled 
out.  Their interest in the army ended’.808  Careful not to construct herself as unique, 
Mtintso was clear that her situation was different as she had been politically active for a 
number of years in BCM and while in Lesotho had gained experience working in the 
Forward Areas prior to coming to the camps.  Because of this, ‘I did not feel any pressures 
because I was a woman.  I was not quiet about gender issues’.809   
While BCM provided a route to cultivate an outspoken voice and determined stance 
about their central role to the liberation of South Africa in the armed wing and 
political/diplomatic realm, exposure to communism for others was equally important.  
SACP comrade Rosita drew upon the lessons of her father and the communist party to 
understand that ‘a woman can achieve whatever a man can, only she has to work harder’.810  
Her later deep engagement with Lenin exposed her to the positions of the USSR outside of 
the influence of the anti-communist South African regime.  She eventually embraced 
Marxism-Leninism which led to her eventually being recruited by the SACP.  While 
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809 ANC Archives NACHES Collection, T. Mtintso, ‘Interview’, p. 7. 
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 282 
 
undergoing further ideological training in the USSR she felt socialism was the only route 
to women’s emancipation.811    
Rosita’s narrative was a part of a rich debate in the 1980s within the journals of the 
SACP (African Communist), ANC-SA (Sechaba), and MK (DAWN) engaging with sexism, 
patriarchy, and women’s rights within the movement.  Rosita was one who believed that 
while there were problems, women on the whole were being treated equally in the 
movement.  Another comrade based out of Lesotho, name not given, agreed with Rosita 
and argued women were being treated equally.  She believed that to argue differently was 
to devalue the real accomplishments of the women currently active in the movement.  
While acknowledging there was not  numerical equality within MK, women were 
powerfully contributing to its success.812  Cynthia Madlala, MK name, agreed with Rosita 
and the comrade from Lesotho as she described her life and training as an MK combatant 
as being a positive one overall.813  Furthermore, Madlala argued that, ‘Our politics teaches 
that a woman is first a comrade and then a woman, not vice versa’.814   
 Phyliss Jordan on the other hand seemed to agree more with Mtintso and Moloi.  
Jordan believed the woman question had been neglected allowing male chauvinism to 
permeate all sections of the African liberation movements.815  What made this neglect 
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worse was it crippled their overall capacity to fight the white settler regimes and reflected 
‘The effect of White domination on the Black people… in its treatment of African 
women’.816  Building on the work of Black radical womanists such as Frances Beal, Jordan 
argued women were the most oppressed producers and as women as they experienced a 
triple oppression along gendered, racial, and class lines.817  Furthermore, Jordan lambasted 
men who spoke of feminism and Women’s Liberation but were sorely lacking in their 
practice.  These men, she argued, were merely paying lip service to these terms in order to 
conceal their ‘traditionalist attitudes against the rights of women and mask the fears and 
inadequacies of men who feel threatened by the loss of the power they at present exercise 
over women’.818     
All in all, these new recruits were far from the blank slates they often have been 
described as by some in the ANC-SA/MK leadership.819  Most of this new wave of recruits 
had made the decision to go into exile to find the armed struggle – whether with the ANC-
SA, PAC, or BCM – due to the Soweto Uprising.  Many were not recruited by the ANC-
SA/MK underground structures and this was demonstrated in the fact that many were not 
clear about the relationship between the ANC-SA and MK or even knew what the ANC-
SA was.  In a later analysis done on the biographies of those in the camps it was shown 
that more than 75% never had been in contact with the ANC-SA before coming abroad.820  
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In some ways the accusations by older recruits concerning the newer ones not being loyal 
to the ANC-SA was a correct assessment, they were loyal only to the freeing of their people 
from apartheid.   
     
‘Turning MK into a Fighting Force’: BC in ANC-SA/MK 
This new generation of MK recruits, many of whom had come from and retained 
their Black Consciousness world-view, remade and revitalised the ANC-SA/MK.  Not only 
did they swell the ranks of the armed wing and provide an energetic boost to a flagging 
organisation, but they participated in missions, revamped the political department, and tried 
to bring the ANC-SA more in line with the thinking of their people within South Africa.  
As the years went on those of the June 16th and Moncada Detachments would leave an 
indelible mark on the ANC-SA/MK.  For Ronnie Kasrils, this generation ‘became the new 
leaders and, by the way, the commanders of MK, the most capable… some… are today 
chief reps in various countries, others who are in key positions in the underground and 
MK’.821 
When Jack Simons returned for his second tour of duty as a political education 
instructor at Novo Catengue in late 1978 he was surprised at how little he was needed as 
many of those he and Shope had trained were effectively running political education 
sessions.822  Cadres like Omry Makgoale would later rise to become the Chief of Staff of 
Engineering camp, then later a pivotal member of MK’s Security Department in charge of 
screening new recruits, and more famously a bodyguard for Oliver Tambo.823  Stanley 
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Manong and his fellow Soweto generation colleague Thabo Mavuyo were in November 
1977, shortly after their graduation, recruited by Keith Mokoape to replace Snuki Zikalala 
and himself in Botswana’s MK underground.  Manong was promoted to Chief of 
Operations, responsible for planning missions inside the country, and Mavuyo was named 
Chief of Reconnaissance and Infiltration for the Botswana MK underground, both served 
throughout 1978 and parts of 1979.824   
Another member of the Soweto generation who trained at Novo Catengue was 
Motso Mokgabudi, codenamed Obadi, who distinguished himself as a member of the 
Special Operations Unit (aka Solomon Mahlangu Unit) commissioned by Oliver Tambo to 
carry out sensitive infiltration/sabotage missions.  Most famously he planned, with Joe 
Slovo, and personally led, unlike Slovo, the successful action to detonate explosives at the 
SASOL plant in June 1st, 1980.  Its success was received positively by MK’s allies and it 
electrified many Black South Africans internally and allies of the struggle world-wide.825  
Similarly, June 16th and Moncada Detachment guerrillas like Stephen Mafoko, Humphrey 
Makhubo, and Wilfred Madela formed MK units that hit police stations across South 
Africa, notably in Silverton and Soekmekaar, throughout the late 70s and into the 80s.  In 
the Silverton raids, some eye witnesses heard those responsible shout “Black Power”.826       
Still others like Joel Netshitenzhe were eventually promoted to work on the 
Politico-Military Council (PMC), the replacement in the early 1980s for the Revolutionary 
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Council (RC), after a short stint in Radio Freedom.  He was then reassigned to work in the 
Department of Internal Propaganda (DIP) in the lead-up to the Kabwe Conference of 
1985.827  Welile Nhlapo was reassigned out of NC to become deputy Editor of Sechaba 
(under Frances Meli) in early 1979.  After some time he too was placed in the DIP and as 
time went on he began to focus more on International Relations and became key in trying 
to rebuild ANC-SA relations with ZANU-PF.828  Thenjiwe Mtintso before coming to 
Angola for training in the early 1980s worked closely with Chris Hani’s MK underground 
in Lesotho after she joined the ANC-SA sometime in early 1979.829  She was among those 
who helped him rethink how the ANC-SA would recruit and build an underground in the 
Eastern Cape in the context of a powerful current of BC saturating the area.  Even the top 
level ANC-SA/MK leadership were forced to admit that their Forward Area in Lesotho had 
the best tactics in the organisation for building underground units.  She rose in MK’s ranks 
but went even higher within the SACP.830   
Jabu Moleketi, one of the key operatives of one of MK’s most successful units 
called the G-5, was a cadre indoctrinated heavily in BC politics before joining the ANC-
SA/MK in exile.  He had been a SASM member in high school and was part of an 
underground that he describes as BC inspired with Super Moloi, Billy Murphy, and Roller 
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Masinga.  According to Moleketi BC was where one grew politically, ‘It played quite an 
important role in one’s life, developing what one would say was a spirit of defiance and 
understanding that we were equal to whites and that there was injustice.  Black 
Consciousness definitely meant that’.831  He and some others left South Africa in December 
1976 through Mozambique where they were given a crash course in firearms, explosives, 
and other sabotage work.  On April 15th, 1977 they were finally re-infiltrated and tasked 
with helping to rebuild the ANC-SA/MK underground as members of the Transvaal Urban 
Machinery under the command of Siphiwe Nyanda.  His unit’s job was to gather 
intelligence and do some sabotage missions.  Their intelligence reports were critical for 
MK as it was used to attack a number of police stations from 1977-1979.832   
More could be added to this list, the essential point has been to show how central 
this Soweto generation, chiefly those who had a prior history as activists in Black 
Consciousness and made up the core of the June 16th and Moncada Detachments, were to 
the remaking of the ANC-SA/MK in ways that went beyond a mere physical and/or 
emotional contribution.    
 
Clash of the Two Armies of MK, 1981-1985  
Tragically, the vast majority of the new recruits of the Soweto generation, and 
subsequent generations, found themselves trapped in the camps in exile until the early 
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1990s and were never able to rise in the ANC-SA/SACP/MK.  This combined with a host 
of other problems pushed new recruits, led by the Soweto generation, to demand a 
consultative conference be held by the ANC-SA.  The last conference had been held in 
1969 at Morogoro and the new recruits felt a similar conference was needed to make some 
changes to the ANC-SA/MK.  This demand made a number of mgwenyas fear these calls 
were a ploy for this new generation to push for positions of power and authority within the 
organisation through elections.  Omry Makgoale, who after serving some time as Tambo’s 
bodyguard became Chief of Staff of MK’s Luanda branch from 1981-1984, recalls, 
whenever they were problems we wanted more democracy and of course because the ANC in 
exile… was closer to Communist Party, they did notreally believe in democracy in the sense of 
questioning things.  The Communists were more like regimental type… so some of the things we 
wanted were not in line with what they expected and this is why we had some episodes in MK as a 
result of our background from BC.833 
As the 1980s unfolded top MK and SACP commanders began to institute harsher 
and more punitive rules to govern not only the discipline of its cadres but their political 
orientations as well.  The reasons for this uptick have been explained in a number of ways.  
To begin with MK was being infiltrated by spies and a few of the disturbances in the camps 
can be traced to their actions.  The food poisoning incident in Novo Catengue in September 
1977, two mini-mutinies in 1979 and 1981, as well as a few other incidents more than 
likely were influenced in part by agents.  Secondly, while the armed sabotage actions of 
MK were increasing in intensity and frequency, far too many units were being caught 
and/or killed by the apartheid security authorities.  Some of this was due to errors made by 
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underground units, however, a disturbing amount were caused by SADF and South African 
Police (SAP) elements attacking and/or arresting/killing cadres as they crossed the borders 
into South Africa making it palpable information on their infiltration spots was being 
leaked.  Lastly, with pressure mounting on MK to execute its stated goal of taking over the 
state through armed force, ideological conformity to the SACP/ANC-SA line was seen as 
necessary. 
Within this panicked context Stanley Manong and Tebello Motapanyane were 
among those arrested and jailed by MK under the suspicion of being enemy agents when 
the Spy Ring of 1981 was uncovered.  In June or July 1981 Manong and Motapanyane 
were sent to a camp, nicknamed ‘Iran’, run by FAPLA where suspected enemy agents were 
being held.  They and others were interrogated and many were physically beaten by the 
inquisitors on whether they were agents or not.  Manong was not  sure why he was under 
suspicion but surmised that between a blown operation in Botswana, which he was blamed 
for, and information given to MK that while in South Africa he had been approached by 
BOSS to spy on BPC, he had become a marked man.834  Manong recalls that, ‘For the first 
time in my life, I started doubting the wisdom of having joined the ANC.  In my wildest 
dreams, I never imagined the ANC could be so brutal against its own innocent members’.835  
After being held in this camp for nearly seven months in January 1982 without warning 
him, Motapanyane, and another cadre named “China” were sent to Quibaxe camp.  It was 
only towards the end of 1982 that he and Motapanyane were cleared of suspicion but the 
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former SG of SASM, Motapanyane, refused to participate in MK activities after the 
interrogation process he went through as a suspected SAP agent.836   
 Cadres like Manong and Motapanyane were just a few of the victims of the 
heightened sense of security that ripped through MK after the Spy Ring of 1981 was 
uncovered.  These cadres as part of the Soweto Generation were among those who often 
challenged leadership on a number of questions and were pushing for the holding of a 
consultative conference.  These qualities had made them factionalists as far as many 
mgwenyas were concerned and eventually legal codes in MK began to be made broadly 
attacking what the leadership perceived as factionalism with the intent to weaken the 
organisation.837     
 One year after the release of Manong and Motapanyane, an MK Military Code was 
circulated throughout the camps with the intent to enforce discipline within MK.  Large 
portions of the document focus explicitly on discipline and obedience as necessary qualities 
for a guerrilla of MK.  If one was insubordinate, especially towards commissars and 
commanders, harsh punishment was justified.  Code seven is of particular interest as it 
pertains to its wording as it stated, ‘Any act or speech that provokes tribal or regional 
animosities or spreads disunity by means of factionalism and/or racism shall be an 
offense’.838  The racism charge is interesting.  According to MK’s own accounts about 90% 
of MK were African while the rest was divided between Indians and Coloureds.  With the 
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exceptions of Joe Slovo, Jack Simons, Ronnie Kasrils and a few Russian commanders, 
there were very few white cadres in MK in Angola.  Hence the question, who were they 
talking about?  Kasrils provides us with a clue when he notes in his own autobiography 
that he never experienced racism from the cadres because he was white, which surprised 
him, implying there was a perception that Blacks could be racist against whites.839  While 
undoubtedly this rule would also have applied to relations among Africans, Indians and 
Coloureds, we must add whites to that category as well.  By doing so, Black Consciousness 
becomes a target in this code as it was perceived by the leadership to be anti-white as well 
as a faction producing ideologies that went against those of the ANC-SA/MK.    
 Understanding this atmosphere is key to grasping why a few months later MK 
would hit its lowest point with two large mutinies in January and March of 1984.  While 
these mutinies are widely known and written about, they have not been written about in the 
context of this heightened suspicion and distrust by the ANC-SA/MK towards Black 
Consciousness.  Most accounts have argued it was viciously suppressed due to hyper-
paranoia of the leadership, the Stalinist/Stazi training of the Security Department of MK, 
lack of democracy within the organisation due to the latter, and outright corruption of the 
organisation.840  Oliver Tambo’s biographer Luli Callinicos argued, ‘Mature soldiers had 
imbibed the lessons of political patience through experience and an understanding of 
strategy and tactics in their long-term mission.  The young intakes were impatient… they 
were unschooled in politics or revolutionary theory or ANC history and had not necessarily 
                                                          
839 Kasrils, Armed and Dangerous, p. 153. 
840 WHP A 3318f12, R. Douglas, ‘The Report of the Douglas Commission, 1993’, 7.1.93, pp. 1-64; S. Ellis, 
MBOKODO: Security in ANC camps, 1961-1990, African Affairs, 93, 371 (1994), pp. 279-297; L. 




internalised organisational discipline’.841  The ANC-SA itself through the Stuart Report 
partly acknowledged the latter but attributed most of the problems to inept leadership.842  
However, none of these report or articles, except according to Hugh Macmillan the 
Shishuta Report, make serious mention of Black Consciousness.843  Looking at who was 
arrested and imprisoned in the aftermath of the mutiny reveals this omission and the charge 
of youths having not cultivated revolutionary discipline to be strongly misguided.       
As the January 1984 mutiny reached its conclusion the rebels held a meeting in 
early February and decided to form and elect a Committee of Ten (CoT) to organise, but 
not lead, discussions between them and MK’s Regional Command.844  The CoT was 
comprised of Bongani Motwa, Zabu Maledza (Ephraim Nkondo), Kate Mhlongo (Head of 
Women’s Section in Angola), Jabu Mafolo (Commissar of Amandla), Sipho Mathelula, 
Grace Motaung, Moss Thema, Simon Botha, Khotso Morena and Sidwell Moroka (Omry 
Makgoale who was elected in absentia as he was in Luanda).845  The first meeting was 
scheduled for February 7th, 1984 at 10h30 with a report back planned at 14h00.  None of 
this took place as FAPLA arrived at Viana camp early in the morning in an attempt to 
disarm the MK rebels.  There was some exchange of fire at the beginning but CoT leaders 
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intervened before tensions escalated further to enable ‘the disarming to take place without 
serious fighting’.846   
A number of other small isolated issues occurred but in early February an ANC-SA 
appointed commission arrived after most of those who participated in this mutiny 
surrendered, were arrested, and had been sent to Quatro.  The Stuart Commission, as it 
came to be called, was tasked with interviewing the rebels to figure out what caused the 
mutiny and suggest necessary changes to the National Executive Committee (NEC).  
Makgoale, who had not even been present when the mutinies started, had also been arrested 
and taken to Quatro because he was one of the names put down for the CoT.       
 Why did this mutiny happen?  The Stuart Commission offered a number of reasons.  
The immediate build-up to the rebellion was traced to what they argued was a deterioration 
in the quality of leadership in MK since Novo Catengue was attacked and destroyed by 
SADF forces in March 1979.  According to them, NC was a well-organised and non-
hierarchical camp with good training and well thought-out logistics.847  Since its 
destruction a culture of elitism began to emerge with administrators demanding and 
receiving special privileges as it pertained to access to food, cigarettes, liquor, perceived 
sexual favours of women, and the procurement of labour from the rank-and-file.848  
Furthermore, there was an increased tendency by leadership to label those who were openly 
critical as being anti-authority and working for enemy agents.  Many of those who spoke 
out were persecuted by leadership and cases of ‘destructive punishment’ increased as a 
                                                          
846 WHP A 3318f, J. Stuart, ‘Report of Inquiry into Recent Developments in the People’s Republic of Angola 
– March ’84’, p. 22. 
847 As we know from our previous sections the claim that NC was non-hierarchical is highly questionable.   
848 WHP A 3318f, J. Stuart, ‘Report of Inquiry into Recent Developments in the People’s Republic of Angola 
– March ’84’, p. 4. 
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method utilised by these leaders to respond to ‘disciplinary problems’ which infuriated the 
comrades in the camps.849     
One unanimous response of all those in the camps as to what their major grievances 
were centred on ‘the security department [which] carried out tasks which are not supposed 
to be theirs – the tasks of disciplining offenders’, succinctly, it had abused its authority.  
This abuse of power was compounded by cadres not having enough contact with regional 
let alone national leadership as both had stopped coming to the camps.  Consequently, the 
commission concluded it was not  an enemy plot although the presence of many ‘enemy 
agents, suspects, malcontents and undisciplined elements’ did not help matters.850  As for 
the CoT itself, the commission concluded that it too was not  an organised conspiracy, yet, 
‘some of the leading members of the Committee as well as those closely connected with 
them have a long history of dissention and anti-movement activities.  For years they have 
exploited every opportunity to ferment regionalism and undermine the organisation’s 
leadership and policies.  Some have illusions of power and leadership’.851   
Some of those interviewed believed there existed within MK two armies, one 
imperialist and one progressive with Mzawi Piliso (head of the Department of Intelligence 
and Security also called NAT) and Andrew Masondo (National Commissar, a position 
created in 1976 during Soweto Uprising) belonging to the former while cadres like Hani 
                                                          
849 WHP A 3318f, J. Stuart, ‘Report of Inquiry into Recent Developments in the People’s Republic of Angola 
– March ’84’, p. 6. 
850 WHP A 3318f, J. Stuart, ‘Report of Inquiry into Recent Developments in the People’s Republic of Angola 
– March ’84’, p. 24.  Again, note the language.   
851 WHP A 3318f, J. Stuart, ‘Report of Inquiry into Recent Developments in the People’s Republic of Angola 
– March ’84’, p. 24.  The last line in this quote is interesting as Makgoale had earlier been demoted because 
of his demands that the ANC-SA hold a consultative conference in the late 1970s.  While he was able to 
regain good favour, his connection with the January 1984 MK Mutiny might have rekindled suspicions about 
his loyalties.   
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and Slovo fell into the latter.852  While the Stuart Commission dismissed this opinion as 
isolated, this chapter suggests this was an accurate assessment of the situation in MK as 
many in the leadership of ANC-SA/MK, as well as middle and low-ranking mgwenyas, 
were on the whole oppositional towards BC from as early as Novo Catengue.  With this in 
mind it is not surprising that the CoT was looked at with such anger and resentment as all 
came from a Black Consciousness background, none perhaps more strongly than Ephraim 
Nkondo, MK name Zabu Maledza.853 
Omry Makgoale recalls Nkondo being older than many of the Soweto generation 
as he came from the age group of Steve Biko and was a student at Turfloop from 1972 to 
1975.  In 1975 he went into exile where he joined the ANC-SA.854  Nkondo was eventually 
based in Swaziland and is remembered by new recruits traveling through this Forward Area 
as one who guided them once they got there.  From scattered sources he had been jailed 
once before by MK command in 1982 for disciplinary reasons, around the same time as 
Manong and Motapanyane, but was released that same year.855  After which he rose to 
become Chief Propaganda Officer for Angola.  After he and many others in the CoT were 
arrested, they were taken to Quatro.  There, according to Omry Makgoale, he died, 
allegedly of suicide.  Makgoale recalls that,  
he seemed to have committed suicide but what actually happened was that, I do not know how he 
got the rope, because I was next to his cell.  You see his cell was at the corner next to his cell was 
my cell.  And there were four cells, isolation cells, so… I think at night you know I did hear that 
sound you know, that [gurgling sound] because he probably when I imagine, the window behind 
                                                          
852 WHP A 3318f, J. Stuart, ‘Report of Inquiry into Recent Developments in the People’s Republic of Angola 
– March ’84’, p. 25. 
853 Omry Makgoale interview, p. 20. 
854 G. Houston and B. Magubane, ‘The ANC’s Armed Struggle in the 1970s’ in The Road to Democracy in 
South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970-1980], pp. 477-478. 
855 I have not been able to ascertain whether this arrest was because of the Spy Ring or something else, 
however, it more than likely was part and parcel of the wider hysteria against anybody who was questioning 
certain leaders in exile.   
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him, small window, these bars that are like burglars bars, so I think that he tied the rope there, tied 
himself so when he was dying he was kicking around… I heard the sound you know but I did 
notreally know what the sound was for.  So in the morning when the guards came to open and check 
and so on, and then I heard that you know the guards were saying he killed himself.856     
 Omry recalls that Quatro held a mixture of cadres who were clearly there for their 
Black Consciousness views as well as those who were there because they were agents, 
insubordinate, or like him, fiercely independent.857  Makgoale himself maintains his 
innocence as it pertains to organizing the mutiny, as he was in Luanda at the time, although 
he did agree with their complaints he rejected their methods.  The conditions of the cadres 
was one which he deeply understood as it seemed, even by admission of the Stuart Report, 
that this was the only way for them to get the attention of leadership.  Whether they were 
fighting in their minds under the banner of Black Consciousness or not, one of the results 
of this mutiny and another one in March 1984 was it forced the ANC-SA leadership to 
make plans to organize a Consultative Conference.  In a recent interview with the author 
Makgoale made it clear that the 1984 MK Mutinies forced this although it had been a 
demand by BC cadres from as early as the late 1970s.  Even the Stuart Commission itself 
proposed a National Conference be organised as one of the many restructurings that needed 
to occur within ANC-SA/MK to solve the problems which lead to the mutiny.858       
In the months leading up to the Kabwe Conference, set to take place in June 1985, 
a commendable democratic process did take place where leadership tried to obtain the 
opinions of as different sections of ANC-SA/MK on where the party was to go from here.  
A close reading of the documents compiled suggests the section entitled “Mass Struggles” 
                                                          
856 Omry Makgoale interview, p. 22. 
857 Omry Makgoale interview, p. 22. 
858 Stuart Report, pp. 26-32; Omry Makgoale interview, p. 23; ANC Archives OTP/093/047/08, R. Johnson, 
‘Suppressed voice of ANC waits to speak’, The Independent, Sunday 2 June, 1991, p.5. 
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seemed to be an area of interest by the various cadres of the ANC-SA/MK.  Candidly, they 
spoke on the ANC-SA underground being ‘out of touch with the people – in fact it has a 
purely military image and there is little understanding between the military and political 
(forms of struggle)’.859  One of the ways to rectify this was to, ‘Place the BCM on the 
agenda of political education inside the country’.860  On “Internal Mobilisation”, similar to 
many of the critiques levelled to the movement by BCM, it was expressed that leadership 
was too far away from the arena of struggle and needed to do more to ground itself with 
internal struggles.  Centrally, as it pertained to “Political Life” within the ANC-SA/MK, 
cadres wrote the organisation needed to become more open to ideological challenges to its 
doctrines and not avoid these discussions.861     
   
The Kabwe Conference: The Victory and Defeat of Black Consciousness in MK      
After months of consultations and debates on June 16th, 1985, with over 250 
delegates in attendance, Oliver Tambo stepped to centre stage in Kabwe, Zambia to open 
the consultative conference.  The date chosen was not accidental as it was part and parcel 
of attempts by the ANC-SA/MK to seize symbolic ownership of the Soweto Uprising, 
Tambo’s opening remarks on it and Black Consciousness are worth noting.  After 
dispelling any notions of the ANC-SA being in or having been in crisis – blatantly ignoring 
the 1984 MK Mutinies which had a 90% participation rate – he launched into discussion 
                                                          
859 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/03, ‘African National Congress National Consultative Conference June 
1985: National Preparatory Committee Documents’, n.d., p. 4. 
860 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/03, ‘African National Congress National Consultative Conference June 
1985: National Preparatory Committee Documents’, n.d., p. 4. 
861 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/03, ‘African National Congress National Consultative Conference June 
1985: National Preparatory Committee Documents’, n.d., pp. 7-12. 
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of the contribution of BC made to anti-apartheid activism.862  Carefully, Tambo 
acknowledged that during the 1970s ‘Black consciousness became a fact of our political 
life’.863  While still inaccurately claiming they were primarily inspired by the Wankie and 
Sipolilo campaigns of 1967 and 1968, he applauded BC as ‘a distinct political and 
organisational force within our country’.864  However, times had changed, consequently, 
the only place for BC was to solidify itself as the nationalist tendency ‘within the national 
democratic revolution independent of the ANC’.865   That said, BCM needed to be praised 
for cultivating ‘the activism of our people into struggle… We should also recognize the 
significant input that the BCM made towards further uniting the black oppressed masses 
of our country by emphasizing the commonness of their oppression and their shared 
destiny’.866   
Steve Biko was given special praise although Tambo strangely and inaccurately 
argued that from 1976 onwards Biko believed ‘the ANC is the leader of our revolution’.867  
On the Soweto Uprising, Tambo stated, in opposition to earlier statements by top leaders 
like SG Alfred Nzo that it ‘resulted in increasing the relative proportion of the youth and 
students within our ranks.  It brought into our midst comrades many of whom had had very 
                                                          
862 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, pp. 3-5. 
863 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, p. 9. 
864 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, p. 11. 
865 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, p. 13.  
866 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, p. 13.    
867 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, p. 17.   
 299 
 
little contact with the ANC, if any’.868  Furthermore, he acknowledged that ‘in 1976-77 we 
had not recovered sufficiently to take full advantage of the situation that crystalised from 
the first events of June 16th, 1976. Organisationally, in political and military terms, we were 
too weak to take advantage of the situation created by the Uprising.  We had very few 
active ANC-SA units inside the country.  We had no military presence to speak of”.869  He 
continued by arguing this generation formed the nucleus for the June 16th Detachment 
which was central in the uptick of MK actions inside the country from 1977 – 1979.     
Welile Nhlapo, who was a delegate to the conference, interpreted these statements 
as being designed to encourage hostile ANC-SA members to be more accepting of those 
coming from BCM as it would enable the entire movement to be better equipped to fight 
the apartheid regime.870  Reflecting on this conference later Keith Mokoape, who was also 
in attendance, recalled that for him and others of Black Consciousness, this signified the 
incorporation of BC thinking into African Nationalism.  In his own words he and others 
were now ‘way above the little confines of the BC of the 60s, of the early 70s, we were 
internationalist freedom fighters.  So we were going to the Kabwe conference with a broad 
framework of how ultimately we must bring down the regime.871  
Going forward, more was to be done to attempt to recruit white South Africans to 
the side of the ANC-SA and it was now made official that they would have a consultative 
conference every five years.  Additionally those who could sit on the National Executive 
                                                          
868 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, p. 18 (emphasis in italics mine). 
869 ANC Archives OTP/055/0521/01, ‘Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the 
African National Congress in Zambia, 16-23rd June, 1985’, p. 19. 
870 Welile Nhlapo interview, p. 20. 
871 Keith Mokoape interview, p. 18.  A number of Soweto generation and other youths were at Kabwe. 
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Committee (NEC), the highest decision-making body in the ANC-SA, was increased to 
thirty members.  Of the new members, one was white (Slovo), two were Indians, and two 
were Coloureds.872  While in many ways the adoption of Indians and Coloureds onto the 
NEC was a contribution of Black Consciousness, as previously only African were allowed, 
the addition of whites could be read as a reassertion of control by those loyal to non-
racialism who operated outside of the BC framework.  In November of 1985 Oliver Tambo 
gave an interview with The Cape Times declaring the ANC-SA hoped ‘our white 
compatriots will learn to understand is that we do not really see them as whites in the first 
instance.  We see them as fellow South Africans in the first instance.  They are as good as 
black’.873  Arguably, in the context of having just had secret discussions with white 
businessmen from apartheid South Africa, Tambo in this interview can arguably be seen 
to be reassuring white South Africa that if the ANC-SA came to power they would be 
safe.874     
   
Concluding Thoughts 
Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Soweto Uprising exiled South African 
scholar Archie Mafeje derided the desire of some of the youths he interviewed to use the 
‘old and experienced organisations… to acquire military skills and diplomatic protection 
and then be discarded is naïve in the extreme and will, no doubt, back-fire in the end’.875  
                                                          
872 ANC LSM/097/0010/05, ‘Communique of the Second National Consultative Conference of the African 
National Congress, presented by President Oliver Tambo at a Press Conference, Lusaka, Zambia, June 25th, 
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874 H. Macmillan, The Lusaka Years, p. 203. 
875 A. Mafeje, ‘Soweto and Its Aftermath’, Review of African Political Economy, 11 (1978), p. 28. 
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While at the time this seemed correct, our examination here has shown this derision to be 
both untenable and deadly accurate.  On the one hand not only did these new recruits 
provide a numbers boost and emotional/energetic renewal to the ANC-SA, but they were 
central to the remaking of MK.  On the other hand, while some were able to rise to key 
mid-level and later top level positions, the vast majority remained locked in the camps or 
at worse in the decrepit jails of Quatro.  This complexity is missed not only in Mafeje’s 
analysis, but in most of the historical accounts of MK’s evolution post-Soweto.          
According to SACP activist Mzala, who was one of those who in the pages of the 
African Communist mounted some of the strongest defences of BC, there were three types 
of Soweto generation cadres in the ANC-SA/MK.  The first were ‘noticed, chosen and 
promoted by the leadership because they are totally loyal and never question those above 
them’ if they ever did question, they would be side-lined.  According to Mzala, Welile 
Nhlapo was a good example of this type of cadre, as the 1980s progressed his rise onto the 
NEC at Kabwe seemed to be all but guaranteed as a number of younger cadres attending 
the conference were determined to vote him into this position of authority.  He was known 
to be and praised as ‘an outstanding youth leader in SASO before 1976’ and as our chapter 
has shown was a willing recruit of the SACP.876  However, according to Mzala, he had 
begun to question things in the movement in ways some of the top leadership did not 
appreciate and so when the elections came he did not garner enough votes to sit on the 
NEC.           
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The second type were cadres who were loyal to the ANC-SA but from the 
beginning of their membership were openly critical of the leadership.  According to Mzala 
‘Some became discontent because of stagnation in camps when nothing seemed to be 
happening.  If they expressed this discontent, they were regarded as a threat, and the 
favoured method of silencing them was to accuse them of being agents… Others were not 
accused of being spies, but were squelched by being accused of being “anti-leader”, which 
was considered a very bad label to have pinned on you’.  The third type do not rock the 
boat but secretly are critical of leadership and was often used by the second type of Soweto 
generation cadre to rally support against leadership.877   
This second and third category of Soweto generation recruits were it seems the vast 
majority.  It can be argued that one of the reasons many guerrillas of MK were not 
infiltrated back into South Africa was because they were not trusted by the leadership.  
Others like McKinley have suggested they were trapped in the camps because the 
leadership of ANC-SA were not serious about physically fighting with the apartheid 
government as most were politicians and diplomats.878  Some like Legassick propose the 
leadership of the movement was always conciliatory towards apartheid and sublimated the 
class consciousness of their recruits, who wanted to go home to fight, for a bourgeois liberal 
vision of negotiated settlement which required most remain in the camps in Angola.879  Still 
others, as we saw in earlier sections, argue that due to the level of infiltration of MK by 
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SAP spies and other “criminal” elements, paranoia set in over who was loyal enough to be 
infiltrated.     
All of these positions have more than a few grains of truth locked within them.  At 
the same time, all are missing an analysis of Black Consciousness within MK that was seen 
on the whole as a threat to the ANC-SA’s non-racialism.  On a more practical level these 
new recruits, whether Black Consciousness or not, threatened the positions of relative 
power and authority many mgwenyas had grown accustomed to over the decades in 
exile.880  Related to this, in an early article written by John Marcum, he correctly argued 
that trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were part and parcel of the 
psychology of exile.  As the decades wore on this produced an insecurity as to what they 
actually were doing to bring down apartheid.881  This was particularly the case with MK 
because unlike other armed wings they were not engaged in constant direct armed 
                                                          
880 Internal factors are very important as to why BC’s influence within ANC-SA/MK fell off drastically as 
the 1980s progressed.  In the wake of the bannings of BCM organisations the ANC-SA refused to allow itself 
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Stronger and more efficient efforts were made, in no small part due to the ingenuity of the Soweto Generation 
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A good example of this would be Thozamile Botha the founder of PEBCO.  PEBCO was assuredly in its 
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to sit on the ANC-SA’s NEC in 1991.  Still others have argued that the ANC-SA through its connections 
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very complicated story and cannot be explored in the detail needed in this dissertation, however, it is 
something we must keep in mind when analysing why BC’s influence in MK decreased over the course of 
the 1980s.         
881 J. Marcum, ‘The Exile Condition and Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation 
Movements’ in C. Potholm and R. Dale, eds., Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics 
(New York, Free Press, 1972), pp. 262-275.  This is a theme my future research will explore in more detail.  
What were and are the psychological effects on contemporary African societies caused through the return of 
exiles during the liberation struggle?  Can we construct a history of the liberation movements through the 
perspective of mental health?  Perhaps doing so can help, or at least better grapple with, some of the current 
problems our societies are silently suffering through.     
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confrontations with SADF or SAP even in a classic guerrilla sense.  Therefore, when these 
fiery youths came into exile demanding to be infiltrated back into South Africa and openly 
castigating the organisation for not bringing about the armed revolution they wrote about 
in their publications, it created a vicious response among some.   
That said, it is undoubtable that the BC praxis many of the Soweto generation were 
exposed to enabled them to question and critique leadership in ways that surpassed even 
the Hani Memorandum in 1969.  These new cadres did not blindly accept the Marxist-
Leninism (some argued Stalinism) of the SACP/MK or the non-racialist broadly Christian 
socialist vision of the ANC-SA and some elements of MK.  Furthermore, they were 
determined to not repeat the mistakes of the older liberation movements by staying so long 
in exile they were forgotten at home.  This kind of cadre if infiltrated ran the risk of 
spreading a political line that uplifted other movements as the authentic representative of 
the South African people, not the ANC-SA.  This was particularly a threat given the 
presence and temporary popularity of the South African Youth Revolutionary Council 
(SAYRCO), the Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort (IRE), and the soon to form Black 
Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA).  To prevent this only cadres whose loyalty 
and ideological allegiance to the non-racialism of the ANC-SA was unquestioned were 
given tasks in the Forward Areas or inside the country. 
This is a critical viewpoint missing from some of the pertinent critiques of the 
ANC-SA/SACP/MK in exile.  Undoubtedly some new recruits learned useful intellectual 
and practical tools from SACP, Stasi, and the USSR, but, this should not be conflated with 
them being unformed clay who were eventually shaped into proper revolutionaries by these 
influences.  By adding BC into this understanding of events some level of understanding 
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can be given as to why and how alternative futures of the direction of South Africa post-
1994 did not manifest.  Indeed, BC’s vision was temporarily politically defeated.  Yet, it 
remained and thrived as scholars such as Shannen Hill and others have carefully shown in 
the political culture of life in South Africa from Biko’s death and the bannings of BCM 
organisations till the present day.882  It was here, within what Amilcar Cabral once called 
the fruit of history as well as its determinant, in culture, that current generations of activists 
rediscovered one of the many sources of the Black radical politics they would need to 
understand and combat an ANC-SA government still deeply imbedded and enthralled in 
white monopoly capital.883         
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Conclusion: BCM’s contribution to the independence of South Africa 
through the perspective of the armed struggle 
 
Towards a Negotiated Settlement, January 1988 – April 1994 
As the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA) and Umkhonto We 
Sizwe (MK) retooled and reshaped themselves in the aftermath of the Kabwe Conference, 
the battle of Cuito Cuanavale drew ever closer.  Here, the Forças Armadas Populares de 
Libertação de Angola (FAPLA) and Cuban troops, supported by some MK and People’s 
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) cadres, defeated the combined forces of União 
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the South African Defence 
Force (SADF).  This, in combination with the growing anti-apartheid movement inside 
South Africa and across the world, forced the National Party (NP) to the negotiating table 
and eventually secured the independence of Namibia.   Unfortunately, under the new 
premier of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Russians were at the same time rapidly 
reducing their military and economic support to their allies.  Due to a combination of the 
draining war in Afghanistan and Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika, the USSR began 
encouraging its allies to adopt more conciliatory measures with the capitalist west.  The 
Cubans could not afford to maintain their large military commitment in Angola without 
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USSR support and so all sides, including US Under-Secretary of State Chester Crocker and 
the NP, were willing to compromise.884 
With the SADF and UNITA forces defeated, the Cubans and Angolans were more 
willing to accept an earlier US proposed linked withdrawal where if the Cubans left Angola 
the South Africans would leave Namibia.  When this happened the Americans agreed to 
stop blocking the implementation of Resolution 435 paving the way for free and fair 
elections to take place in Namibia.  In February 1990 F.W. De Klerk unbanned the ANC-
SA and PAC, shortly afterwards Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and on March 
21st, 1990 Namibia celebrated its independence.  There was hope, among some, that free 
and fair elections and peace were soon to come in South Africa, this was not to be. 
 Inside South Africa an intense civil war was brewing between the ANC-SA/MK 
and elements of Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP), the latter being secretly being armed and financially supported by apartheid regime.  
Their conflict threatened to prevent the holding of free and fair elections.   In the meantime, 
the ANC-SA was also attempting to transition from a radical exile movement with a secret 
underground to an internal legal political party.  At their 1991 National Executive 
Committee (NEC) elections, many of the Soweto generation were effectively locked out 
of power, as were those who were in the forefront of the movement inside South Africa.  
Of those with clear BCM roots, Joel Netshitendze, Thozamile Botha, Cyril Ramaphosa, 
Billy Nair, and Mosiuoa Lekota were elected onto the newly expanded NEC.  Ramaphosa, 
a former SASO Local Chairman now turned union organizer, was elected Secretary-
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General.   Winnie Mandela, an outspoken internal activist against the apartheid regime, 
was also elected onto the NEC but not a position.   
 After their bannings were lifted in 1990, Chris Hani and others MK commanders 
were allowed to enter South Africa legally.  In the years before his assassination he struck 
up a political friendship with Winnie Mandela.  Hani was very popular within MK and 
most importantly among Black South Africans in the townships and rural areas.  He was 
also in line to succeed an ailing Joe Slovo as the General-Secretary of the SACP.  Winnie 
Mandela was arguably even more popular than Hani inside South Africa.  Her outspoken 
rejection of apartheid, deep links with some in the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), 
and her singular determination to remove the NP and redistribute land among the Blacks 
by any means necessary endeared her to the masses of South Africa.    
 A few months after their political friendship became known, Hani, disenchanted 
with the backroom fights for positions and disturbed by how disconnected the negotiation 
process had made ANC-SA from the masses, resigned as Chief of Staff of MK.  He also 
resigned his place on the NEC and took up the position of General-Secretary of SACP full-
time.  This seemed to be a further sign to many on the right that their fears of a Hani-
Winnie alliance were justified.  Un-coincidentally, on April 10th, 1993 Hani was 
assassinated in his driveway by Janusz Waluś, an expendable tool of the forces of white 
supremacy.885   
The country stood on the brink of civil war and it took a powerful but in hindsight 
perhaps misguided plea for peace by Nelson Mandela to calm the justifiably angry Black 
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masses.  Two weeks later former ANC-SA President Oliver Tambo died peacefully and 
the country continued to mourn.  Later that year Mandela and De Klerk received the Nobel 
Peace Prize, in April 1994 the ANC-SA won the first ever free and fair elections, and 
Mandela was named President of South Africa within a power-sharing government with 
the NP.   
 
Concluding thoughts 
The purpose of this dissertation has not been to argue BCM would not have entered 
into a negotiated settlement with the NP if it had been the dominant movement.  Mosibudi 
Mangena himself recalls feeling afraid of the implications of a civil war after he secretly 
infiltrated South Africa in the early 1990s to personally assess the state of the country.  He 
and his colleagues were almost attacked numerous times by groups that had formed in 
various sections of the townships.  A bloody civil war, already in its early stages, was on 
the horizon if another path was not offered.  Those disproportionately impacted would be 
poor Blacks in the townships and rural areas.  This was something Mangena and others in 
the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and its armed wing wanted to 
avoid if possible.886     
Neither does this dissertation wish to suggest that the ANC-SA/MK or the SACP 
(not to mention the liberation movements of the entire region) were not under constant 
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pressure from the apartheid war machine.887  This was the unceasing reality, as chapters 
five and six point out, many in these respective organisations believed their actions against 
BCM were critical to defeating apartheid.  Moreover, many staunch BCM activists 
willingly joined the ANC-SA/MK/SACP and some were able to rise rapidly through the 
ranks. 
What this dissertation has attempted to chart is how those in the ANC-SA and PAC 
who acted against BCM, both internally and externally, were misguided and ultimately 
hurt the wider fight against white supremacy and capitalism in South Africa.  Keeping this 
in mind, I believe if BCMA, the Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort (IRE), and the South 
African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO) had been able to unify themselves in 
exile and strengthen their connections with AZAPO, they could have established a forceful 
Black Nationalist alternative to the ANC-SA by the mid-1980s.  As that did not happen, 
this dissertation has sought to chart an alternative topography of struggle that BCM 
organisations operating in exile imagined and sought to build beginning in the late 1960s.   
In the introduction, we did a number of things.  To begin with, we laid out three 
broad bodies of literature this dissertation locates itself within.  The first, Black 
Consciousness literature, was presented chronologically instead of thematically to capture 
the ebbs and flows of its historiography since the 1970s.  We suggested that two traditions 
existed in the research and writing of BCM historiography, an academic tradition and 
activist tradition.  The former was and is influenced mostly by white scholars, although 
this is changing, yet contains within it hidden gems of Black scholars such as the work of 
                                                          
887 For just a few interesting pieces written in the 1980s see H. Campbell, ‘War, Reconstruction and 
Dependence in Mozambique’, Third World Quarterly, 6, 4 (1984), pp. 839-867; H. Campbell, ‘Dismantling 
the Apartheid War Machine’, Third World Quarterly, 9, 3 (1987), pp. 468-492. 
 311 
 
Sam Nolutshungu.  As the literature evolved since the 1970s we saw efforts made to both 
discredit the movement, or offer critical takes on its effectiveness, that have come to 
dominate much of how BCM was understood within South Africa’s wider liberation 
struggle.   More recently, those in the academic tradition like Leslie Hadfield and Julian 
Brown have recuperated the more radical details of BCM’s contributions to the fight 
against apartheid rule.  Nevertheless, the activist tradition has consistently captured a more 
radical vision of BCM from Mosibudi Mangena’s first autobiography to Nigel Gibson, 
Andile Mngxitama, and Amanda Alexander’s text on the resonance of BCM today.   
This was followed by a broad discussion of the state of the literature dealing with 
the South African liberation struggle and the wider Southern African Liberation 
Movements.  It was noted that recently there has developed a more working peoples take 
on the historiography of the various liberation movements across southern Africa.  In 
addition to moving away from leadership-centric accounts and towards a working peoples’ 
history, the literature has also sought to emphasise the regional and global aspects of the 
liberation movements.  Keeping this in mind, the literature review also looked at the Global 
Black Power literature and tried to bring it into conversation with Southern African 
Liberation Movement history.  The literature on Black Power has been mostly silent on the 
reverberations of the movement within Africa and in particular on the African liberation 
movements.  Like the BCM literature and that of the South African liberation struggle, 
there has been little to no mention of BCM’s attempts to form an armed wing and offer a 
different vision of a post-apartheid South Africa.  Consequently, this dissertation fills gap 
in each of the three literatures with its focus on BCM’s armed struggle.   
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The second half of the introduction dealt in some length with the work of Michel-
Rolph Trouillot who has been deeply influential to this dissertation.  His writings and 
research on the meaning of history, with the Haitian Revolution as his pivot, has been 
essential to my own understanding of the role of BCM in South Africa’s history as well as 
that of the ANC-SA/MK.  Trouillot’s work offers those interested in the contemporary 
problems of the Pan-African world a framework for returning to our past revolutionary 
traditions while simultaneously offering critical takes of them that are not right-wing or 
dogmatically Marxist, but infused with radical Black Nationalism.   
While his concept of the Haitian Revolution being “unthinkable” and his broader 
concept of “silences” in history remain his most well-known contributions to our thinking 
of racism in historical analysis, for my work, his treatment of Sans-Souci has been more 
useful to my meditations on “post-colonial” Africa through an engagement with the 
African liberation struggles.  Trouillot’s notion of the War within the War, as it pertains to 
his unique treatment of the uprisings of 1802-1803, is one of the most unheralded aspects 
of his work.888  In it he both acknowledges the importance of the leadership of figures like 
Toussaint L’Ouverture and Henri Christophe against slavery and racism, while at the same 
time critiquing them for their treatment of maroon and Bossales (African-born) elements 
of the movement (who made up the majority).  As it pertains to the maroon population and 
their rebellions from 1802-1803 against the French and the creole generals, Trouillot 
frames them as central to the overthrow of slavery, racism, and colonialism on Saint 
Domingue (Haiti).  At times they operated independently of the regular armed forces of 
                                                          




L’Ouverture, other times they operated as a part of the larger forces.  Their contributions 
remain little known and respected, as were the betrayals they faced at the hands of CLR 
James’s Black Jacobins (L’Ouverture, Christophe, and others) and in the opinion of this 
author numerous parallels exist between them and BCM in South Africa.   
Following this engagement the introduction closed with a brief discussion of the 
sources used for this dissertation.  Most of the primary documents used for each chapter 
were obtained at the ANC Archives at the University of Fort Hare and the Karis-Gerhart 
Papers at the University of Witwatersrand.  The documents used at these archives ranged 
from memos, letters, public statements, court documents, interviews, and publications from 
the ANC-SA, MK, SACP, SASO, the South African Student’s Movement (SASM), Black 
People’s Convention (BPC), and a host of other BCM aligned organisations.  These were 
amplified, or supplemented, over a dozen oral interviews I obtained in 2016 and 2017.  The 
oral interviews were done mainly with cadres who were members of the Bokwe 
Group/APLF, Isandlwana Revolutionary Effort (IRE), the BCMA, the Azanian Liberation 
Army (AZANLA), and some former members of SASO.  A few MK cadres were 
interviewed, such as Keith Mokoape and Welile Nhlapo, who were former SASO and/or 
APLF members who joined ANC-SA/MK.  Gathering this material was tedious and a 
number of interviews with AZANLA comrades were not used for this dissertation given 
time constraints and lack of primary sources to confirm some of their narratives.  In future 
publications these interview will be revisited in order to amplify the rich history of 
AZANLA in exile in the 1980s.       
That said, the first chapter opened with a broad survey of the build-up towards 
armed struggle against colonialism in Africa in the late 1950s.  Beginning with the First 
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All-African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC), we attempted to sketch the discussions and 
debates that emerged among activists and intellectuals thinking through and planning 
African decolonisation.  Disagreements within the First AAPC would be played out in most 
African Liberation Movements (ALMs) in its wake and had been seen, and would be seen 
later, within countless radical/revolutionary movements across the globe.  From this we 
recounted how the African working people under white colonial rule themselves provided 
the tinder and sparks of armed rebellion in the various colonies.  Little in the first half of 
chapter one can be considered new information.  However, it is important to reemphasise 
the regional nature of what Vladimir Shubin has called the Hot Cold War.       
The second half of chapter one discussed the powerful reverberations of the Black 
Power Movement among and within many of the ALMs in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
Following the work of Seth Markle, this section of the chapter was grounded in the 
perspective of the Africans to show the resonance of Black Power among a number of 
armed decolonisation movements.  This is an area of research little explored by scholars of 
Black Power’s global reverberation and the ALMs.  It also demonstrated how the founding 
activists of SASO were not unique in their embrace of Black Power.  Many, if not all the 
liberation movements at some point in time positively engaged with Black Power.   
Moreover, as some liberation movement figures and African heads of state believed 
(and still believe) Black Power had/has little relevancy to revolutionary African struggles, 
this chapter argues the contrary.  Much of this belief stems from Black Power being 
interpreted, and often dismissed, as a movement primarily engaging in a politics of Black 
self-affirmation, identity politics, cultural nationalism (bordering on chauvinism), or 
economic independence.  For states and peoples where the majority are Black, this was and 
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still is considered to some as something of minor importance.  My research has shown this 
to not be true.  Stokely Carmichael, James Forman, and Kwame Nkrumah were clear that 
for African decolonisation Black Power was anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-racist, and 
for African unity worldwide.       
Tied to this was the importance of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination to the 
ALMs, another underexplored topic of what some scholars have called the Black 
International in the Long 1960s.889  In some ways, the concluding pages suggest King’s 
assassination validated Malcolm X’s 1964 warning to the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and fledging ALMs to be wary of becoming embedded in American capitalist 
relations.  In the early 1960s many ALMs and newly independent states wanted to be 
neutral or outright friendly with the United States.  They hoped to cultivate positive 
relations with the United States to use as a counter-weight to the European colonial powers.  
While they may have spoken in the language of decolonisation the Americans, Malcolm X 
warned, acted only in the spirit of racist exploitation and oppression.  By murdering Dr. 
King, this man of peace known and respected throughout the world, Black Power’s 
message, eloquently, if not arrogantly, delivered by Carmichael was heard with different 
ears.890   
Finally, the connection with Carmichael and Chris Hani’s critique of the liberation 
movements and ANC-SA/MK respectively demonstrates the similarity of the two radical 
traditions from across the Atlantic.  Hani and Carmichael, to our knowledge, had no contact 
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or knowledge of each other during this time.  Yet, their critiques were surprisingly similar 
and while the literature now, and internally inside the ANC-SA/MK after Morogoro, 
champion Hani as a reformer of the movement, the same acknowledgement has not been 
given to Carmichael.  This despite Tanzanian newspapers and a number of letters to the 
editors by people living in Tanzania, as well as the PAC, Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU), and the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) embracing 
his critique at the time.   
Furthermore, it is telling how similar the ANC-SA responded to both Hani and 
Carmichael, the former was imprisoned, had his membership stripped, and according to 
some was almost shot.  In the case of Carmichael, he was slammed in the media with 
seemingly no sensitivity to the ramifications a public rebuke of him would cause in the 
imperialist media.  How Hani was physically treated and how Carmichael was publicly 
denounced would preface how some in the ANC-SA/MK/SACP would react to the 
challenge of BCM and other insurgent voices in exile and in the camps.     
On this note, the next three chapters took us through the early years of BCM and 
followed revolutionaries within the movement who went into exile in 1973 to continue the 
fight against the apartheid regime through force of arms.  Chapter two focused on the links 
between BCM and Black Power, the early presence of the desire to embrace armed 
struggle, and the central role Black women played in building the movement.  Much in this 
chapter is already well-known to most scholars of BCM and the ANC-SA/PAC.  Where 
we tried to insert something new is in the realm of armed struggle and the understanding 
by many BCM activists that apartheid could only be overthrown if violence was used.  This 
guided the actions of many of BCM’s first converts such as Bokwe Mafuna and Keith 
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Mokoape who would later attempt to build such capabilities in exile when they felt their 
role in non-violent direct action had reached its limit.  Importantly, their desire to pick up 
arms against apartheid oppression came from the reality of the failure of the ANC-SA/MK 
and PAC/Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) to mount their own stated mission 
of overthrowing the apartheid state through force of arms by the early 1970s.          
The next two chapters chronicled the struggles and strivings of BCM activists to 
form an armed wing in exile, particularly in Botswana.  This task was far harder than 
initially imagined and while they were eventually able to coalesce around the Azanian 
Peoples Liberation Front (APLF), IRE, SAYRCO, and BCMA/AZANLA, wider events in 
the region and internal contradictions overtook them thus minimizing their potential to 
form a powerful alternative to the ANC-SA/MK.  Chapter three focused on the Bokwe 
Group/APLF as it grew from a handful of dedicated activists to an organisation with 
roughly, according to those involved, one-hundred cadres underground in Botswana.  By 
1975 they were able to acquire training in Libya and Syria as well as form tangible 
connections with youth organisations and independent cells inside South Africa.  They 
refused to be absorbed into the ANC-SA/MK because they wanted to form a broad united 
front along the lines of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).  While the ANC-
SA/MK refused this offer, the PAC/APLA accepted which was how they were able to 
obtain training in Libya and Syria.  Yet, the PAC/APLA was by this point, the mid-1970s, 
corrupt to its core.  They betrayed the APLF by seeking to re-route them to their own camps 
in Tanzania which caused a split between the two organisations.  The split was so damaging 
that eventually some APLF members like Welile Nhlapo and Tebogo Mafole left to join 
the ANC-SA/MK where they would prove central in the rebuilding of the MK after 1976. 
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The APLF was important for a few reasons despite disbanding in late 1976.  To 
begin with, it signalled the desire of militants inside South Africa who were impatient with 
consciousness-raising work, independent Black institution-building (e.g. the Black 
Community Programmes), and non-violent mobilisations against apartheid oppression to 
build an armed wing.  This is important to understand because it reveals BCM to be far 
more than a movement of elite intellectuals disconnected from the masses and unwilling to 
offer organised violent resistance against apartheid.  Furthermore, the BCM activists’ 
desire to build a guerrilla army in Botswana, close to the borders of South Africa, in ways 
not done by MK and APLA, opened a new war front the apartheid regime had to consider 
as it combated the liberation movement guerrillas.  Additionally, the international links 
they formed reemphasises the importance of global support of South African movements 
in their fight against white supremacy and capitalism in South Africa.     
Secondly, it shows that far from being a period of turmoil and uncertainty among 
South Africa’s liberation organisations, the early 1970s was a time of vibrant political 
activity and creativity among some, chiefly, BCM.  Often the history of the ANC-SA/MK 
and to a lesser extent the PAC/APLA dominates how we view various time-periods in 
South Africa’s struggle.  This engagement helps us move away from those narratives.  
Lastly, on a more sombre note, it revealed how both internal disagreements and rivalries 
between South African liberation movements hurt the overall fight against apartheid.  By 
failing to find meaningfully ways to cooperate or unite against the white colonial regime 
oppressing their people at home, resistance against the NP regime was weakened.        
Chapter four discussed attempts by BCM activists in exile to continue mobilising 
and organising an armed wing after the fall of the APLF.  The organisations which followed 
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such as the IRE, SAYRCO, and BCMA/AZANLA continued to reject the idea of uniting 
with the ANC-SA/MK.  They, like BCM at home, had their own independent vision of 
what an overthrow of apartheid would look like and, mostly importantly, had their own 
independent political praxis on how to organise themselves to fight apartheid.  The IRE, 
led by former APLF cadres like Charles Mthombeni and Musa Mdlalose, and new recruits 
like Vusi Mchunu, tried to continue the work of forming an armed wing in exile.  Tapping 
into earlier networks cultivated made with Palestinian organisations like the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and forging new connections with a number of 
underground European leftist groups, this new BCM formation also was able to acquire 
military training.   
While they were organising, Khotso Seatlholo and others separately formed 
SAYRCO out of a frustration with the lack of protection given to the South African 
students being shot by the apartheid police and army during the Soweto Uprising.  Less is 
known of them than others, but what we do know is they obtained training in Nigeria and 
were not in conflict with other BCM organisations like the IRE.  At the subsequent BCM 
conference in 1980 in London, they with the IRE and a number of other BCM groups 
agreed to form an umbrella organisation to unite themselves in exile.  From what we know 
SAYRCO and the IRE seemed to have no issues with Barney Pityana leaving the 
organisation during this process due to disagreements in vision.  Many at the conference 
felt Pityana wanted them to join the ANC-SA and Pityana felt these newer BCM activists 
were too influenced by Trotskyist elements.  In the wake of Pityana’s departure to join the 
ANC-SA, which shocked his good friend Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu in Botswana, the 
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BCMA was formed and a more open embrace of a Marxism-Leninism as a praxis offering 
some use to Black radicalism was signalled.           
At the same time, as the discussion of the IRE, SAYRCO, and BCMA shows, 
internal disagreements crippled this attempt at unity, something Mthombeni would lament 
thirty years later.  Especially as it pertained to the IRE and BCMA/AZANLA, when 
Mangena and Skaap Motsau came into exile in 1981 and 1983 respectively, an opportunity 
for sharing of skills and experience was lost.  Hard feelings and disagreements over 
organising pushed the IRE to disband while the capture of Seatlholo inside South Africa 
destroyed SAYRCO.  As for the BCMA/AZANLA, they grew in ways previous BCM 
formations in exile with armed wings had not.  They had a more centralised command 
structure while striving against repressive hierarchies.  By the late 1980s were successfully 
infiltrating armed groups into South Africa, particularly Bophuthatswana.  As the chapter 
closed, we argued that with the defeat of the apartheid forces in Cuito Cuanavale, the fall 
of the USSR, and other global changes, BCMA was overtaken by events. 
 These chapters take us beyond the borders of South Africa and tracks attempts by 
radical BCM activists to build guerrilla armies that would do what MK and Poqo/Azanian 
People’s Liberation Army (APLA) up to that point had not, work with the internal political 
struggles of the masses to overthrow the apartheid regime through the force of arms. The 
ANC-SA/MK and PAC/APLA were not the primary reasons why these formations failed 
in some of their attempts, yet, they did contribute to the hardship these cadres faced in their 
attempts to free their people from apartheid.  A spirit of competition instead of cooperation 
dominated ANC-SA and PAC thinking in exile which weakened the wider fight against 
apartheid.   
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For some, the argument running through chapters two, three, and four that BCM 
was a liberation movement on par with the ANC-SA and PAC during the early part of the 
1970s comes off as an overstatement.  If we were merely discussing the movement in exile 
alone and in a vacuum, this opinion would be valid.  However, as these chapters show, the 
internal strength of BCM was obvious, so much so that staunch allies of the ANC-SA like 
Sweden wanted to cut funding from the former to fund BCM.  This was not, according to 
my research, solely because BCM was in their eyes less violent.  It was, as Sellstrom has 
pointed out, based primarily on the situation in the country where the ANC-SA and PAC 
were simply not relevant to the growing anti-apartheid movement.   
Consequently, for this short period of time, BCM was the movement most radical 
activists passed through and embraced.  This internal strength, combined with growing 
attempts to form an armed wing, made it a liberation movement on par with the ANC-SA 
and PAC at this point in time.  That said, the question does come as to how we define what 
constitutes a liberation movement.  If we are counting representatives in foreign countries 
or state allies supplying arms and ammunition and training, then perhaps BCM does not 
qualify.  On the other hand, if we are talking about mass support inside South Africa, 
serious attempts to form an armed wing, cultivating global allies, then BCM qualifies as 
one.     
Chapters five and six on BCM and the ANC-SA/MK disturb traditional narratives 
by demonstrating how BCM was vital to the success of the organisation post-1976 while 
simultaneously being supressed.  Most critiques of the ANC-SA, and for that matter many 
of the liberation movements now in government, have incorrectly argued that these new 
political parties are little different from those they replaced.  Some like the once progressive 
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John Saul have gone as far to argue things have gotten worse with these governments in 
power as they never took class analysis seriously.891  Martin Legassick, considered the 
leader of the Marxist Workers Tendency in the ANC-SA, argues something similar, 
although he believes the organisation did not do enough to meld itself to the union 
movement.  He, thankfully, does not believe the struggle was a wasted effort.892  Stephen 
Ellis argues the repression the ANC-SA government currently exercises in South Africa is 
a result of them uncritically adopting the Stalinism and Stasi politics of the USSR and GDR 
respectively.  He is closer to Saul in his conclusions as he also centred the corruption of 
ANC-SA/MK leadership in exile to foreshadow to the corruption of the movement when 
it came to political power.893  Vladimir Shubin argues the USSR support was decisive in 
the ANC-SA’s success but did not control the movement as others claim.  The current 
problems experienced by the regime are no different than any radical movement that wins 
state power.894 
 None of these perspectives look to how Black radical politics were absorbed and 
suppressed within the ANC-SA/SACP/MK from the 1970s onward, hence, some of their 
narratives of this 1976 – 1985 time-period are incomplete.  Chapters five and six argues 
the ANC-SA rose to become the dominant movement in part through the incorporation of 
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BCM elements into its ranks, incorporating as shown Keith Mokoape, his group, and the 
APLF.  The ANC-SA suppressed as well, those who joined it and who had a different 
vision of how the struggle needed to be built and executed.  These cadres represented a 
political vision of freedom which centred structural changes in ANC-SA/MK to promote a 
more grassroots democracy and the redistribution of land to the Black masses.  These 
cadres were strongly influenced by BC praxis even if they did not directly participate in 
any of its key organisations. 
 These two chapters do not argue that those who joined the ANC-SA/MK/SACP 
represented a dilution of BC radicalism.  Keith Mokoape and Welile Nhlapo, to name a 
few, actually radicalised and enriched the ANC-SA/MK in ways that have not been 
discussed in any serious detail before.  Some like Omry Makgoale argue the ANC-
SA/MK/SACP enriched their political praxis by emphasising the importance of a class 
critique of oppression.  They, like others, were central to the resurgence MK experienced 
in the post-Soweto moment.  While some like Strike Thokoane of BCMA/AZANLA and 
Mthombeni of APLF/IRE saw their departures in a more negative light, it is clear from the 
evidence that cadres such as Mokoape and Nhlapo felt different.   
At the same time, there was an active suppression of BC ideas within MK.  This is 
clear and cannot be excused away by arguments pertaining to the reality of agents, 
saboteurs, and infiltrators.  These were of course real and their actions hurt the capabilities 
of MK in ways chapter six clearly discusses as it pertains to large number of units being 
killed just as they crossed the borders into South Africa.  Equally true were those who 
joined MK not fully understanding the level of commitment needed to be a full-time 
guerrilla.  Corrupt and misguided leadership was also a real and damaging reality faced by 
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many in the camps.  Nevertheless, none of this means some Black Consciousness adherents 
weren’t targeted by some in the ANC-SA/MK/SACP as something to be stamped out and 
distrusted.  As we saw with how Carmichael and Hani were treated in chapter one when 
they offered their criticisms, the ANC-SA/MK was fully capable of ruthless suppression 
against those who criticised them in unexpected ways.        
 These chapters also amplify the arguments of scholars like Raymond Suttner that 
there was much complexity in the intellectual fabric of the ANC-SA.  Chapter five clearly 
shows how Acting-President Oliver Tambo and many ANC-SA cadres embraced BC and 
Black Power thinking in its early years.  It also tracks a number of BCM activists like Keith 
Mokoape who joined the ANC-SA/MK (after much hardship), found comfortable political 
homes, and contributed decisively to the growth and radicalisation of the ANC-SA/MK.  
At the same time, there as was a constant shifting of political opinions and positions by the 
ANC-SA that often contradicted their earlier positions.   
Tambo, for example, was very flexible in his embrace of Black radicalism.  In the 
early 1970s he like many in the ANC-SA seemed to openly embrace the importance of 
Black Power and BC to South Africa’s struggle against apartheid.  By the mid-1970s there 
was a shift against BCM, more than likely due to the alliance of the APLF and PAC for the 
former to obtain military training.  As the Soweto Uprising erupted and it became clear the 
ANC-SA and PAC had no serious role in its organisation or political praxis, unlike Black 
Consciousness as it pertains to the praxis, there is again even more hostility.  This increased 
when Tsietsi Mashinini and Seatlholo went into exile and denounced the ANC-SA as being 
an ineffective organisation.  By the mid-1980s, Tambo in an interview with the Cape Times 
claims whites claimed also be considered politically Black when in the early 1970s he 
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rejected this position.  Throughout this Alfred Nzo, the Secretary-General of the ANC-SA, 
seemed the most politically honest in his rejection of BCM having any serious role in the 
fight against apartheid.  He often openly denounced them as puppets of the apartheid 
regime and a hindrance to the larger struggle despite briefly backtracking after Steve Biko’s 
murder in prison.  Others feared BCM cadres who joined the ANC-SA/MK would take 
their positions of authority.  Taken together, there was much fluidity, both productive and 
destructive, as it pertained to the ANC-SA’s relationship with BCM.      
 These contradictions, especially as it pertains to Black Nationalist praxis within 
African Liberation Movements, which my dissertation has uncovered, is something future 
research must go.  One can accept organisations like the ANC-SA, SWAPO, Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), MPLA and others as the dominant movements 
against oppressive regimes who offered a progressive/radical vision of the future while also 
being critical of how they treated other radical groups with different visions.  At one point, 
the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was seen as the radical organisation in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe due to their avowed embrace of Marxism-Leninism over ZANU 
which was more Maoist (and non-incidentally Black Power).  This is the contradiction 
inadequately illuminated in histories of the liberation struggles where essentially Black 
Nationalist organisations are disregarded as being revolutionary.   
This is not to say some of the distrust was unfounded.  In Angola, the União 
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) initially adopted the language of 
Black Power to frame themselves as the more organic representatives of the Black 
population against the mestizos and communists who ran the MPLA.  For FRELIMO in 
1969, Uria Simango similarly adopted some of the language of Black Nationalism in how 
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he framed his own expulsion from the organisation after he lost out in a power struggle 
with Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos.  In South Africa the PAC was, for a time 
for the larger Pan-African world, considered to be the most revolutionary South African 
organisation.  However, as the Potlako Leballo rose to power combined with their inability 
to receive secure financial backing from the socialist bloc with the exception of China, the 
PAC became a destructive force in the fight against apartheid.  Similar narratives can be 
sketched with SWAPO and the South West African National Union (SWANU).  Often, 
especially in his later years, Black Nationalists like Stokely Carmichael, who would later 
become Kwame Ture, wrongly and damagingly supported some of these formations and 
repressive states (Sekou Toure of Guinea-Conakry and Idi Amin of Uganda for example) 
over more radical formations who did not centre Black Nationalism.        
 Yet, this dissertation argues these represent, especially in the case of UNITA, 
Leballo’s PAC, and Simango, counter-revolutionary trends within Black Nationalism.  
Through an exploration of Black Power and BCM, we can see the potential revolutionary 
Black Nationalism held for the liberation of southern Africa from colonial rule.  Seen in 
this perspective, the ANC-SA/MK can be both anti-apartheid, socialist, and radical as well 
as repressive and oppressive to other Black radical trends.  Apartheid was, and still is, the 
enemy in the shadows and in the open, however, for BCM in exile it wasn’t the force 
directly hindering and/or repressing them, the ANC-SA and PAC were.  It is a sad fact, and 
painful one indeed, but a true one nevertheless.   
At the same time, the deeper argument calls for us to understand that given the 
immense power, global support, and brutality of the apartheid regime, the ANC-SA/MK 
and some elements of the PAC began to adopt certain tendencies of the oppressive 
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structures they faced.  As the conflict raged on for decades with no ending in sight, 
combined with the strictly hierarchical structures these organisations adopted where most 
of those in the top leadership in the 1960s were still in power in the 1980s, they became 
vulnerable to this kind of transformation.  It seems in the case of the ANC-SA/MK and 
elements of the SACP (which notably had a more fluid changing of leadership structures 
than the ANC-SA) many became so stuck in fighting apartheid they considered those who 
didn’t adopt their vision of how the struggle needed to be executed, and indeed seemed to 
briefly threaten their hegemony over the opposition to apartheid, became constructed as an 
enemy.  This hurt not only BCM organisations and BC inspired activists in exile, but the 
wider struggle against apartheid rule.  It also confused activists at home who unlike those 
in exile, at least in the 1970s, had a rich and productive relationship with one another across 
organisations and some ideological spectrums.  Biko himself sacrificed his life trying to 
bring unity to the warring organisations in exile and his loss, as well as countless others, 
might have been avoided had organisations like the ANC-SA/MK done a better job 
managing their relationships with BCM organisations.   
Postscript: Musings on Contemporary Implications 
In closing, this has implications for ANC-SA politics today, for the first time in its 
history in 2017 the two front runners for the Presidency of the organisation came from 
BCM backgrounds.895  Both were intimately involved in SASO before joining the ANC-
SA and it should not be surprising from an age standpoint that these will be the new faces 
of ANC-SA leadership going forward.  More so than age, the ANC-SA has had to respond 
                                                          
895 ‘Ramaphosa, Dlamini Zuma in Tight Race to Lead ANC’, Eye Witness News (December 14th, 2017), 
available at http://ewn.co.za/2017/12/16/ramaphosa-dlamini-zuma-in-tight-race-to-lead-south-africa-s-
ruling-anc .  
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to the critiques of the masses of its country who are still living in an apartheid constructed 
political economy and culture.  Organisations like the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 
and Black First, Land First (BLF) have been quick to capture the simmer anger of the Black 
masses at this continued state of affairs.  Now, we see the ANC-SA slowly, but very clearly, 
embracing this new political culture as Cyril Ramaphosa, the new billionaire President, has 
declared land redistribution efforts will be accelerated.896  They will need to do all they can 
because with the 2018 elections for President approaching, there are real fears of the ANC-
SA losing its majority which would force it for the first time in its history to have to enter 
into a coalition government with other political parties.   
In addition to the ANC-SA in power, this line of thinking holds an important key 
to understanding the powerful social movements rising across South Africa.897  Movements 
such as Abahlali baseMjondolo, #RhodesMustFall, #FeesMustFall, and countless others 
have signalled the intent of the Black masses to re-engage with some of the Black Radical 
Traditions in South Africa.898  For them, heroes like Robert Sobukwe, Steve Biko, Chris 
Hani, and Winnie Mandela in particular have become symbols of the type of leadership 
millions of Black South Africans seek to return to.  In the Cabralian sense, they are 
returning to the source.899  Moreover, the non-hierarchical organizing strategies, the 
rejection of charismatic leadership (although this is uneven), and incorporation (also 
                                                          
896 ‘Ramaphosa vows faster land redistribution’, ENCA (March 15th, 2018), available at 
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/ramaphosa-vows-faster-land-redistribution . 
897 What follows has been heavily inspired by the following piece, L. Naidoo, ‘Contemporary student politics 
in South Africa: The rise of the black-led student movements of #RhodesMustFall and #FeeMustFall in 
2015’, in A. Heffernan and N. Nieftagodien, eds., Students Must Rise: Youth Struggle in South Africa before 
and beyond Soweto ’76 (Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2016), pp. 180-190. 
898 N. Gibson, ‘Upright and free: Fanon in South Africa, from Biko to the shackdwellers’ movement (Abahlali 
baseMjondolo)’, Social Identities, 14, 6 (2008), pp. 683-715. 




uneven) of the race, class, gender, and sexual orientation questions into conceptions of 
revolutionary change mark these movements as unique to South Africa.  In this, they share 
a common link with their comrades across the Atlantic in the more radical wings of the 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement.  One of the reasons this dissertation has striven to 
be as detailed as possible in its renditions of BCM and armed struggle is because I organize 
with cadres on both sides of the Atlantic who want to know as much as possible about this 
period in history.   
 This dissertation has also been detailed because, although it has been heart-
warming to see this return to BCM, it has been heart-breaking to see the dogged presence 
of sexism, homophobia, transphobia, and toxic masculinity plaguing the current 
movements.900  Many have uncritically taken what Biko or Sobukwe said and used it to 
animate their contemporary praxis.  While they are correct to return to these silenced 
voices, they damage their current movements by doing so uncritically.  Hence, the attempt 
whenever possible to centre the praxis of Black women and offer a committed critique of 
the movement.  RMF and FMF have emerged within the global #BlackLivesMatter 
moment which is a political movement founded by three Black Queer women: Alicia 
Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi.901  They, and many more, have opened a space 
for others across the globe, like the recently assassinated Brazilian Black lesbian radical 
                                                          
900 In this, I have not been immune as my acknowledgements pointed out.  I have had to grow in ways as a 
hetero-cis male that I believe in previous eras I would not have had to, especially as it pertains to my 
awareness around my own patriarchy and toxic masculinity.  Moreover, the discussions around mental health 
have also enriched my own political rubic of revolution and for that these contemporary struggles have gone 
further than the ANC-SA, BCM, SWAPO, Black Panther Party, and countless others.   
901 A. Garza, ‘A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement’, Feminist Wire (October 7, 2014), available 
at http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/; L. Naidoo, ‘Contemporary Student Politics 
in South Africa: The rise of the black-led student movements of #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall in 
2015’, in A. Heffernan and N. Nieftagodien, eds., Students Must Rise: Youth Struggle in South Africa before 
and beyond Soweto ’76 (Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2016), pp. 180-190. 
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activist Marielle Franco, to be heard more clearly as they mobilise the masses against the 
multi-headed hydra that is capitalism.  They come from a tradition of activists like Barbara 
Smith of the Combahee River Collective and Ella Baker, the founding mind of the Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).      
Similar activists and organisations exist in the political constellation of South 
Africa’s hidden past and emergent struggles.  My generation needs to return to the source 
of this Black Radical Tradition, so coined by Cedric Robinson, in order to enrich our 
current strivings in southern Africa against Babylon in blackface, who are little more than 
overseers on the global plantation the capitalist world-economy has enslaved human life 
under.902  If we are to overthrow its keepers and remake society anew all of us, myself 
included, must do more to incorporate into our political praxis the revolutionary work of 






                                                          
902 C. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill, University of 
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